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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides an outline for how we should think of the ethics of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) by giving sense to what it means to treat 
an NGO as a moral agent. That is, it aims to answer the following question: 
Which special moral obligations do NGOs have in virtue of the distinctive type 
of organisation that they are?  In brief, the answer provided by this thesis is 
that NGO agency is defined by the multiple relationships that threaten to 
undermine its unity. Obligations are identified as what an NGO must do in 
order to maintain such a unified organisational self. 
In Chapter 1, I define an NGO as an autonomous, norm-enacting organisation 
not motivated by profit and reliant on voluntary interaction. The idea of NGOs 
as unique agents is then developed indirectly in the middle four chapters. 
Each chapter engages with a central topic pertaining to NGO ethics, arguing 
for a particular position with respect to the topics of accountability (Chapter 
2), resource allocation (Chapter 3), contributions to domestic and global 
justice (Chapter 4), and NGOs’ impact on the viability of universal welfare 
rights (Chapter 5). The second task performed by each chapter is the 
identification of a particular ability, or power, possessed by NGOs as agents.  
These four abilities characterise the moral agency of an NGO and form the 
basis for identifying four types of NGO obligation: 1) accountability, 2) acting 
consistently with organisational norms, 3) demonstration of positive social 
change, and 4) epistemic procedural virtue. In Chapter 6 I produce a basic 
framework for NGOs to use as a way of assessing themselves with respect to 
these four obligations. This framework is then connected to the findings from 
a 10-month qualitative research project, conducted from 2007-2008, on the 
ethical perspectives of NGO workers in Mongolia. 
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Taking ourselves seriously means that we are not prepared to accept 
ourselves just as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our 
choices, and our behaviour to make sense. We are not satisfied to think 
that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by 
transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to 
direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing 
ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. 
We want to get things right. 
 
Harry Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right 
 
 
UFC is just so big. And, what, we target indirectly 50% of the population 
here. And we can have a huge impact. So I guess we’re trying to get it 
right too. That responsibility to—you know, we have so many 
resources—let’s get it right. 
 
INGO worker, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 
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INTRODUCTION  
Consider three stories of change: 
In the period between 1796—1805, British slavers traded an average of 50,000 slaves 
per annum, the greatest level in the 300-year history of Britain’s slave trade.1 Yet, in 
1808, this number dropped to zero with the abolishment of the slave trade.2 Within 15 
years, public opinion shifted from an acceptance of slavery as an entrenched 
institution to a rejection of the practice as “an Evil so derogatory to the dignity of 
Christianity and the true interests of a people who value themselves on their 
sentiments of Liberty.”3 Within another 15 years, slavery was abolished entirely. 
Until the late 1970s, driving while intoxicated did not incur serious social or legal 
sanction in the United States. In the 1980s, the enforcement and severity of 
punishment for impaired driving increased significantly. Here again, public opinion 
had shifted to support the implementation of new, stricter legislation. One 
consequence of these changes was a 49% decrease in the number of deaths caused by 
drunk driving in the U.S. between 1980 and 2009.4 
The Mt. Makiling Forest Preserve is one of the most significant ecosystems remaining 
in the Philippines. By 1960, 45% of the preserve had been logged and appropriated for 
farmland and settlements.5 A decades-long engagement that provided livelihood 
assistance to forest dwellers, and granted access to forest resources in exchange for a 
commitment to principles of conservation, resulted in the reforestation of 45 hectres 
and a significant increase in biodiversity.6 Mt. Makiling is today considered a prime 
example of successful locally-based forest management.7 
 
                                                 
1
 Eltis et al., Slave Trade Database. 
2
 Drescher (2009); C. Brown (2006); Hochschild (2005). 
3
 C. Brown (2006, p. 412). 
4
 Century Council (2010). 
5
 Duthy & Bolo-Duthy (2003, p. 23). 
6
 Ibid.; Lasco, et al. (2001). 
7
 Duthy & Bolo-Duthy (2003); Lasco, et al. (2001); Chokkalingham (2006, chp. 2). 
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These disparate changes in the areas of economics, social policy, and 
environment share a common feature: they were realised largely through the 
activities of groups that have come to be known today as non-governmental 
organisations, or NGOs. British abolitionism was propelled at the turn of the 
19th century by the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade8 and 
several women’s societies, which were instrumental in organising mass 
boycotts of slave-grown sugar.9 It was the NGO, Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD), that Senator John Danforth spoke of when explaining how 
significant changes in drunk driving legislation and enforcement had come 
about during the 1980s: “This organization has made the public realize that 
drunk driving is not a victimless crime. This change in public attitude has 
made it possible for those of us in Congress and in state legislatures to pass 
stronger drunk driving laws.”10 And NGOs were the actors credited with 
fuelling the community-based approach to forest protection and reforestation 
that was integral to the successful conservation of the Mt. Makiling Forest 
Preserve.11  
Those who work for NGOs aim to improve the world they inhabit. They 
pursue this aim through the collectively-created identity of an organisation 
defined by a set of values. In virtue of these characteristics, one of the classic 
monikers associated with NGOs is that of the “do-gooder.”12 But the label can 
be a curse as much as a compliment when NGOs are perceived as failing to live 
up to this reputation.13 For example, INGOs14 assisting victims of the 2004 
tsunami in Southeast Asia came under fire for what many observers felt was a 
                                                 
8
 This group arose out of joint discussions between the Society of Friends (Quakers) in the 
U.S. and U.K., but later included non-Quaker participants. See: Drescher (2009, p. 151); C. 
Brown (2008, chp. 7). 
9
 Hochschild (2005, p. 327); Drescher (2009, pp. 220-1). 
10
 McCarthy & Ziliak (1990, p. 1223). 
11
 Duthy & Bolo-Duthy (2003). 
12
 Fisher (1997). 
13
 Ibid.; Gibelman & Gelman (2004). 
14
 In this thesis, INGOs are regarded as a type of NGO, with differences between INGOs and 
domestic NGOs discussed where relevant. 
13 
 
mismanaged humanitarian effort that wasted funds and lacked sufficient 
coordination.15 Greenpeace’s successful campaign against plans to sink the 
Brent Spar oil rig off the U.K. coastline in 1995 was marred by the later 
revelation that their estimates of the oil on the rig were 55 times greater than 
the actual amount.16 INGOs advocating a change in the policies of the World 
Bank, IMF, and WTO have long been criticised for their own perceived lack of 
accountability.17 
NGOs’ successes in achieving change highlight their power as social actors. At 
the same time, their perceived failures highlight questions about the moral 
justification of this power and what we can expect of such organisations. 
Together, the successes and failures of NGOs indicate the importance of 
exploring their ethical status and obligations.  
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the moral 
obligations of NGOs. Its central claim is that such an understanding cannot be 
reached without an account of the moral agency of NGOs. An attempt to 
formulate a set of NGO obligations or guiding principles without attention to 
what characterises them as agents will fail to provide a full justification for the 
relevance of such requirements. This is because consideration of what NGOs 
ought to do, with respect to whom, and how, are necessarily grounded in a 
perspective on the kind of agents NGOs are.   
We can illustrate the importance of agency by considering three main 
perspectives through which the topic of NGO ethics is currently 
problematized. These are:  
                                                 
15
 Ossewaarde, et. al (2008, pp. 48-51); Logister (2007); Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006). 
16
 Schoon, N. (1995 Sept 6).  Greenpeace’s Brent Spar Apology. The Independent, p. 16. 
17
 The Economist (2000 Jan 21) “The Sins of the Secular Missionaries”; (2000 Sept 23) “Angry 
and Effective”; (2011 Jan 27) “Does anyone here speak NGO-ish?” See also Slim (2002). 
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(1) The perspective of the third sector and development literatures on the 
role and value of NGOs.  
(2) The views on INGOs by moral and political philosophers working on 
topics pertaining to justice and obligations of assistance. 
(3) The growing practical scrutiny of the justifiability and value of NGO 
activity by donors, governments, media, and the public. 
 
(1) The perspective of the third sector and development literatures on the role 
and value of NGOs.  
After ten years of positive characterisation, in the mid-1990s NGOs as research 
subjects began to be treated with greater scepticism within the fields of third 
sector/civil society research, political science, and development studies.18 This 
critical stance has now become dominant, especially for NGOs engaged in 
development.19 Much of this criticism stems from the perception that 
researchers had initially studied NGOs with too much optimism regarding 
their comparative effectiveness, their significance as social actors, and their 
ability to fulfil or promote certain values and norms.20  
Taking a more realistic approach to the study of NGOs has led to an emphasis 
on three main normative issues.21 First, a large sub-literature on empowerment 
and participatory methodology has emerged from the view that NGOs ought 
to address power imbalances and ownership issues within their relationships 
                                                 
18
 Lewis & Opoku-Mensah (2006); Bebbington, et al. (2007). 
19
 See, for example: Tvedt (2002; 2005); Chandhoke (2005); Bebbington, et al. (2007); Lewis 
(2005); Hilhorst (2005); Seckinelgin (2006). 
20
 Bebbington, et al. (2007); Lewis (2005). 
21
 Topics of research within the NGO literature are heavily influenced by current trends and 
issues pertaining to NGO practice; thus, the significance of these three topics was largely due 
to the attention they were receiving by donors and NGOs themselves. 
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to “beneficiaries,” that is, those targeted by their projects.22 Second, 
accountability has been addressed as a major issue for NGOs, with a central 
question being what model and mechanisms of accountability are most 
suitable for NGOs. Answers to this question range widely, from technical 
processes of reporting and accounting, to democratic modes of internal 
decision-making, or detailed self-regulation schemes. Finally, NGO 
effectiveness has risen to the fore in recent years, as several donors and 
academics have argued that performance measurement ought to be the 
primary standard used in identifying “good” NGOs.23  
These are normative issues insofar as their discussion has involved a deep 
examination of the value of participatory methods, accountability, and 
performance for NGOs.24 Rarely, however, are these topics addressed as truly 
ethical questions. When prescriptions are offered, they are couched in terms 
of organisational strategy or pragmatic choice, rather than as a matter of what 
NGOs are morally prohibited from doing or are required to do.25 
This pragmatic perspective is embodied most strongly in discussions of NGO 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is the fundamental normative issue that underpins the 
discussion of participatory methods, accountability mechanisms, and 
                                                 
22
 The term “beneficiaries” has fallen out of favour with some, as it is taken to imply a 
relationship in which the NGO worker sees herself as providing benefits to a passive recipient. 
My view is that the alternatives, such as “client” or “participant” or “target group,” entail 
equally questionable assumptions. One might specify what is meant by opting for the term 
“intended beneficiaries,” but this is cumbersome. Throughout the thesis I therefore simply use 
the term “beneficiary” as a technical term, not as a claim that NGOs in every instance provide 
benefits to those targeted by their projects.  
23
 Ebrahim & Rangan (2010). 
24
 See, for example: Cooke & Kothari (2001); Jordan & van Tuijl (2006); Ebrahim (2007); 
Ebrahim & Rangan (2010). 
25
 The notable exceptions that make explicit reference to the ethical aspects of NGO work on 
the ethical dimensions of NGO work are: Taylor (1996); Atack (1999); Slim (1997; 2002). While 
Slim (2002) offers some substantive suggestions on accountability, much of this work engages 
in taxonomising or theorizing ethical issues for NGOs rather than offering specific solutions or 
answers. For example, Kantian and consequentialist approaches to ethics are described by 
Taylor (1996) and Slim (1997), but presented as different viewpoints the NGO can opt to use at 
its discretion. 
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improved performance: all three are cited as ways in which an NGO can 
legitimise itself. However, NGO scholarship tends to use a descriptive, instead 
of normative, conception of legitimacy: an NGO is legitimate insofar as others 
actually perceive (or believe) it to be justified in doing what it does.26 This 
means legitimation can pose a significant operational challenge when different 
stakeholders demand different things from an NGO. In order to achieve 
legitimacy, it is argued, NGOs must attempt to navigate competing and 
contradictory sets of expectations, a task that in some cases seems 
impossible.27 
An account of an NGO’s moral agency can help resolve these issues by 
providing the basis for a normative account of NGO legitimacy. Others’ 
expectations regarding what NGOs should be or do may be wildly inaccurate 
or unjustifiable. For example, it is not clear that emergency aid NGOs such as 
MSF should lose legitimacy if they concentrate on a fast distribution of life-
saving care over processes of empowerment. While a descriptive conception of 
legitimacy explains the conflicts and tensions NGOs experience in attempting 
to meet the varied expectations of different stakeholders, a set of moral 
standards for NGO activities, supported by argument, gives these 
organisations an essential tool for resolving these conflicts. Armed with an 
account of what can be justifiably expected of them, NGOs can better respond 
to criticisms and questions regarding their legitimacy.  
 
 
                                                 
26
 Descriptive legitimacy is often contrasted with the normative conception of legitimacy more 
commonly found in political philosophy. The former refers to the perception of 
appropriateness, while the latter refers to a set of standards that justifies a set of powers 
exercised by an agent, or, in other words, establishes the “right to rule.” See: Beetham (1991); 
also Lister (2003); Vedder (2007). 
27
 Vedder (2007, p. 207); Lister (2003); Ossewaarde, et al. (2008); Logister (2008). 
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(2) The views on INGOs by moral and political philosophers working on topics 
pertaining to justice and obligations of assistance. 
Until recently, non-governmental organisations received little attention within 
moral and political philosophy. Political philosophy of the 1980s and 90s, 
heavily influenced by the work of John Rawls, focused on the concepts of 
justice and legitimacy as these pertained to the state. As voluntary 
organisations, NGOs qualify as “associations,” a type of organisation Rawls and 
those who followed him explicitly excluded from the domain regulated by 
principles of justice.28  
One might have expected to see NGOs attract greater attention in the field of 
applied ethics, which emerged during this same period as a prominent area of 
research within moral theory. However, no body of literature comparable to 
the work on bioethics, business ethics, or animal welfare developed around 
NGOs. The closest attention they received during this time was through Peter 
Singer’s (1972) influential argument for obligations of assistance to the poor, 
which drew attention to the work of Oxfam International and similar 
organisations. However, since Singer’s focus was on persuading individuals in 
the developed world to donate to NGOs, little attention was given to their 
inner workings or ethical obligations.  
These matters have begun to change, due largely to the important debates 
concerning global justice and the moral imperatives elicited by the persistence 
of severe poverty. While institutional reform tends to be the favoured solution 
for rectifying global injustice, INGOs are seen as providing an opportunity for 
important medium-term assistance that can reduce suffering and improve the 
                                                 
28
 Rawls (1971, p. 409; 1993, pp. 40-43). 
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livelihoods of the global poor.29 They are also cited by some as possible players 
in bringing about long-term institutional reform.30 
The influence of the ethics of poverty on philosophical approaches to NGOs is 
reflected in the three volumes that currently constitute the bulk of 
philosophical thinking on NGO ethics. All three focus on the ethical 
challenges and problems faced by INGOs working on emergency relief or 
development aid.31 Many contributions to these volumes take a situation- or 
principle-based perspective to NGO ethics, classifying the field in terms of 
types of situations or decisions NGO staff face in their work. In these cases, 
the “NGO” in NGO ethics takes a back seat to a general moral analysis, and 
consideration of the NGO as a special type of moral actor is not given 
significant attention. Elsewhere, others have attempted to work INGOs into a 
framework of justice, arguing that the international aid system constitutes a 
“basic structure,”32 or that we ought to take more seriously “non-ideal” 
theories of justice in which INGOs can play a significant role.33 The most 
widespread perspective, however, is that INGO obligation ought to be 
understood through the obligations of their affluent donors.34 INGOs are the 
“executors of the obligations of their contributors and supporters” and, 
therefore, are “constrained by the content of the obligations in question.”35 
Either implicitly or explicitly, these discussions of NGO ethics rely on premises 
concerning their roles and morally relevant functions. A more direct 
                                                 
29
 For example, see Pogge (2005a; 2005b). 
30
 O’Neill (2001). 
31
 Bell & Coicaud (2007); Horton & Roche (2010). Both of these volumes were the products of 
separate workshops held between philosophers and NGO practitioners who then contributed 
chapters based on these dialogues. Illingworth, et al. (2011) also features contributions from 
multiple disciplines and includes several chapters on NGOs, though its overall theme is the 
ethics of philanthropy.  
32
 Rubenstein (2009). 
33
 Fuller (2006). Also O’Neill (2001)’s idea of INGOs as secondary agents of justice could fit this 
description. 
34
 Horton & Roche (2010); Pogge (2007a); Wenar (2006); Illingworth, et al. (2011). 
35
 Horton & Roche (2010, p. 220). 
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examination of NGO agency can be useful here, as it would allow us to work 
out which roles are most relevant to an NGO’s obligations. Are INGOs indeed 
agents of justice? Or are they simply a group of individuals free to select and 
pursue their aims as they please, so long as they do so lawfully?36 Should they 
be understood as agents acting on behalf of their contributors, or as agents 
acting on behalf of the poor? Or as a broker between the two? Without an 
argument for how NGOs ought to be understood as moral agents, the 
principles and obligations elicited by a particular account can be rejected by 
those who disagree fundamentally with the characterisation of NGO agency 
upon which they are based. 
 
(3) The growing practical scrutiny of the justifiability and value of NGO activity 
by donors, governments, media and the public. 
Finally, outside of academia, NGOs increasingly face scrutiny and criticism by 
their donors, members of the public, and sometimes even the intended 
beneficiaries of their projects. Organisations focused on aid and emergency 
relief are regularly entrusted with large pools of resources, prompting 
concerns over NGO executive pay, the lack of sufficient performance 
measurement, and the perceived mismanagement of funds in humanitarian 
emergencies.37 Advocacy-focused NGOs enjoy access to the processes of policy 
making at both the domestic and global levels. The powers that they wield, 
however, are often informal and difficult to concretely identify, making it 
unclear who can make claims on an NGO, for what, and on what grounds. 
Publications such as The Economist have been particularly outspoken critics of 
such organisations, contending that they advocate policies that are not in the 
best interest of the global poor, that they are wasteful and too dependent upon 
                                                 
36
 Charnovitz (2005). 
37
 Gibelman & Gelman (2004). 
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governments for their funding, and that they use a lexicon of vague buzzwords 
to justify and guide their work.38 
Part of what makes these criticisms so difficult for NGOs to respond to is that 
there is no broad consensus as to what can be justifiably demanded of them. 
This connects to the previous two points: an account of what NGOs ought to 
do must explain why a set of obligations or principles is relevant to an NGO, 
or, more strongly, why it has normative force for such organisations.  
Reaching a better understanding of NGO moral agency is, therefore, a timely 
aspiration, as the topic of NGO ethics cannot adequately be addressed without 
considering what kind of agent an NGO is. Such considerations are morally 
relevant, as they reflect how an NGO relates to others in ways that can 
impinge upon its rights and responsibilities.  
In pursuing an account of NGO moral agency, this thesis takes as a starting 
assumption the view that collective agents can and do exist, and that they can 
be held morally responsible.39 My aim here is not to explore the intricacies of 
the nature of collective agency, but to examine how an NGO’s collective 
agency differs from that of the state, the corporation, other civil society 
organisations, and international institutions of economic policy and 
governance. 
With that in mind, Chapter 1 begins with the question, ‘What is an NGO?’ 
There, I provide an empirical definition of an NGO as an autonomous, norm-
enacting organisation not motivated by profit and reliant on voluntary 
interaction. This empirical definition gives an idea of the type of organisation 
to which this thesis applies, and also forms the basis for a theoretical 
definition of NGO agency. I argue that, in virtue of the five empirical features 
                                                 
38
 See above, ff. 17. 
39
 For a detailed account of the possibility of group agents, and of holding them morally 
responsible, see Pettit (2003); List & Pettit (2010). 
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above, NGOs are distinguishable from other types of actor by their reliance on 
multi-party collaborative activity for the exercise of their agency. Specifically, 
this collaborative activity is shaped by the other parties’ perceptions of the 
NGO as norm-enacting, that is, as identifying and justifying its activities 
through moral rules. This serves as the theoretical definition of an NGO: while 
states, corporations, other civil society organisations, religious institutions and 
individuals engage in types of collaborative activity that overlap with those of 
an NGO (e.g. provision of goods or services, joint voluntary action centred on 
a shared value), only NGOs utilise multiple types of activity with actors that 
perceive them to be norm-enacting.   
The idea of NGOs as unique agents is then developed indirectly in the 
remaining chapters. The middle chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 may be read as 
performing two tasks. Each chapter engages with a central topic pertaining to 
NGO ethics, arguing for a particular position with respect to the topics of 
accountability (Chapter 2), resource allocation (Chapter 3), contributions to 
domestic and global justice (Chapter 4), and NGOs’ impact on the viability of 
universal welfare rights (Chapter 5). The second task performed by each 
chapter is the identification of a particular ability, or power, possessed by 
NGOs as agents.  
As I argue at the end of Chapter 5, and summarise in the interlude preceding 
Chapter 6, these four abilities characterise the moral agency of an NGO and 
form the basis for identifying four types of NGO obligation: 1) accountability, 
2) acting consistently with organisational norms, 3) demonstration of positive 
social change, and 4) epistemic procedural virtue. In Chapter 6 I produce a 
basic framework for NGOs to use as a way of assessing themselves with respect 
to these four obligations. This framework is then connected to the findings 
from a 10-month qualitative research project, conducted from 2007-2008, on 
the ethical perspectives of NGO workers in Mongolia.  
I will now describe the main points of each chapter in greater detail. 
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In Chapter 2, I examine the concept of accountability, one of the most 
common normative requirements applied to NGOs. Both academics, such as 
Leif Wenar (2006), and NGO practitioners have largely considered 
accountability to consist in a set of control mechanisms that are valuable only 
in so far as they contribute to further goals such as effectiveness or improved 
public trust. Opposing this view, I argue that accountability can have intrinsic 
value for an NGO, and outline a conception of accountability as the 
responsibility to create opportunities for the moral appraisal of oneself by 
others.  
The need for accountability is triggered, I argue, by an NGO’s ability to affect 
the abilities of other agents to act and pursue their own goals and projects. 
Some contend that NGOs do not need to be accountable to corporations or 
states whose harmful activities they attempt to limit. Against this, I argue that, 
if we understand accountability as a form of moral appraisal instead of as an 
evaluation coupled with the ability to sanction, then NGOs can indeed be 
accountable—even to those with whom they have an adversarial 
relationship—without exposing themselves to material loss or punishment. 
Moreover, this form of accountability possesses value for an NGO as an end in 
itself, as it is constitutive of the relationships that comprise an NGO’s own 
agency. 
In Chapter 3, I examine Thomas Pogge’s assessment of the moral priorities of 
INGOs engaged in relief and development. Pogge has argued forcefully that 
the current global distribution of wealth and resources is unjust, on the basis 
that it has been created, and is sustained, through rules and institutions that 
impose severe deprivation on the global poor to the benefit of citizens of 
affluent nations. He outlines several institutional reforms that can alter the 
global system to better realise the demands of justice. However, in the 
meantime, he believes that individuals reaping the benefits generated by this 
global injustice owe compensation to the global poor for their part in 
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supporting the institutions that violate the latter’s negative rights.  The 
primary means by which private citizens can provide this compensation is 
through donations to INGOs. These considerations, Pogge argues, support the 
conclusion that INGOs have a moral obligation to systematically prioritise 
certain projects over others.40 He then contends that these priorities should be 
directed by a consequentialist concern for maximising cost-effective harm 
reduction. 
I argue in Chapter 3 that Pogge’s approach to INGO moral priorities is 
multiply flawed. First, his deontic argument for the obligation to assist is in 
tension with his consequentialist principle for the guidance of INGO resource 
allocation. The consequentialist principle can direct INGOs away from helping 
those most seriously harmed by unjust global institutions, as the latter may 
suffer from harm that cannot be reduced cost-effectively. Second, Pogge’s 
claim that INGOs act as intermediary agents for their donors is not sufficient 
to ground a transfer of obligation from donor to INGO simply via a transfer of 
funds. Unless the INGO makes a promise to the donor, it is under no 
obligation to spend the donation in a manner that provides a maximally 
effective fulfilment of the donor’s obligation. Drawing on the discussion from 
Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that Pogge’s view of INGOs as intermediary agents 
incorrectly assumes an economic model of agency, in which NGOs are 
generally compared to private companies acting on behalf of shareholders. I 
argue that this model of agency is inadequate because, as discussed in the 
previous two chapters, the economic model of agency ignores some of an 
NGO’s relationships and distorts others. 
As an alternative, I argue that the particular abilities an NGO draws on in its 
relationships should serve as the basis for considering their obligations. As an 
example, I discuss Pogge’s problem of the “discriminating contributor”—what 
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an NGO ought to do when faced with a potential contribution from a racist 
individual—and argue that the relevant ability here is an organisation’s power 
for altering the moral beliefs of others and creating new norms. To the extent 
that an NGO relies on this ability for the exercise of its agency, it ought not to 
engage in collaborations, such as the acceptance of funding, with actors that 
espouse values inconsistent with those the NGO advocates. 
Chapter 4 engages with the statist positions of Thomas Nagel (2005) and 
Saladin Meckled-Garcia (2008) in order to examine whether it is appropriate 
to assign responsibility to NGOs for fulfilling principles of justice. Nagel 
contends that justice is limited to the domain of domestic state institutions in 
virtue of the special nonvoluntary manner in which they engage with citizens’ 
wills. I argue that an appeal to nonvoluntary relations in-and-of-itself is not 
sufficient to preclude the possibility of applying similar principles to voluntary 
associations such as NGOs. Nagel, I suggest, may be arguing that the grounds 
for political legitimacy—state coercion and imposition onto citizens’ wills—
also serves as the necessary means for justice.41 However, he does not make 
this line of argument explicit. Therefore, I turn to Saladin Meckled-Garcia, 
who offers a statist argument similar to the one Nagel requires for his view to 
succeed.  
Meckled-Garcia’s argument ties the means for justice to the grounds for justice 
through an appeal to agency and agential capacity: only agents with the 
necessary capacities to satisfy principles of justice can be responsible for 
justice, he claims. He then argues that the key necessary capacity for justice is 
the ability to assign rights and duties, something which only state institutions 
can do, and only with respect to domestic distributions.42 Therefore, he 
concludes that justice is limited to individual states.  
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While the notion of agential capacity is important, I believe Meckled-Garcia is 
unclear on his definition of this term, and ultimately conflates two different 
conceptions of capacity. Therefore, I distinguish between capacity as a causal 
power, i.e. the ability of an agent to bring about an effect in the world, and 
capacity as a moral power, i.e. the ability of an agent to alter the normative 
status of others.43   
In the remainder of Chapter 4, I focus on capacity as a causal power, arguing 
there is no institution-based distinction between the causal powers of states 
and NGOs to effect a just distribution. Rather, the powers of both vary 
drastically based on the surrounding institutional environment. However, 
states do uniquely possess the moral power to assign and enforce rights and 
duties. In contrast, the comparable causal power of an NGO is to manipulate 
and use material resources to achieve positive normative change. The 
measurement of NGO performance ought to emphasise the “theory of 
change”44 an NGO uses to justify and explain its projects, and the degree to 
which this theory is sensitive to changes in the NGO’s environment. NGOs, I 
argue, also possess a moral power comparable to that of the state, insofar as 
they can alter the status of rights-holders in a given institutional setting and 
enable others to act more capably as duty-bearers.  
The impact of NGOs on the ability of others to act as duty-bearers is further 
developed in Chapter 5. There, I identify a final NGO ability: the ability to 
increase citizens’ awareness of facts relevant to rectifying institutional 
injustices and meeting the welfare rights of others. To introduce this topic, I 
examine the role of epistemic conditions in setting the stringency of 
obligations by reviewing Onora O’Neill’s critique of universal welfare rights.45 
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O’Neill argues that, without institutions that recognise welfare rights, such 
rights are not claimable by those who hold them because it is unclear which 
duty-bearers are morally responsible for providing specific recipients with 
access to basic goods and services.46 She concludes that welfare rights are not 
universal, and that, therefore, the corresponding duty to provide assistance is, 
without institutions, an imperfect obligation that individuals owe to no one 
and may exercise great latitude in fulfilling.  
I then introduce two cases presented by Elizabeth Ashford (2006; 2007) to 
refute O’Neill’s account of rights. Ashford discusses two types of complex 
causal chains, in which large groups of people collectively cause serious harms 
to others in a manner that is foreseeable and avoidable.47 In such cases, where 
moral responsibility for a rights violation is shared by many perpetrators, it is 
impossible to link the harm suffered by any individual victim to the actions of 
any individual perpetrator. Therefore, victims cannot make the claims against 
specified others that O’Neill says are necessary for the establishment of a 
universal right. Ashford’s cases pose a dilemma for O’Neill: either she can 
accept that they qualify as rights violations, in which case her basis for 
distinguishing between liberty and welfare rights disappears, or she can claim, 
implausibly, that such cases do not qualify as human rights violations, despite 
the foreseeable and avoidable cause of serious injury to others.  
While I agree that Ashford’s examples of complex causal chains can 
undermine O’Neill’s account, I argue that they require further modification in 
order to do so. O’Neill provides multiple characterisations of her claimability 
condition for the existence of a right. Specifically, she discusses claimability in 
terms of both antecedent and post hoc perspectives; Ashford’s cases address 
only the latter. I therefore modify Ashford’s cases to defeat O’Neill’s 
antecedent version of her claimability condition, showing that complex causal 
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chains can obscure both the content of our obligations and to whom they are 
owed before any violation or harm occurs. In such cases, foreseeing and 
avoiding the violation is still possible, thereby allowing us to maintain the 
position that our actions constitute a rights violation.  
NGOs, I argue, can assist duty-bearers in navigating complex causal chains to 
meet the universal liberty and welfare rights of others. A primary way in which 
they do so is to convey necessary information across epistemic boundaries and 
raise awareness of how we can contribute to beneficial causal chains and 
reduce our contributions to those that cause serious harm. Chapter 5 
concludes with a discussion of the abolitionist movement as an example of the 
potential impact of exercising such an ability, and of the importance of 
exercising it with honesty and accuracy.  
Following Chapter 5, I present a brief ‘Interlude’ that summarises the four key 
NGO abilities identified in the previous four chapters, and I argue that these 
abilities generate four corresponding obligations: 1) accountability, 2) 
consistency across actions and norms, 3) building a theory of positive 
normative change, and 4) implementing internal procedures to ensure 
accurate collection and transfer of information (epistemic procedural virtue).  
While the literature on NGOs is immense and detailed, most research on 
NGOs does not provide an idea of the day-to-day experiences and broader 
system of relationships within which NGOs constantly operate.48 Nor was 
there, in 2007, much of a literature identifying ethical challenges and 
problems faced by NGOs. In order to understand what issues constituted real 
ethical problems for NGO staff, I conducted a 10-month interview-based 
research project in Mongolia, using the method of grounded theory. Grounded 
theory methodology was selected in view of its goal of “discovering”49 an 
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explanatory or predictive theory through deep, systematic analysis of 
qualitative data. The data for my study consisted of transcripts from 38 
interviews conducted with staff from Mongolian and foreign NGOs and a 
handful of executives from donor organisations, as well as field notes from 
observations of NGO projects and workshops. Early transcripts were coded 
while still in the field. These codes were grouped and connected in initial 
theoretical models using nVivo7 software, and then tested through further 
rounds of interviews.  
Using a grounded theory approach maximises the informative potential of 
qualitative research for a philosophical account of NGO moral agency, as it 
pushes the researcher to go beyond mere description to arrive at a more 
abstract understanding of key concepts and meanings that are conducive to 
generalisation. In brief, the findings I discuss in Chapter 6 identify two core 
phenomena that explain the ways in which NGO staff experienced the topics 
of ethical obligation, accountability, and organisational value: 1) the process of 
validation, and 2) the framing of relationships with others.  
Throughout conversations on what they considered to constitute right action, 
NGO staff characterised the moral justification of their activities by reference 
to an overarching assessment of their organisation’s validation as a social 
actor. Ethical problems were constituted by scenarios or conflicts that 
threatened this organisational validity. The three main sources of validity 
were: process (method, or, “how” the NGO worked), consequences (the effects 
or outcomes of the NGO’s activities), and, most importantly, their 
relationships with other actors, which impacted validity through the concept 
of obligation. Therefore, NGO staff perceived their organisation as valid if they 
1) achieved the “right” process, 2) achieved the “right” consequences, and/or 3) 
fulfilled their obligations to others. These obligations in turn were defined, not 
on the basis of a moral theory or worldview, but rather, in terms of how the 
NGO staff viewed their organisation’s relationships with other actors. NGO 
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staff identified these obligations to others by characterising, or framing, their 
relationships based on two factors: the focus of the relationship (process or 
consequences), and the relationship base, namely, whether the relationship 
was personal or professional.  
Using the framework presented in the Interlude, I conclude with two 
frameworks that I suggest can help NGOs navigate their relationships by 
better orienting NGO staff with respect to what their activities and 
collaborations obligate them to do. 
While the qualitative research is discussed primarily in Chapter 6, the impact 
of this study on my thinking about NGOs can be found throughout the thesis. 
The importance of engaging directly with the realities through which 
problems in applied ethics are experienced cannot be understated. A 
persistent methodological concern amongst those working on practical or 
applied moral issues is locating right principles or actions along a range 
between what is possible and what is best.50 One of the main purposes of 
engaging in inter-disciplinary research was to identify how NGO staff 
themselves draw ‘best’ or ‘right’ principles or actions out of a set of possible 
activities, and what strategies they use when faced with their own limitations. 
This, I believe, has afforded my analysis in this thesis a better appreciation of 
the difficulties of finding a justified path of action in contexts that are subject 
to swift changes, interference from other actors, and internal conflict. 
In considering the problems that constitute “NGO ethics,” particularly in light 
of how NGO staff spoke of these problems, it became clear that their solution 
is precluded by questions regarding what, morally speaking, NGOs are 
perceived as being. Therefore, this thesis provides an outline for how we 
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should think of applied NGO problems by giving sense to what it means to 
treat an NGO as a moral agent. In brief, the answer provided by this thesis is 
that NGO agency is defined by the multiple relationships that threaten to 
undermine its unity. Obligations are identified as what an NGO must do in 
order to maintain such a unified organisational self.  
As for why employees of an organisation would (or should) be compelled to 
seek such unity, Harry Frankfurt’s comments on the agency of individuals 
provide a compelling answer: engaging in reflective self-direction and seeking 
coherence in an organisation’s activities and values is what it means for NGO 
staff to take their organisation seriously as a social actor. Frankfurt talks of the 
stability and sense-making sought by individuals in the avoidance of 
haphazardly-formed ideas and actions “driven by transient and opaque 
impulses or by mindless decisions.”51 Similarly, NGOs must seek a similar 
stability in order to ensure that their activities and relationships with others 
are not simply a hodgepodge of ad hoc decisions, but instead reflect a 
thoughtful and responsible attempt to engage positively with the world.  That 
is, NGOs should care about their agency in so far as they care about getting 
things right. I turn now to considering what this entails. 
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CHAPTER 1   WHAT IS AN NGO? 
 
 
Introduction 
Non-governmental organisations are a major topic of interest across policy 
and legal settings, as well as several academic disciplines including 
development theory, organisational management, political science and social 
policy. Because the type of actor identified by this term can vary significantly, 
“NGO” has enjoyed wider use than any of its particular definitions, threatening 
to render it “a virtually meaningless label.”52  
This issue has not gone unnoticed: the “definitional problem” and/or the 
“classificational”53 problem have received considerable scrutiny in the NGO 
literature. NGOs, it is said, “remain terra incognita; the term NGO has become 
a commonly accepted phrase within the academic world, but it is unclear what 
this phrase actually encompasses."54 This analysis has led to a further debate 
over what exactly the absence of a consensus on what is an NGO portends for 
the vitality of NGO research. Discussions about definitions55, about the 
discussions about definitions56, and about the discussions about the 
discussions about definitions57 overlay and nest into one another like 
Matryoshka dolls. Some find the absence of a unified definition to be a threat 
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to the possibility of any meaningful, rigorous study of NGOs.58 Others, taking 
a more optimistic view, point to the broad interest in NGOs across many 
disciplines as a testament to their importance as objects of inquiry which 
unfortunately, but necessarily, acts as a detriment to any shareable 
definition.59 Still others contend that NGOs are more the products of specific 
institutional settings than an important category of social actor.60  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a characterisation of an NGO that will 
serve as a foundation for the remainder of the thesis. Section 1.1 identifies 
three primary factors that explain why there is no common definition of an 
NGO at present: its use of definition-by-negation, the diversity of charitable 
associations produced by different cultural and historical traditions, and the 
multi-disciplinary nature of NGO research that uses different types of 
definition. Each of these factors both explains why there is a lack of consensus 
on a definition, and poses a challenge for what a successful definition must 
accomplish. I suggest these challenges may be met if we maintain a clear 
distinction between an empirical and a theoretical definition of an NGO. This 
way, we may be able to both pick out actual organisations in the world that 
qualify as NGOs, as well as provide a theoretical account of what it means to 
be an NGO, which will, in turn, be instrumental for developing an account of 
NGO moral agency.  
Section 1.2 begins with an overview of the early work of Lester Salamon and 
Helmut Anheier in their research on defining what they called the “third 
sector”61: organisations that were neither part of the market or the 
government. While Salamon and Anheier were interested in identifying a 
broader group of actors than the ones that are the focus of this thesis, I 
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develop my account in contrast to theirs because their definition has since 
become the paradigmatic characterisation of “third sector” organisations, 
NGOs included. Moreover, their approach was rigorous, using a set of criteria 
to assess proposed definitions. I therefore adopt their criteria-driven approach 
in order to develop a new working empirical definition of an NGO. I present 
both this definition and a theoretical characterisation of NGO agency at the 
end of 1.2. 
Finally, in 1.3, I demonstrate the explanatory strength of both definitions by 
illustrating how they distinguish an NGO from five other types of agent: the 
state, market, religious institutions, other civil society/nonprofit organisations, 
and the individual.  
 
1.1   Why there is no simple answer to ‘What is an NGO?’ 
 
I believe the definitional problem is the product of three primary factors 
hindering consensus on what counts as an NGO: 
1) The term itself is vague and defined negatively; 
2) Different cultural and historical traditions produce a diverse set of 
associations which are difficult to generalise and categorise 
systematically; 
3) Research interests in NGOs employ definitions for divergent purposes, 
and these differences are not often clearly indicated.   
Many acknowledge (1) and (2) as hurdles for resolving the definitional 
problem. However, the implications of (3) for the viability of a meaningful, 
uniform characterisation of an NGO have not been fully recognised. I will first 
discuss the challenges posed by (1) and (2). I then provide a brief sketch of the 
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multi-disciplinary research interests in NGOs, and highlight recent scepticism 
regarding whether a meaningful solution to the definitional problem can be 
identified. The challenge posed by (3) to a unified definition is fortified by the 
use of separate types of definition in the literature. Consensus is inhibited not 
simply out of disagreement over what is an NGO, but also different ideas 
about what we mean when we ask this question.62 Distinguishing between 
different types of definition can, I argue, point the way to overcoming the 
challenges posed by each of the above factors.  
 
1.1.1   Nature of the term 
The term ‘NGO’ has its origins in the 1947 charter establishing the United 
Nations. At the behest of the American delegation, Article 71, included in the 
chapter laying out the function and powers of the Economic and Social 
Council, designated a unified consultative status for a variety of international 
groups and organised social movements. These groups were referred to under 
the general label, “non-governmental organization”:63 
“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned with 
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
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international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations 
after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”64  
As such, the term had a broad scope and narrow use: within a prescribed 
institutional setting it gave recognition to a wide variety of organisations 
grouped under a catch-all phrase that defined them only in terms of what they 
were not: representatives of states.65 This definition by negation allowed the 
term to be easily extended beyond its original use, with different parties left to 
fill in additional, mutually exclusive, characteristics. 
The type of organisation now called NGOs have a longer history than the term 
itself. Given a rather generic account of NGOs as forms of socially-minded 
associational activity, they have their roots in the labour unions and 
abolitionist and peace movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, and further 
back to the church and traditional practices of charity and alms-giving.66 
Before the invention of the NGO moniker, such organisations existed under 
other terms, including “international organizations,”67 “associations,”68 
“voluntary agencies,”69 and “private organizations.”70  
Since the U.N. convention, however, NGO has become the common term used 
to refer to this broad class of associational, charitable organisations. A notable 
exception is the counterpart term, “non-profit organisation.” While “NGO” 
tends to be the term used for non-profit organisations engaged in 
international development and relief or advocacy, NPO, or non-profit, is more 
frequently used in the U.S.71 Elsewhere, NPO is also used interchangeably with 
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the term “charity,” to describe non-governmental, non-profit organisations 
operating domestically within a given country.  
As discussed in 1.2, I identify a non-profit-making motivation as one of the 
defining features of an NGO. One could presumably take the opposite 
approach, using the term NPO and including a non-governmental attribute as 
one of its defining features. However, since this term is less common overall, 
particularly with respect to international types of such organisation, I have 
opted to use “NGO” for the purposes of this thesis. Regardless, both terms face 
problems stemming from their definition by negation. 
 
1.1.2   Different cultural and historical traditions 
Whereas “Northern” NGOs have their roots in centuries of associational 
activity and Euro-American social movements, NGOs of the developing world 
draw from their own culture-specific histories of charitable giving and 
association. Examples include the peasant movements and church-based 
charitable projects in South America, shared-household credit groups in South 
Asia, burial societies and self-help groups based on kinship ties in Africa, 
almsgiving as a core Islamic practice in the Middle East, and anti-communist, 
pro-democratic grassroots organisations in Eastern Europe.72   
                                                                                                                                          
concerns with private property have influenced the development of U.S. charity law is 
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This presents a challenge similar to the one mentioned above. Just as 
definitions based on negation allow for a term’s overextension to a variety of 
organisations, the diversity of associational and charitable enterprise across 
cultures leads to even further disparities amongst the organisations and 
groups that the term “NGO” is often meant to capture.73 Some suggest that the 
notion of an NGO is an organisational model particular to western, developed 
democracies and, as such, its application to associational movements in other 
cultures is ill-suited.74 Still others charge that the application of the NGO 
model to groups in the developing world through foreign-financed “civil 
society building” contributes to an “NGO-ization” of local grassroots initiatives 
which weakens their closeness to the people with whom they work.75 
Therefore, like the issues addressed by current research on NGOs discussed 
below, cultural diversity challenges the idea that a unified characterisation is 
something we ought to aim for.  
 
1.1.3   Differing research interests and their definitions 
Research on NGOs is represented in a large body of literature that spans 
multiple disciplines. Because NGO research is a relatively new subject, there 
has been very little time for taking a systemised look at the voluminous 
amount of empirical data, case studies, frameworks, and conceptualisations 
that have been offered in the past three decades. That said, greater strides 
have been made recently in taking stock of the original aims of NGO research 
and how these aims, as well as the mainstream assumptions and ideas of NGO 
researchers, have evolved over the decades. Here, I am unable to give the kind 
of detailed account that would do justice to this complex history. Rather, I 
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shall summarise briefly what has been given greater attention elsewhere, 
focusing on two broad areas of research: technical-legalistic and social 
scientific. Each employs their own type of definition of an NGO. As I argue 
below, social scientific research on NGOs employs two types of definition, 
leading researchers in some cases to talk past one another. 
1.1.3.1  Technical-legalistic 
For technical-legalistic definitions, the meaning of a term lies in how it is 
defined and used within a legal and/or policy-related context. It is technical in 
so much as the term operates as nomenclature for a specific linguistic 
community, and is legalistic if the community in question is defined by a 
bounded system of law. In the technical-legalistic sense, “what an NGO is” 
comprises both the set of criteria an organisation must meet to be considered 
by law to be an NGO, as well as what privileges, protections, responsibilities, 
etc. accord to such a legal standing—in short, its legal status.  Issues 
pertaining to the technical-legalistic study of NGOs can be grouped according 
to whether they arise in reference to domestic charity law or the international 
legal system. 
At the domestic level, a primary topic of interest is how the state defines its 
non-profit or charitable sector and relates to it through law, giving way to 
questions regarding the function, content and effects of such laws.  
One can inquire about how charity law functions: what are the conceived 
purposes of the law?76 Generally, what does charitable status consist in? 
Specifically, what sort of special relationship to the state is being established, 
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e.g. tax exemption?77 In what way is the law regulatory versus facilitative of 
charitable activity?78  
Attention is also drawn to the content of charity law: what demarcations, if 
any, are made between different forms of charitable giving?79 If charities are 
defined, and thus allocated tax exempt status, on the basis that they serve a 
“public benefit,” what constitutes such a benefit? This last question is of 
considerable importance. Recent revisions of centuries-old charity law in 
Europe and North America have raised questions regarding what social topics 
and activities should be considered as contributing to the public benefit and 
which criteria the state should use in classifying a gift as under charitable 
giving. An interesting aspect of this second question that is relevant to our 
later discussion is whether such gifts should be judged objectively or 
subjectively. Legal systems using an objective determination of public benefit 
must include an official list of sanctioned causes towards which donations 
count as charitable gifts. Systems in which subjective determination is used 
instead will base the classification of the gift as charitable on the proven 
intention of the donor—if it can be shown in court that the donor gave the gift 
with the intention and belief that it was for a charitable cause, then it qualifies 
as charitable giving under the law.80  
Finally, the effects of different types of charity law are important areas of 
research, particularly in the form of cross-country comparisons. Charity law 
has been studied to understand its effects on perceptions of social justice and 
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charity,81 on the level of social inclusion of disadvantaged groups within a 
society,82 and on the level and quality of NGO activity in general.83  
At the international level, the main concern is not with how boundaries are 
drawn, but rather with their absence. Individual Intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) engage in consultative and classificatory activities 
through which they define an NGO for their own purposes. As such, there is 
no coherent, internationally recognised “legal personality” or status for non-
governmental organisations.84  NGOs instead continue to be defined based on 
the law of the state in which they originated or are registered. This creates 
some difficulties, most evidently the lack of any clear understanding of exactly 
what kinds of powers are being accorded to which unelected agents and on 
what basis. There are also complications associated with the schizophrenic 
legal personalities of INGOs, whose individual branches are defined differently 
across different countries of operation.  
Here, a desire to have a clearer and more centralised standing laid out for 
NGOs in their international activities is balanced against the view that the 
absence of any such definition is ultimately a boon, allowing for greater 
diversity and freedom in global civil society. On one hand, the flexibility that 
the lack of a definition affords not only NGOs, but also IGOs and other actors 
that relate to them is highly valued by all actors85 On the other, this same 
flexibility allows for a variety of questionable organisations—such as 
Government-Organised-NGOs (GONGOs)86, or NGOs set up by businesses 
(BONGOs)87 to lobby governments for corporate interests—to “hide behind an 
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NGO façade.”88 An answer to the definitional problem for NGOs in 
international law must find some balance between these two concerns.  
1.1.3.2   Social Scientific 
Concerted interest in the “nonprofit sector” within the areas of sociology, 
political science and organisational management, amongst others, arose in the 
early 1980s.89 The aim was to better understand associational organisations 
and their impact, based on the idea that such organisations, comprising a 
“third sector,” had been significantly under-researched (or, as some saw it, 
completely ignored) in comparison to the two other main sectors of politics 
and the market.90  
Later in the same decade, NGOs emerged as a major topic of interest within 
development studies, a phenomenon that ran in tandem with their dramatic 
rise in popularity as the “magic bullet”91 or “favoured children”92 of donor 
states and organisations. This popularity was based on the view that NGOs 
were more effective “development alternatives,”93 facilitating successful aid 
through close relationships to the poor and disadvantaged. Research questions 
came packed with weighty assumptions about NGOs. If they were viewed as 
complementary to the neo-liberalism favoured by many donor organisations, 
the question was how to confirm that NGOs were in fact more effective than 
the state. If they were taken to be outspoken critics of such donor 
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organisations and states, the question was how they had such authority, and 
whether NGOs were as close to the disadvantaged as they claimed.94 
Both lines of research intersected in the revival of the concept of civil society 
in the 1990s.95 From the perspective of third sector researchers, civil society 
could operate either as a competing or a complementary concept to the notion 
of a third sector.96 Within development studies, conceptualising NGOs as civil 
society actors accompanied an interest in how development work could 
strengthen democratic processes and empower people at the grassroots level.97 
Recently, NGO scholarship, particularly within the field of development 
studies, has reflected critically on the trajectories of NGO research, in 
particular taking issue with how NGOs have been portrayed as social actors.  
One of the most widely cited problems is the prevalence of “normative 
assumptions” amongst researchers that has allegedly affected how NGOs are 
approached as objects of study. This worry arises almost exclusively in the 
development literature, in part because there is sufficient evidence there for 
the charge that researchers were too close to development practices, resulting 
in bias. Many researchers conducted their work as consultants with NGOs or 
on grants from donor organisations.98 Others working within NGOs left to 
pursue PhDs, after which they published material as they returned to work 
with their organisation.99 Thus, much research, particularly in the 1980s and 
1990s, has been entangled with assumptions about the positive value of 
NGOs—as development “alternatives”100 or efficient agents of empowerment, 
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for example—or has drawn conclusions with respect to this value with very 
little supporting evidence. 101   
David Korten’s early and influential work on NGOs has been singled out as a 
particularly unabashed example of this kind of research.102 His characterisation 
of NGOs as agents of positive change evolving through different ‘generations’ 
of social action, was typical of the glowing views of NGOs and their special 
abilities in development research in the 1990s. Accounts such as Korten’s have 
in recent years been dressed down as “the NGO community’s imagined past.”103 
Terje Tvedt has been particularly vocal in pushing this objection generally, and 
using Korten as an example specifically, charging Korten’s history of NGOs 
with being at best myopic: “This story about NGOs is in reality only about the 
‘good,’ ‘progressive,’ and ‘humanitarian’ NGOs, as if they alone constitute the 
NGO scene, or transnational civil society, or global civil society.”104 The upshot 
of Tvedt’s criticism is that there are a number of examples of NGOs failing to 
meet minimal performance standards, or engaging in outright illegal or 
wrongful activities, events which a normatively-laden framework such as 
Korten’s is incapable of recognising, let alone explaining or analysing. 
Tvedt espouses what David Lewis and Paul Opoku-Mensah have called a “new 
research agenda” for NGOs that emphasises the need for empirical research to 
be more realistic and sensitive to the actual ways in which NGOs operate and 
are constrained.105 This, in turn, leads to a more critical perspective on what 
NGOs are capable of achieving as solitary actors.106 Several authors advocating 
for a more realistic approach have questioned the very idea of NGO agency, 
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arguing that what NGOs are and what they do depends greatly on the abilities 
that other institutional actors attribute to them.  
Here, I follow the literature in understanding agency as “both an individual 
and a collective concept referring to freedom and capacity to act in pursuit of 
self-perceived interest.”107 An NGO is an agent in so far as it can engage in a 
“reflexive monitoring of action”108 and “is organized so as to seek the 
realization of certain motivations in the world and to do so on the basis of 
certain representations about what that world is like.”109 The idea of an 
account of NGO agency rests on the premise that actors identified as NGOs 
have a shared set of abilities and processes that constitute their agency.  
Against this assumption, Dorothea Hilhorst, in her influential study of the 
day-to-day activities of NGOs in the Phillipines, argues “the real world of 
NGOs”110 reveals a considerably more fractured and particularistic portrait of 
the abilities and processes constituting NGO agency. Hilhorst expresses 
agreement with Tvedt’s critical approach, but claims he does not go far 
enough, as “his work is limited by the implicit assumption that NGOs 
constitute a single reality.”111  Instead, Hilhorst argues, what an NGO is and 
does depends on the particular actors with whom NGO staff interact, and the 
discourses within those interactions. NGOs use “different faces”112 when 
relating to donors, other NGOs, or beneficiaries. This means, she says, “that 
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there is no single answer to the questions of what an NGO is, what it wants 
and what it does. NGOs are many things at the same time.”113 
Hilhorst’s perspective is one of several examples of researchers aiming to reach 
a more “nuanced understanding of NGO agency … [b]y embedding research on 
the NGO phenomenon more tightly within these wider aspects of institutional 
systems, policy discourses and organisational politics.”114 Just as different 
cultural histories of charitable association hinder consensus as to what is an 
NGO, the present-day institutional settings in which different organisations 
operate imply that what it means to be an NGO will vary from context to 
context.  
1.1.3.3   Distinguishing between types of definition 
I believe this challenge can be resolved by identifying the different types of 
definition used for various research purposes in the literature. It is this third 
factor—the various uses of a definition of NGOs—that, together with the 
definition-by-negation and diverse cultural and historical backgrounds, 
inhibits consensus around a single characterisation.  
We can identify three distinct uses for the term “NGO” in descriptive NGO 
research. These are: technical-legalistic, empirical, and theoretical. 
Recall that, in legal literature, which operates with a technical-legalistic 
definition of an NGO, the meaning of a term lies in how it is defined and used 
within a legal and/or policy-related context. Originally, ‘NGO’ was coined as a 
technical-legalistic term for the purposes of guiding consultative relations 
between the U.N. and a group of non-state social movements and 
organisations.  
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As the use of the term expanded, it acquired a second sense: an empirical 
definition that reached beyond its original technical-legalistic use to select a 
set of organisations based, presumably, on certain structural or organisational 
features they possessed. While the aim of a technical-legalistic term is to 
articulate a legal status or a role in policy, an empirical definition is used to 
identify and describe specific actors or entities in the world. For example, 
“marriage” as a technical-legalistic term is defined by the conditions and 
specifications laid out in actual law, whereas “marriage” as an empirical term 
may involve conditions that go beyond the technical-legalistic definition, 
depending on what kind of relationship or phenomenon a researcher is trying 
to examine. For instance, a cultural minority may engage in marriage practices 
that are not recognised legally by the state, but which are equivalent to, or 
share the same key features as, “official” marriages, such as co-habitation, 
exclusive sexual behaviour, etc. 
A third type of definition, currently overlooked, is a theoretical definition, one 
that characterises in abstract, though still descriptively, what it means to be an 
NGO: what distinguishes it as an agent, what types of normative 
considerations might apply to it, and what meaning it has as a social entity.115 
Whilst empirical definitions give “thin” descriptions, e.g. “to wink” means “to 
close and open one eye,” or an NGO is “a non-for-profit entity separate from 
the state with a certain organisational structure”; theoretical definitions give 
what Ryle (and more famously, Geertz) called “thick descriptions,” e.g. “to 
wink” means “to convey a message surreptitiously,” or an NGO is “an agent of 
change.”116 To recall the example of marriage used above, a researcher may 
define marriage empirically in terms of a closed sexual relationship or co-
habitation, and then offer a theoretical definition of marriage as a 
psychologically and emotionally intimate partnership, or, to put a different 
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spin on it, perhaps as a state of perpetual conflict mitigated by conditions 
requiring necessary cooperation.117  
A good example of how these different types of definition can create confusion 
can be seen in the widely-cited article by Adil Najam (1996), which advocated 
an approach to the definitional problem that would give more emphasis to 
identifying similarities across, instead of differences within, the sector. There, 
Najam takes issue with Salamon and Anheier’s definition of the non-profit 
sector. Salamon and Anheier use a structural-operational approach to defining 
the non-profit sector, which bases a definition of the non-profit sector on 
organisational structure. According to Najam, “The purpose of the 
[definitional] exercise is to outline the dominant and preferred characteristics 
of each sector rather than to fit the peculiarities of all the outlying entries 
within each.”118 Najam therefore finds Salamon and Anheier’s structural-
operational approach insufficient for identifying a meaningful definition: 
“Even where such an approach is able to tell us which organization is a 
nonprofit, it tells us nothing about what a nonprofit is and why it is so.”119  
This remark starkly highlights the contrasts between empirical and theoretical 
definitions. Najam seeks an understanding of what it means for an 
organisation to be nonprofit, i.e. what kind of special perspectives, skills, 
prerogatives, responsibilities, and powers is entailed. In contrast, the empirical 
definition provided by Salamon and Anheier is designed to list a set of 
observable features, with corresponding indicators, in order to identify 
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existing organisations and analyse these in terms of their roles in causal 
processes, much like the creation and use of a taxonomical chart.  
Thus, while his concerns for a higher-level theorisation of NGOs is valid, 
because he does not recognise that Salamon and Anheier are engaging in a 
different type of definition, Najam’s criticism talks past them. Their process is 
intended to be inductive, and yet this is precisely what Najam seems to take 
issue with: the attempt to formulate a definition by looking at the set of 
individual organisations one wishes for it to cover. In general, this kind of 
tension is generated by the different disciplinary backgrounds that motivate 
NGO research. Third-sector researchers were attempting to classify and define 
the contours of a given set of social organisations, while researchers coming 
from within development studies, like Najam, are interested in questions that 
centre on what NGOs are uniquely good for and how they should be 
understood as a specific type of development actor.  
This distinction between theoretical and empirical definitions and the 
frequent lack of its recognition by theorists is, I suggest, one of the main 
reasons why some view NGO research as making little progress towards 
answering key questions about NGOs. It also fuels scepticism regarding NGO 
agency: authors argue that general empirical definitions of NGOs are not 
useful, since both the features themselves and what they allow an NGO to be 
or do in a given setting will vary significantly.  
 
1.1.4   Re-framing the definitional problem 
In sum, the task of reaching a versatile and general definition of an NGO has 
faced three barriers that we can take into account as we pursue a 
characterisation of NGOs as agents. 
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First, the NGO sector has often and primarily been defined in terms of what it 
is not, leading to broad characterisations that lack specificity. 
Second, it is questionable to what extent a definition of an NGO can apply 
cross-culturally while still remaining meaningful. The cross-cultural 
differences in the evolution of charitable associations and grassroots groups 
may be more significant than their similarities for the purposes of empirical 
research and theories of agency. 
Third, research on NGOs is multi-disciplinary, making use of technical-
legalistic, empirical and theoretical definitions. Distinguishing between the 
latter two types is of particular importance, as failure to do so can contribute 
to the perception that a useful general definition is impossible to reach. With 
respect to this aim, recent scholarship on NGOs in development has argued 
that the institutional contexts in which NGOs operate shape their agency to 
such a degree that general definitions or accounts of their agency are 
inaccurate and unhelpful.  
These issues indicate that what we require for a theoretical account of NGO 
agency is an empirical definition that uses positive, not negative, 
characteristics, is flexible across different institutional and cultural contexts, 
and at the same time can explain why the ways in which organisations in 
different contexts relate to others is significantly similar. I turn now to the task 
of outlining such a definition. 
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1.2   NGO: A working definition 
 
1.2.1   The standard account: Salamon and Anheier 
1.2.1.1   Criteria and approaches to defining 
In their landmark research on empirically defining the non-profit sector, 
Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier stated that the aim of their cross-national 
study was to develop “a general definition of the sector that can be used in 
comparative research.”120 To guide their analysis, Salamon and Anheier draw 
on the work of social scientist Karl Deutsch to outline three criteria against 
which they will assess the strengths and weaknesses of different definitional 
approaches:  
Economical: The model abstracts from and simplifies reality in a way that 
emphasises “the truly critical aspects of a phenomenon or process.”121 
Significance: It identifies qualities that are neither “already obvious” nor 
“trivial.” 
Explanatory or predictive power: The model is rigourous, i.e. can be used by 
different researchers and research programmes, possesses combinatorial 
richness, i.e. can generate a large pool of hypotheses, and has organising 
power, i.e. can be used to explain phenomena outside its original intended 
purpose.122 
Salamon and Anheier identify four approaches to defining the nonprofit 
sector, two of which reappear as features in their final definition of a nonprofit 
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organisation: an ‘economic’ approach that defines them based on their 
differences from corporations is incorporated as a ‘non-profit distributing’ 
condition; and a ‘legal’ approach, identifying NGOs based on legal status is 
brought in as a ‘formal’ condition. The more significant divergence lies 
between a ‘functional’ versus a ‘structural-operational’ approach.  
Functional definitions denote organisations by reference to their purpose or 
activity, in other words, by what they do. As an example, NGOs would be 
defined as value-driven organisations or those that work to serve “the good of 
society” or a “public purpose.”123 Salamon and Anheier note that an advantage 
to this approach is that it allows us to reach beyond the legal status of an 
organisation to pick out meaningful features of its activities that make it 
adjudged eligible for such a status, thus avoiding the aforementioned 
problems (1.1.3.1) with technical-legalistic definitions.124 However, after citing 
issues with a functional approach that will be discussed in detail below 
(1.2.3.6), Salamon and Anheier opt for a structural-operational definition. 
Structural-operational definitions pick out features of the basic structure of an 
NGO and its operation as its essential, defining characteristics. While a 
specific definition of this “basic structure” is never provided, based on the 
features offered under structural-operational definitions, we could say, 
generally, the basic structure of an NGO is the set of features that constitutes 
the form, as opposed to the content, of their activities. Rather than looking at 
the purpose or the activity in which an organisation is engaged—which may 
be very similar or identical to that of another type of organisation—a 
structural-operational definition looks at the organisational features shaping 
how that activity is pursued. For example, such a definition may consider 
decision-making structure, how resources are acquired and distributed within 
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the organisation, or how NGO members or staff become part of the 
organisation. 125 
1.2.1.2   Salamon and Anheier’s definition 
In the years since Salamon and Anheier’s original work, it has been most 
common to adopt either their definition or a structural-operational definition 
similar to theirs, often along with some added reference to function 
(particularly in the development literature on NGOs). Therefore, most 
definitions given in the literature follow along the lines of those of Salamon 
and Anheier (1992a and 1992b), as well as the later adaptations provided by 
Vakil (1997), and Edwards and Hulme (1992, 1996, 2002).126  
Salamon and Anheier’s original structural-operational definition of the 
nonprofit sector gives five distinguishing features. For them, NGOs are: 
 “formal, private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary.”127  
I begin with these five, and then address the functional condition that is 
frequently attached to different interpretations of this definition. 
 
1.2.2   Additional criteria for a definition 
I shall continue to use Salamon and Anheier’s original three criteria. However, 
since the aim is to produce an account of NGO agency to serve as the basis for 
an understanding of an NGO’s moral standing, I will require two further 
criteria: 
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Uniqueness: A definition must give sense to the idea that it means something 
to be an NGO, by sufficiently distinguishing such organisations from other 
types of social actor. 
Throughout this section I assume that there is some sense in which NGOs are 
a distinctive kind of agent. While this is a defeasible assumption, my enquiry 
will adopt it for the sake of assessing possible features for an empirical 
definition. The revised empirical definition produced at the end of this section 
will therefore constitute the best possible definition under the assumption 
that NGOs are a distinctive organisational type. This assumption is then 
supported indirectly by the theoretical characterisation of NGO agency that 
results from the revised definition, as well as by the arguments of section 1.3., 
where the revised definition is used to illustrate how NGOs are importantly 
different from other types of social agent. 
Explanatory power: A definition must make sense of the problems and 
questions being asked of it.128 In other words, it must give an account of an 
NGO that also has the resources to explain why problems arise in its usage 
(why there is debate as to what counts as a token NGO). 
The necessary conditions identified in an empirical definition should be 
considered as attributes which an organisation can possess in degrees. The 
problems presented with “outlying”129 cases or grey areas should then be 
explicable by pointing to how a particular organisation is either missing one 
condition or fulfils one or more conditions to a lower degree. 
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1.2.3   An alternative definition 
1.2.3.1   Formal 
The argument for including “formality” as a condition is best seen in light of 
the short-comings faced by the aforementioned legal approach to defining an 
NGO. Recall, first, that there is no legal consensus beyond the boundaries of a 
particular country on the definition of an NGO. At the international level, 
NGOs occupy a “non-status,” and domestically, legal identities vary from 
country to country, making a coherent characterisation impossible. 
Second, even if there were a legal consensus, it may, in fact, offer a poor 
definition, as is the case according to critics of the current ECOSOC definition, 
which allows GONGOs to function ostensibly as voices of civil society.130 
Taking any legal definition at face value begs obvious and important 
normative questions as to what factors should be taken into account in 
determining non-profit law and when decisions made by the state to refuse 
non-profit status are unjustified.  
Taking NGOs to be formal provides a way of capturing the focal point of the 
legal approach without tying a definition to actual laws. The conferral of legal 
status requires some degree of formalisation in an organisation, but 
conversely, a given legal system may not have yet caught up to the task of 
giving such formalised groups a full and detailed definition. Including a formal 
condition allows for the identification of a particular type of social actor, 
leaving it as a separate issue how such organisations are (or should be) 
represented in law. 
To say that NGOs are formal, then, is to give meaning to the sense in which 
they are an ‘organisation’ as opposed to a loose collection of individuals or ad 
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hoc activities. As to what constitutes formality more specifically, “meaningful 
organizational boundaries,”131 such as “an awareness of the distinction between 
organizational and individual responsibilities”132, but also “regular meetings, 
officers, rules of procedure” can be sought to identify organisations meeting 
this condition.133 Even more specific versions of this condition are the 
requirement that NGOs have “a formal existence with a statute and a 
democratic and representative structure,”134 or that they be “professionalized” 
with “paid staff.”135  
Problems 
On the one hand, the formal condition helpfully separates NGOs from 
“voluntary activities and helping behaviour within private households and 
neighbourhoods.”136 However, as mentioned above in 1.1.2, it also excludes 
“informal, often community-based organizations of the Third World,” which 
are typically taken to be a main form of non-governmentalism in the South.137 
For example, a grassroots women’s organisation may provide small loans to its 
members, or counselling and advice on domestic or career issues, without 
having a headquarters, paid staff, written statutes, or legal identity.  
What reason do we have to group these grassroots organisations from non-
western contexts with those that are significantly more formal and 
professionalised? For many studies with a social scientific, classificatory 
purpose, a distinction between these two groups is arguably more useful, and 
certainly more common, with GRO (GrassRoots Organisation) or CSO (Civil 
Society Organisation) referring to the informal groups and NGO referring to 
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larger, typically Northern-based, organisations.138 Presumably, the level of 
formalisation has a significant effect on how a given organisation operates—
both as a cause and an effect—in whatever process or part of the social 
environment that is being examined, making this sort of distinction important 
for empirical explanation and prediction. 
But, since our aim is to support a definition that will be useful for 
understanding the normative status of such organisations, there is more 
reason to relax the formality condition to include informal organisations. 
Because they operate in different social contexts, with different historical 
backgrounds regarding nonprofit and associational life, the structures of 
professionalized northern NGOs and grassroots southern NGOs139 as 
organisations diverge, giving the former more of the trappings of formality. 
But they share an organisational nature, or personality, that is, within the 
context in which they operate, how they are taken by others to be different 
from individuals (because they are collective) and from ad hoc activities 
(because they are long-term and/or intentional).  
It is this latter factor—the organisational personality that they share—that 
best meets the criterion of uniqueness for my definition. What makes 
formality a useful defining feature with respect to uniqueness is that it 
separates a particular collective agent from individuals as well as from short-
term or unintentional group activities. This separation applies just as much to 
small grassroots organisations with medium- or long-term goals as it does to 
larger NGOs operating in the U.K. The particular trappings of formality, e.g. 
headquarters, staff, are different across contexts, but these are inconsequential 
to what it is about the formality condition that contributes to an 
understanding of an NGO as a unique agent within a given environment. In 
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other words, formality is more useful when it is conceived of as more of an 
operational than structural feature. Collectivity and long-term, intentional 
action are qualities that can be possessed by grassroots organisations, despite 
differing greatly from international NGOs in terms of structure.  
In sum, the structural condition of formality, particularly when it is defined 
rigidly in terms of the presence of a statute, “a fixed headquarters” or even 
“paid staff”, is not as useful for explaining how the similarity shared by a 
variety of organisations is more important to how people relate to them than 
the differences in their structures.   
Revised condition: Organised 
Thus, just as a legal definition was passed over for a more encompassing 
formal condition, I suggest a loose interpretation of the formal principle, 
requiring only that there be some “institutional reality”140 to an organisation, 
specific to a particular institutional system and cashed out, perhaps, in the 
most general of the terms quoted above. That is, there should merely be some 
recognition of a difference between an individual’s personal relationships and 
obligations and those that the individual experiences as a member or 
employee of the organisation.141  A simpler way of putting this, which 
maintains fidelity to the words in the term NGO itself, is that there must be 
some sense of centralised organisation—implying collectivity and 
intentionality with respect to long-term aims—to the efforts and activities of 
the group in question. For many NGOs, this level of organisation may reach a 
highly professionalised stage, with headquarters, official budgets and paid 
staff. But it is importantly not the only form of ‘institutional reality’ an NGO 
may assume. Such a revision makes the formal condition more flexible, in the 
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same spirit of the original move towards a general notion of formality away 
from the more rigid condition of legal status. 
1.2.3.2   Private  
“Private” means “institutionally separate from government,”142 in other words, 
the non-governmental nature of NGOs.  Most generally stated, this condition 
implies that an organisation cannot be “part of the apparatus of government 
nor governed by boards dominated by government officials”143 in order to 
count as an NGO.   
While Salamon and Anheier’s classification allows for organisations that 
receive financial support from a government, the issue of how much funding 
NGOs may receive from the state before they compromise their identity has 
been a matter of intense debate elsewhere.144 In particular, the question of the 
extent to which GONGOs and Quasi-NGOs (QUANGOs)145 “count” as NGOs is 
one of the main reasons why the definitional problem is taken to be of 
considerable practical importance, and not just a matter of interest only to 
social scientists. The trend of Northern NGOs (in particular, international 
development organisations) receiving significant grants from states has given 
rise to discussions of what exactly constitutes non-governmentalism with 
respect to such organisations.146  
Funding-related issues aside, this non-governmental condition is also 
sometimes specified in order to distinguish NGOs from political parties or 
interest groups. Not only are NGOs not part of the state apparatus, it is also 
not their goal to acquire or control state powers. While advocacy may be an 
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important role and policy change a widespread interest shared by many NGOs, 
“direct control” over major social and political institutions is not one of their 
aims.147 
Problems 
On one hand, this condition is quite clear-cut—NGOs must in some way be 
non-state actors. At the same time, it is so broad and unspecified, it is often 
unclear when this condition is being met or not. In terms of our criteria, it is 
not strong with respect to establishing uniqueness or explaining why some 
organisations seem to be non-governmental to a greater or lesser degree than 
others.  In seeking out a definition that better satisfies these criteria, we will 
do better with a more specific, positively expressed (as opposed to negative, 
‘non’-type) feature.   
While it is not a definition by negation, “private” does not offer much 
advantage over non-governmentalism as a way of explaining what it means for 
NGOs to be independent from state institutions. Understanding what is meant 
by “private” requires an account of the private/public distinction, a conceptual 
categorisation that has a very long, contested, and central place in political 
and social theory. With respect to our discussion, a survey of the different 
theoretical cuts between the private and the public realms either find NGOs 
straddling both,148 or leave us no better off than we were with the broad 
language of non-governmentalism. Just a sampling of the definitions of the 
“public” sphere are: “sharing common ends”149 or in particular “the end of 
supporting just institutions and of giving one another justice accordingly,”150 
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open and accessible activity of a collective nature,151 and civil society conceived 
of as various associations jockeying to bring different viewpoints and interests 
into the political process. A similar sampling for “private” yields: civil society 
conceived of as a “system of needs” and “contractual relationships”,152 
community, sharing the same “comprehensive doctrine”153 (i.e. set of particular 
moral values and aims), familial and friendly ties, what is “hidden or 
withdrawn.”154   
Taking these in view, how might we place what are considered to be 
archetypical NGOs—Oxfam, BRAC, Greenpeace, Habitat for Humanity, CARE 
International—within this distinction? These organisations are open and 
accessible and often claim to work on issues of public concern, yet they also 
espouse values that would qualify as comprehensive doctrines.  Thus, they fall 
under both characterisations to some respect, with greater compatibility going 
to the side of ‘public’, if anywhere.155  
Revised condition: self-mandated 
Another way of capturing NGOs’ independence from the state without relying 
on negative terminology or a theory-laden account of the private/public 
distinction is to say that NGOs are self-mandated.  Elsewhere, (i.e. not in 
relation to this non-governmental condition) NGOs are often described as 
operating without any “statutory authority to act.”156 This refers to the idea 
that the existence and agenda of an NGO is not mandated or necessitated by 
anything other than the decisions of freely-acting individuals. 
                                                 
151
 Weintraub (1997, p. 5). 
152
 Cohen & Arato (1996); Weintraub (1997, p. 13). 
153
 Rawls 1993, (p. 202). 
154
 Weintraub (1997, p. 5). 
155
 One might suggest the following compromise: that NGOs are privately formed, yet 
publically oriented. But this still rests on an account of what it means for an interest or issue 
to be ‘public’ as opposed to ‘private.’ I therefore believe that if we can arrive at a feature that 
does not rely on such a contested distinction, our definition will be stronger. 
156
 Edwards & Fowler (2002, p. 4). 
61 
 
Such a feature of NGOs, which is usually expressed informally and not as a 
defining condition, is a suitable candidate for a non-negative version of “non-
governmental.” NGOs identify causes (which may or may not be classed as 
“public”—see 1.2.3.6) that purportedly serve as the justification for their own 
existence. They, in turn, issue a mandate for themselves to pursue a course of 
action as a response to such a problem, and then enlist and incite others to 
help them realise that course of action. While they may form close 
relationships with the state, being self-mandated in this sense rules out the 
possibility that they could function as a part of the state. 
Like Salamon and Anheier’s version, a new working definition will be aided if 
there is no stipulation regarding the funding relationship between NGOs and 
the state. This is because we are interested in meeting the criteria of 
uniqueness and explanation, the latter of which leads us to look, not only for 
empirical adequacy, but also for a definition that can help us explain why 
definitional problems arise with regards to NGOs in practice. That is, we want 
to be able to explain what is problematic about QUANGOs or why more 
independent NGOs wrestle with decisions over how much funding they will 
accept from the state. We do not want to adjust our definition so as to include 
such groups. These struggles and problems arise because significant financial 
reliance on another agent undermines the autonomy that is implied by being 
self-mandated. The non-governmental condition is meant to contribute to an 
understanding of an NGO as a unique agent by distinguishing it from another 
main type of agency. Thus, it is not the case that NGOs receiving significant 
funding from the state no longer “count” as NGOs, but, rather, that one of the 
defining features of their agency is being subverted. In a way, this captures the 
complaint about GONGOs perfectly: they operate under the mantelpiece of 
being an NGO while lacking a central determining feature of NGO agency.  
The way to understand the problem of state-NGO donor relationships, then, is 
to recognise that what originally defined the organisations as NGOs remains 
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unchanged, but their ability to act appropriately as that type of agent, to be an 
NGO in a meaningful sense, can be compromised depending on the extent to 
which their funding relationships adversely affect their autonomy. Being self-
mandated is one component of an organisation’s autonomy.  Below we turn to 
the second component: self-governing.   
1.2.3.3   Self-governing 
By “self-governing” Salaman and Anheier mean “able and equipped to control 
and manage its own activities.”157 They include this condition in addition to 
the non-governmental “private” condition above, on the basis that “some 
organizations that are private and nongovernmental may nevertheless be so 
tightly controlled, either by governmental agencies or private businesses, that 
they essentially function as parts of these other institutions.”158  
Problems 
It would seem that reformulating “private” to “self-mandated” as we did above 
already implies the self-governance condition. While there are organisations 
that meet Salamon and Anheier’s original condition of private—i.e. not part of 
the apparatus of the state—and yet fail to meet the condition of self-
governance, there is no organisation that would meet the condition of self-
mandated but not the condition of self-governance. The former entails the 
latter, but not vice versa (for example, the BBC is arguably self-governing but 
not self-mandated). An organisation that was self-mandated but not self-
governed, were it to exist, would have to be self-created and structurally 
independent, and yet managed in its affairs and projects by the state; the 
existence of such an organisation is highly implausible, if not conceptually 
impossible.  
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Nonetheless, it is useful to retain Salamon and Anheier’s self-governance 
condition as an explicit reminder of what is required for an organisation to be 
sufficiently independent from the state. It seems most parsimonious to 
combine self-governing and self-mandated into a single umbrella concept of 
autonomy. Self-governing refers to autonomy in the day-to-day operations and 
projects of an organisation, while self-mandated refers to autonomy with 
regards to the organisation’s further, long-term strategy.  
An important final question here regarding the condition of autonomy is, 
“with respect to what or whom?” We have, so far, been discussing the 
autonomy of an NGO with respect to the state, but in fact the features of self-
mandated and self-governing can apply to the relationship between an NGO 
and any institution or organisational body. For instance, “NGOs” established 
and managed by corporations can reasonably be considered NGOs only by 
name and not by any substantive definition of an NGO, since they are not 
autonomous from the corporate agent. They are, therefore, best regarded as 
the charitable arm of a corporation.  
Also, these two components of autonomy helpfully explain how religiously 
affiliated organisations can be situated along a sliding scale of NGO-ness. On 
one side there are faith-based organisations: full-fledged NGOs that are 
motivated by religious beliefs, but entirely self-mandated and self-governing 
with respect to an established religious institution. Examples of this type of 
group include the international aid NGOs World Vision and Muslim Hands. In 
the middle there are NGOs that are mandated by a particular religious 
institution, but are entirely self-governing, such as the Norwegian Lutheran 
Mission. Finally, on the other end are the non-NGO charitable projects 
mandated and managed by the Catholic Church or particular synagogues or 
mosques.   
Features that further distinguish NGOs from corporations or religious 
institutions are discussed below in 1.2.3.4 and 1.2.3.6. While autonomy is 
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primarily intended to distinguish NGOs from state institutions, it is important 
to note that this also helps to differentiate them from charitable enterprises 
that operate under the auspices of other types of non-state institutions. 
Revised condition: Autonomous (self-governing and self-mandated) 
 
1.2.3.4   Non-profit distributing 
A partner condition to non-governmental,” “non-profit,” or “non-profit-
distributing” is the other core defining feature of an NGO. Being non-profit 
can mean that an organisation does not engage in profit-generating activities, 
or that, if it does, such profits are used solely for the purposes of 
organisational projects and are not re-distributed to members. Another way of 
putting this is that NGOs do not have a “single bottom line”159 or profit-making 
objective, regardless of whether they do indeed make and distribute profits to 
their members.160 This is because they at the same time are pursuing other 
aims deemed important by them as well as their stakeholders, such as 
empowerment or fulfilling accountability requirements for donors or state 
agencies.161 
Problems 
The issues here mirror those that arise with the non-governmental condition. 
To say that an NGO is nonprofit is to give a broad, negative definition that is 
difficult to apply usefully to contemporary NGOs and the variety of 
fundraising strategies they pursue, as well as membership-based cooperatives 
that distribute profits across their members. Attempts to specify exactly what 
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profit-related activity is allowable by the condition run a wide gambit. Even in 
legal contexts where this condition is most common and most important for 
defining an NGO, interpretations of the non-profit feature vary widely.162  
In order to gain ground on uniqueness and explanatory power, we can 
describe NGOs as aiming for profit only instrumentally, if ever, and never as a 
final end-in-itself. This seems to be what is intended by the widely-adopted 
phrase “not-for-profit,” but the terminology is not well suited to this idea. 
NGOs may be “for-profit” in the sense that they aim for profit in order to 
satisfy another objective. The idea that the phrase is meant to capture—that 
NGOs do not exist solely for profit or that they do not aim for profit as a goal 
in and of itself—is perhaps better cast in terms of motivation, rather than 
intention. One might aim for something without being motivated by it. 
Instrumental goals are only ever aimed for in virtue of a final end, which 
serves as the source of motivation.  
A more accurate formulation of the relationship of NGOs and profiteering 
activities is to say that NGOs might aim for profit, but they are never 
motivated by it. This captures membership-based groups as well, given that 
the motivation in such contexts is typically some deeper value such as self-
reliance or rising out of poverty.163 So-called “socially-oriented” or “green” 
businesses, however, are distinguished from NGOs by their dual motivations 
of profit and fidelity to certain social or moral values.  
Revised condition: not motivated by profit 
1.2.3.5   Voluntary 
In its original articulation, voluntariness as a defining condition referred to the 
individuals working within an NGO.  A distinguishing feature of NGOs was 
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that such organisations “cannot rely on hierarchy or coercion, or financial 
rewards and material incentives as the means to obtain the compliance of staff 
towards organisational goals.”164  Rather, successful organisational activity 
comes about through the “self-motivation” of staff and volunteers “responding 
to the personal value base that persuades an individual to work in and for the 
third sector.”165 
Voluntary can be taken in this original sense, as the empirical requirement 
that there be some minimal voluntary contribution within the organisation, 
either in the form of staff, board members or financial donations. But it can 
also be connected to a feature that appears frequently in other definitions, 
namely the non-coercive nature of NGOs.166 The lack of a coercive apparatus 
does not apply only to the organisation’s internal structure: voluntariness also 
describes something important about how an NGO relates to the outside 
world. Donors are not obligated to give an NGO their money as they are 
obligated to pay their taxes, and those who participate or assist in the 
organisation’s projects do not do so under direct coercion or legal 
requirement. NGOs are both internally voluntary in their construction, but 
also externally voluntary, since they are collective agents that rely on the 
voluntary cooperation of others for their capacity to act successfully. 
Problems 
The first, internal, version of the voluntary condition has dropped off in the 
past decade, due to the fact that many NGOs have indeed become more 
professionalized, with most staff on paid salary.167 This is just as well, given 
that defining an NGO in language that construes its staff as self-sacrificing 
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volunteers rallying around a moral aim does not provide a particularly useful 
definition. First, it requires one to get “inside the heads” of the people who 
work for such organisations in order to determine their underlying 
motivations. Second, this kind of language tends to paint NGO workers in an 
overly positive light, as “saints” and is closely tied to the idea that NGOs 
themselves are by definition good-making or righteous organisations (see 
1.2.3.6).168  
Finally, for our purposes, the motivations of individuals within an organisation 
are largely irrelevant. While of course it cannot (and should not) be denied 
that those who work in NGOs make a number of personal sacrifices out of 
their desire to satisfy a moral aim and change the world for the better, such a 
feature is not central to a definition of an NGO as a collective agent. An 
organisation as a whole may operate with the same agency, even when the 
individuals who comprise it are motivated by a diverse set of reasons, 
including highly self-interested ones.169   
Revised condition: relies on voluntary interaction 
The second, external version of the voluntary condition is worth maintaining, 
as it is apt for capturing their non-coercive or associational nature (empirical 
adequacy), and explaining how calls for their legitimacy and self-justification 
arise. That they receive support and build relationships based on consent and 
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agreement bears direct relevance to how NGOs relate to others as agents and, 
thus, is important for constructing a characterisation of an NGO that speaks to 
their particular obligations and guiding principles. As Edwards and Hulme 
remarked in the early literature on NGOs, “their calling is voluntary and self-
chosen, so [they] must continually justify their presence in, and value to 
society.”170 It is this process of justification that will be explored as the source 
of normative demands on NGOs later on. Maintaining a voluntary condition is 
important for explaining why this process of justification arises in the first 
place and how it is different from other forms of justification, for example, that 
which is demanded of coercive institutions like the state. 
1.2.3.6   Values: the functional feature 
Salamon and Anheier originally used the structural-operational definition as a 
way of identifying the non-profit sector as a whole, classifying NGOs as the 
subset of this sector that is specifically geared towards development. In other 
words, they classified NGOs as a subset by adding a functional feature.  
In this fashion, other definitions of NGOs, primarily in the development 
literature, but also elsewhere, have presented some combination of the above-
described structural-operational conditions, along with a sixth condition that 
refers to the purpose or function of such organisations. This latter feature is 
where definitions are most likely to diverge from one another, as authors have 
offered a variety of interpretations of NGOs’ “raison d′être.”171   
Problems 
Because the goals and mission statements of NGOs play such a significant role 
in defining individual organisations, it seems these should also have some part 
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in characterising NGOs as a group. And yet, it has been extremely difficult to 
generalise across the various values and missions of NGOs. 
Salamon and Anheier recognised this difficulty as well, citing two problems 
with a functional definition of organisations that are relevant to our 
discussion: its lack of parsimony, and its ambiguity. 
Defining NGOs based on their purpose can lead to a laundry list of functions 
that complicates a definition.172 As an example, Vakil (1997) attempts to 
capture the functional dimension of NGOs by defining them as organisations 
“oriented” towards “welfare, development, advocacy, development education, 
networking and research.”173 Such an account is already a hodgepodge, but it is 
common to find longer and more complicated lists elsewhere in the literature. 
One way to avoid this problem is to abstract from the variety of NGO missions 
and to generalise the type of function that these missions serve. Vakil (1997) 
again, offers a broader definition of NGOs as “geared to improving the quality 
of life of disadvantaged people.”174 While this definition may be suitable for 
Vakil’s development-focused audience, it excludes environmental groups such 
as Greenpeace or World Wildlife Federation and also, arguably, human rights 
advocacy organisations such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International, whose aims are better described as rights protection and 
promotion.   
Other common attempts at identifying a general NGO function include 
“working towards a common goal,”175 working with a ‘”social vision,”176 or “for 
the public good.”177 While much easier to work with than a list, one purchases 
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parsimony at the cost of clarity; as Salamon and Anheier (1992a, pp. 138-9) 
point out, “common goals” or “the good” are highly ambiguous categories:  
Serving the public good…is a difficult concept to define with precision 
and may depend on the eye of the beholder…The Weeks organisation 
may have been considered charitable in medieval England for its work 
in distributing ‘faggots’ used in burning heretics, but only a few die-
hards would consider this a valid charitable purpose today. 
Through a combination of factors—their historical origins, their mission 
statements, the activities and issues in which they are engaged—there is 
something value-laden about the agency of NGOs that all definitions of the 
term attempt to capture. While making attempts to incorporate this 
important feature, the functional condition, as well as the less rigorous story-
telling portraits of NGOs as “idealist” “do-gooders” who work for “the 
disadvantaged”, the “powerless” and the “voiceless”, risk running afoul of a 
conflation of description and evaluation. 
As reflected in Salamon and Anheier’s comments, the main weakness of the 
functional feature is that it seems to invite positive normative assumptions 
regarding the aims and activities of an NGO. The worry is that it is impossible 
to describe the values aspect of NGOs without implicitly affirming those 
values or making positive assumptions about NGOs as social actors. Hence the 
oft-expressed sentiment that, while these values seem so central to these 
organisations’ identity, a functional definition must be abandoned. Such 
definitions are, ultimately, “in the eye of the beholder” and “unanswerable 
outside a particular scholar’s own political leanings.”178 
And yet, this problem can be reduced to a conflation that suggests a rather 
straight-forward resolution. It seems clear that there is a distinction between 
describing an organisation as oriented towards a set of values and actually 
affirming those values. One can speak of NGOs as “do-gooders” without 
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asserting that they do good, or that what they are aiming to do actually is 
good. In saying that they are do-gooders, we are saying something about the 
way in which NGOs identify themselves, and this does not commit us to 
affirming the value of that identity, nor to claiming that the NGO successfully 
lives up to it through its activities. 
Revised condition: norm-enacting  
The best way to describe these organisations’ orientation toward values 
without endorsing those values, I suggest, is to describe NGOs as norm-
enacting. By “norm,” I mean what others might specify as a “moral norm”179: a 
rule that guides action based on a conception of right action or morally 
required states of affairs. An NGO’s norms constitute its vision for how the 
world ought to be, or what actions or processes ought to take place within it. 
Its activities or programmes then constitute enactments of these norms.  
This is an observable, empirical feature that refers to the structure of NGO 
identity statements. The norms that NGOs enact may not be “true” norms (i.e. 
they may be rules based on erroneous judgements about what is good), but 
they still posses the structure of a norm insofar as they express a belief about 
what ought to be the case. This structure creates the basis for a unified 
definition, as it is shared by all NGOs, regardless of the content of their 
particular norms. In this way we can avoid laundry lists of causes as well as 
evaluative assumptions about the goodness of NGOs, while still capturing 
what it means for them to be organisations defined in some way by values. As 
an illustration, consider the following self-identifying statements from several 
NGOs:  
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BRAC is “dedicated to alleviating poverty by empowering the poor to bring 
about change in their own lives.”180 
Here, the norm enacted is: Poverty should be alleviated through the 
empowerment of the poor.  
Greenpeace “champion[s] environmentally responsible and socially just 
solutions, including scientific and technical innovation.”181  
Here, the norm enacted is: Solutions to the management of our natural 
resources should be environmentally responsible and socially just, and be 
amenable to scientific and technical innovation. 
Médecins Sans Frontières “are committed to providing medical aid where it is 
most needed, regardless of race, religion, politics or gender and also to raising 
awareness of the plight of the people we help.”182  
Here the norm enacted is: Medical aid should be provided based on level of 
need, and the injustices that cause this need ought to be better and more 
widely known. 
Dogs for the Disabled “is a life-transforming charity, creating exceptional 
partnerships between people living with disability and specially trained 
assistance dogs. Through practical assistance a dog can offer freedom and 
independence to children and adults with physical disabilities and children 
with autism.”183 
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Here, the norm enacted is: It is valuable and important to transform the lives of 
children and adults with physical and developmental disabilities by helping 
them gain greater freedom and independence. 
Our fifth and final defining condition, then, is whether an organisation is 
norm-enacting: whether it identifies itself as following a rule that guides action 
in light of a judgment about what is good.   
 
 
1.2.4   NGO: a working empirical definition 
From the above discussion, the resulting characterisation is as follows. An 
NGO is an autonomous, norm-enacting organisation that is not 
motivated by profit and is reliant on voluntary interaction. An 
organisation consists of more than one person, acting collectively and with 
long-term intentionality. An organisation is autonomous with respect to 
other agents, in particular the state, if and only if it is both self-mandated (sets 
its own mandate and charters its own creation) and self-governing (sets its 
own projects and is responsible for its own funding, though it may receive 
grants from the state). An organisation is not motivated by profit if it 
pursues profit only as an instrumental aim, if ever, and never as an end-in-
itself. It relies on voluntary interaction if other agents are not under legal 
requirement or directly coerced to interact with it. Finally, and most 
importantly, an organisation is norm-enacting if it defines itself through 
activities that are enactments of rules that prescribe a valued outcome or 
action.  
Different NGOs will meet these conditions to various degrees. Therefore, 
while this set of conditions is necessary and sufficient for classifying an 
organisation as an NGO, each condition can be understood as a continuous 
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scale. NGOs that are lower on certain conditions therefore share greater 
overlap with the agency of the organisational type from which that condition 
distinguishes it: an organisation that is low on autonomy and voluntary 
interaction may be more like a state agent, whereas an organisation that aims 
to sell products and distribute profits among its members may be more like a 
firm. 
 
 
1.2.5   Theoretical definition 
Because an NGO is not defined by its generation of profits or its provision of 
religious or spiritual services, and because it is autonomous from state 
institutions and relies on voluntary interaction, such organisations must 
engage with motivations of other agents that are not related to profit, 
spirituality, or fear of punishment. Because they define themselves by 
activities that are enactments of certain norms, or by their claims that they are 
uniquely positioned to deliver on a given goal, it is through recognition and 
acceptance of such claims that NGOs are capable of interacting with others, 
and thus capable of exercising their agency. Without these collaborative 
interactions, NGOs are impotent, would-be actors. Therefore, it is this 
collaborative nature of an NGO’s exercise of it own agency that is the focal 
point for understanding them as a unique theoretical subject, that is, as a 
normative agent within their own right: 
An NGO is defined theoretically as an agent whose existence and 
agency is predicated entirely by collaborative activities with other 
agents that perceive it to be norm-enacting.  
This theoretical definition accommodates the critique of NGO agency 
mentioned earlier, which holds that: “While there can be no doubt that NGOs 
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participate in the creation of agreed conventions involving multiple social 
actors and sites, such participation—which takes place on the basis of 
capability attribution—takes place within a policy field-specific set of 
justificatory norms, values and knowledge claims.”184 Complementing this, the 
above understanding of NGO agency acknowledges the importance of the 
influence of other actors and institutions on NGO agency. At the same time, it 
recognises the active role NGOs themselves can play in defining and shaping 
other agents’ perceptions and abilities, via the same shared system of 
justificatory norms, values and knowledge claims.  
Hilhorst herself draws attention to the idea that “NGO” has a general meaning, 
insofar as organisations use it as a label to identify themselves:  
What is important is that they adopt the label of NGO. This label is a 
claim-bearing label. In its most common use, it claims that the 
organization is ‘doing good for the development of others.’ The label 
has a moral component. Precisely because it is doing good, the 
organization can make a bid to access funding and public 
representation.185  
My two definitions provide a versatile and yet general answer to the question 
that Hilhorst claims cannot be answered: What is an NGO? Empirically, it 
possesses the five organisational characteristics listed above (1.2.4). 
Theoretically, I agree with Hilhorst that the term “NGO” is a “claim-bearing 
label” with “a moral component.” However, my account differs importantly 
from Hilhorst’s on the implications of this moral component of NGO identity. 
An NGO is an agent that claims to enact certain norms, and relies on 
collaborations with other parties who interact with it largely on the basis of 
these claims. This, as I will argue throughout the remainder of the thesis, 
triggers obligations that apply to any organisation operating under the claim-
bearing label of “NGO.”  
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1.3   Establishing uniqueness 
 
I will now take the working definition offered above and explore how it works 
to distinguish NGOs from five main other types of agents: individuals, broader 
civil society/nonprofit actors, firms, religious institutions, and the state. 
 
1.3.1   Individuals 
Nonshared features: organised.  
As organisations, NGOs stand apart from individuals insofar as they are 
constituted by a collective effort of several people who set long-term goals, 
give reasons for those goals, and create detailed plans to realise them. Their 
collectivity distinguishes them as normative agents in virtue of the fact that 
collectives are able to exert greater influence on others through the multiple 
individuals that comprise them, enjoy a special identity—and thus, certain 
privileges and opportunities—under law, and also possess a greater degree of 
informal power in the eyes of others.  
The nature of collective agency, particularly the ability to ascribe moral 
responsibility to collective agents, is a subject of contentious debate. 
Defending a general account of collective agency is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Therefore, I assume throughout that it makes sense to speak of 
collective agents as being intentional, responsible and accountable.186 
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1.3.2   Civil Society 
Non-shared features: norm-enacting. 
My analysis here parallels Salamon and Anheier’s construal of the relationship 
between NGOs and the nonprofit sector: the former is a sub-set of the latter. 
However, whereas they defined NGOs more narrowly as nonprofit 
organisations engaged specifically in development and poverty relief, the 
definition I have constructed allows for a greater diversity of organisations, all 
of which are united in virtue of their perceived enactment of certain action-
guiding rules. 
NGOs differ from ad hoc and casual social interactions by way of being 
organised. They differ from other parts of civil society or the nonprofit sector 
in so far as their collaborations rest on the perception of their activities as 
norm-enacting. This separates NGOs from, for example, bowling clubs, 
unions, museums and professional groups like lawyers’ associations.  
We can distinguish between NGOs and other civil society actors by 
distinguishing between the kind of value entailed within a norm, as opposed 
to an interest. Norms and interests both entail evaluative judgments, but these 
judgments are importantly different with respect to their direction of fit, that 
is, how they relate to states of the world. The values that comprise an 
individual’s interests have a world-to-value direction of fit. We are presented 
with activities, products or opportunities, and fit our judgments of what is 
good based on what is on offer. Norms, on the other hand, have a value-to-
world direction of fit: we seek to shape and change the world to meet our 
norms, not the other way around.  
Bowling clubs and professional associations may be enactments of certain 
values, namely, the value of bowling or the value of horticulture, but these are 
interest-values: they are judgments of value that select from an available set of 
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activities or subjects in the world.187 Such associations could be thought of as 
interest-enacting: hubs where individuals that value a particular activity or 
profession, such as bowling, may coordinate their shared interests.188 In 
contrast, the perception of NGOs as norm-enacting implies they are organised 
around values to which the world must conform, not vice-versa: poverty ought 
to be reduced, the environment ought to be protected in a responsible 
manner, etc.  
This is what makes professional associations in the developing world 
somewhat of a grey area: in one sense, if one is not a lawyer, one does not have 
a reason to support or engage with a lawyer’s organisation, and such 
associations are part of the civil society of the country in which they are 
formed. But if one ascribes to the norm that an orderly system of law is 
important for the development of an impoverished country and that 
supporting a professional lawyers’ association assists towards realising that 
end (bringing the world closer to fulfilling that value), then foreign donors or 
supporters may engage with that association in a manner similar to the way in 
which they would engage with an NGO.  
In sum, all civil society actors define themselves by reference to some kind of 
value. The difference between NGOs and other third sector organisations rests 
on the direction of fit that value has with respect to the world.  
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1.3.3   Firms 
Nonshared features: norm-enacting, not motivated by profit. 
The distinguishing features between NGOs and firms are in some ways clear-
cut: NGOs only ever seek profit as a means to a further end that is selected on 
the basis of a certain set of values, whereas firms have a single bottom line of 
profit, which is the sole necessary and sufficient condition for their activities.  
As greater work has been done on corporate social responsibility and the place 
of market-based agents within theories of global justice, and as more attention 
has been drawn to the values of efficiency and effectiveness in the work of 
international development and aid NGOs (and their alleged failure to live up 
to those values), tighter analogies have been drawn between NGOs and 
corporate bodies. From the NGO side, these organisations have been 
compared to corporations that have public or social benefit as their bottom 
line instead of profit, and thus, should adopt similar instrumental strategies 
and maximising principles in their work regarding morally good outcomes.189  
As will be argued in chapters 2 and 3, the way in which NGOs collaborate with 
others does not lend itself to an interpretation of NGOs as economic agents. 
Very briefly, one main reason why this is so is that the structure of an NGO’s 
relationships is fundamentally different: the “principal” that provides funding 
to an NGO is not identical to the parties who benefit from the NGO’s 
“product.” Insofar as this leads NGOs to engage with those parties in a manner 
that differs from the way corporations engage with shareholders and 
customers, they operate as theoretically distinct agents.  
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1.4.4   Religious institutions 
Nonshared features: autonomous 
If we attempt to define NGOs by the structure of their values instead of their 
content, then it becomes difficult to distinguish them from religious 
institutions, since the latter are also feasibly interpreted as norm-enacting 
organisations. Further problems ensue if one attempts to base this distinction 
on a notion of religious practice. Defining religious from non-religious practice 
does not necessarily lead to a neat dividing line between religious institutions 
on one side and NGOs on the other. It is perhaps for these affinities that 
NGOs have been described often by critics as “secular missionaries.”190  
My definition provides a better way to draw the distinction by highlighting 
how religious institutions lack one of the two components that comprise the 
autonomy condition. NGOs, it was said, are both self-mandated and self-
governed. While an organisation cannot be self-mandated if it is not self-
governed, there are organisations that are self-governed but do not qualify as 
self-mandated: religious institutions are such a type of organisation. Religious 
institutions are not self-mandated because they are considered by their 
practitioners to be mandated by a higher power or spiritual dimension. They 
therefore lack the autonomy that characterises an NGO.  
Recall the contrast between religious institutions and faith-based NGOs 
discussed in 1.2.3.3. Faith-based NGOs are not only autonomous from religious 
institutions themselves, they are also sufficiently autonomous from the 
spiritual framework that mandates a religious institution. Those who create 
and work for faith-based organisations are motivated and inspired by their 
religious practices and their self-identification as believers; however, their 
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organisational mandate is represented as a self-originating enactment of their 
religious values and beliefs. This mandate is not depicted as issuing directly 
from a higher power or spiritual framework. To the extent that some 
organisations do view and portray their mandate in this manner, they move 
further away from the agency of an NGO towards a charitable form of religious 
institution.    
 
1.4.5   The state 
Nonshared features: norm-enacting, voluntary 
One of the key features of the state is its non-voluntary nature: interaction 
between individuals as co-citizens is taken to be coercive, with the nature of 
that coercion interpreted in a variety of ways. The tradition of political 
philosophy in the West can be viewed as a series of attempts to reconcile this 
non-voluntary feature of the state with the preservation of human freedom. 
How is the existence of the state possible, that is, how is it rationally justifiable 
to those who submit to it, and how is it normatively justifiable, i.e. legitimate?  
While their inability to coerce does not exempt NGOs from justifying their 
activities, it does shape their relationships to others in such a manner as to be 
sufficiently distinguishable from government institutions. While the problem 
of normative justification for the state rests on justifying their coercive powers, 
this problem for NGOs rests on their being able to deliver on the assumptions 
others must make in order to be motivated to interact with them. This 
provides a significant dividing line between the agency of state institutions 
and that of NGOs. States are not “norm-enacting” in the same manner as 
NGOs. States may be required to follow or enact norms as a way of 
establishing or justifying their coercive power. Defining NGOs as we have 
here—as agents that rely on collaborative engagement with others who 
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perceive its activities to be norm-enacting—presents us with a different type 
of agency. NGOs gain their abilities, or powers, through others’ recognition of 
them as norm-enacting agents. As discussed in the following chapters, their 
standards of assessment will rest on the implications of this recognition.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the discussion of this chapter, I can now provide a brief list of 
organisations that illustrate the type of agent discussed throughout the 
remainder of this thesis:  
 INGOs, such as Amnesty International, BRAC, Greenpeace, World 
Wildlife Federation, Oxfam, CARE International, World Vision; 
 Domestic charities in ‘Northern’ nations, such as the British Legion, 
United Way, Shelter UK, Harlem Children’s Zone; 
 Domestic NGOs in ‘Southern’ nations, such as the People Engaged in 
People Projects Foundation (Philippines), the Mongolian Center for 
Gender Equality (Mongolia), and the Uganda Child Rights Network 
(Uganda). 
Here, I have argued that the current debate over the definition of an NGO is 
caused by problems inherent in the term itself and the extended use of the 
term across diverse cultural and research contexts. With respect to the latter, 
the use of the term in social science has been frustrated by the lack of 
recognition of three different types of definition: technical-legalistic, 
empirical, and theoretical. 
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With this distinction in hand, I set out an empirical definition of an NGO as 
an autonomous, norm-enacting organisation not motivated by profit and 
reliant on voluntary interaction. Particular organisations can fulfil these 
conditions to varying degrees, however all must be met to qualify as an NGO. 
These empirical features shape the way in which an NGO relates to others. In 
other words, they shape the way it operates theoretically as an agent. The 
resultant theoretical characterisation of an NGO is as an agent whose 
existence and agency is predicated entirely by collaborative activities with 
other agents who perceive it to be norm-enacting.  
I then briefly reviewed the ways in which this theoretical definition 
distinguishes NGOs from individuals, other civil society organisations, 
economic agents, religious institutions, and the state. However, the case for 
distinguishing NGOs from economic agents and the state was not fully 
developed, as this will come in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 4. 
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CHAPTER 2   THE VALUE OF NGO 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In March 2010, the UK-based New Philanthropy Capital launched a manifesto 
calling for a more uniform, sector-wide approach to charity evaluation. The 
purpose of the suggested reforms was to reduce the costs incurred by UK 
charities through their efforts to meet an assortment of accountability 
requirements, each specific to a different donor agency.191 New Philanthropy 
Capital is a type of organisation that has grown in number and in prominence 
in recent years: a charity founded for the purpose of monitoring and 
evaluating other charities. Other such groups include the U.S.-based GiveWell, 
whose efforts to measure charity effectiveness were discussed in detail in Peter 
Singer’s 2009 The Life You Can Save, and Giving What We Can, an Oxford-
based group started by British Academy postdoctoral fellow Toby Ord, which 
enlists individuals to pledge 10% of their lifetime salary to charity, while 
providing statistics and recommendations on which NGOs would use their 
donation most effectively.192   
Organisations such as New Philanthropy Capital or GiveWell reflect the 
growing view that service-providing NGOs ought to embrace stronger 
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practices of accountability. This concern encompasses organisations working 
domestically for public benefit, as well as larger NGOs engaged in 
international development and aid. From the perspective of these third sector 
monitors, accountability allows for better dissemination of information 
concerning how aid is administered, and can incentivise organisations to 
perform more efficiently with the funding they receive. This performance-
driven concern for accountability is, in part, a response to the strident 
criticism that NGOs—in particular development and aid INGOs—have failed 
to produce any measurable, positive change after decades of activity.193  
These voices join a long-running chorus that has questioned the 
accountability of NGOs for nearly two decades.194 Advocacy-focused NGOs 
face similar demands for accountability due to the collection of formal and 
informal powers they wield with respect to the activities of other social actors 
such as corporations, states, and international institutions of governance. 
These organisations are asked to demonstrate “voice” accountability by 
providing evidence for their empirical claims and claims of representation.195 
The expectation to demonstrate voice accountability has become particularly 
acute for NGOs lobbying the WTO, IMF and World Bank on development and 
global economic policy. Some charge that these organisations campaign 
against policies that would help the poor, while providing no means of 
demonstrating that they adequately represent the interests of the poor. 
Within these contexts of performance and voice, accountability is deployed 
only as a specific instrument for a specific purpose. Service-providing NGOs 
are asked to demonstrate measurable success to actual or potential donors and 
to provide detailed information on the costs of achieving such success 
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primarily for the purpose that donors may direct their funds most effectively 
towards beneficient goals. This view of accountability is aptly captured by Leif 
Wenar (2006): “Greater accountability is not always good and when greater 
accountability in development agencies would be good, its value is only 
instrumental, not intrinsic."196 Similar observations are made regarding voice 
accountability. Holding NGOs accountable for their campaigns can improve 
NGOs’ credibility and their potential to democratise political processes, but at 
the same time accountability is not “an absolute value,”197 as there are costs 
attached to increasing transparency or adopting labour-intensive democratic 
decision-making processes within an organisation.  
Many of those writing within the NGO literature may agree broadly that 
charities need to know more about what is working and what is not, and about 
the long-term impacts of their projects. More commonly, research on NGOs 
endorses the view that accountability can, in theory, be useful for improving 
an NGO’s public reputation.198 However, based on case studies and cross-
country comparisons, many NGO researchers have outlined reasons for 
doubting that accountability can deliver improved performance or accurate 
accounts of success and failure.  The type of information that websites such as 
GiveWell ask for in order to evaluate an organisation’s impact requires 
intensive measurement and research, which each individual NGO is expected 
to undertake and fund itself. Moreover, those writing on advocacy-focused 
NGOs have expressed concern over whether it is constructive or even fair to 
ask NGOs to be accountable when the powers of advocacy they wield are 
already so informal and weak compared to other types of actor.199  
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While she does not discuss specific organisations like Givewell or New 
Philanthropy Capital, Lisa Jordan has highlighted the strains that such 
quantitative performance-focused accountability requirements place on the 
already restricted resources of NGOs:  
What’s wrong with all this activity? Plenty. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with these accountability mechanisms and in 
some circumstances they can be quite helpful. But in other 
circumstances they are inadequate, they do not address the 
needs of the NGOs, they are divorced from missions, they do not 
address moral obligations, they prioritize some relationships 
over others, they are quite often punitive and controlling in 
application…and often fail to recognise the context within which 
NGOs operate.200 
Jordan concludes with an expression of scepticism that has become 
representative of the views of many on contemporary accountability practices 
across the NGO sector: “No one has really made a positive argument as to why 
NGOs should undertake a risky, expensive, difficult exercise to create 
meaningful and concrete accountability mechanisms.”201 
This chapter attempts to build such a positive case for accountability. Current 
concerns over accountability’s value arise out of the prevailing view that if 
accountability is good, it must be good for something, such as performance 
improvement or verifying NGOs’ claims.  Accountability is merely an 
instrument through which other valued ends are realised. This view is 
articulated in 2.1, and revealed to be defeasible based on further information 
regarding what constitutes an accountable relationship. The case for 
accountability is then built on the position that accountability has intrinsic, in 
addition to instrumental, value for NGOs. Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 discuss 
three distinctions that characterise different conceptions of accountability. In 
each case, I show how failing to recognise these distinctions lends support for 
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the argument that accountability is only an instrument for reaching other 
ends. At the same time, I argue for an alternative definition of accountability 
as an obligation to structure a relationship so as to enable moral appraisal of 
one’s actions. Under this conception of what I call moral appraisal 
accountability, accountable relationships can be good for their own sake, 
regardless of what outcomes or ends they produce. This is because 
accountability is an embodiment of respect between an NGO and the parties 
whom it affects, and this show of respect is expected of an NGO by those who 
agree to collaborate with it. Thus, accountability is valuable for its own sake, 
as a constitutive element of the relationships that support an NGO’s agency. 
Section 2.5 concludes by arguing that moral appraisal accountability is more 
important for NGOs than a close alternative, known as mission accountability, 
because it provides a stronger justification for the actions of organisations that 
fulfil its conditions. 
 
 
2.1   Accountability and value: the instrumental view 
 
2.1.1   A working definition of accountability 
Accountability is sometimes described as an “expansive”, “chameleon-like”202 
term that defies a single, shared definition.203 I will not discuss here the 
various ways in which accountability is conceptualised, nor summarise the 
thorough taxonomies of others.204 Rather, my aim is to look at one prominent 
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understanding of NGO accountability, which treats it as an instrument for 
procuring certain ends.   
The broad contours of this account are as follows: accountability is a process205 
or interaction206 between two agents, thereby implying the presence of two 
actors: an accounting agent and an account holder.207 These actors have a 
relationship in which one agent provides, or is expected to provide, an account 
of some event or action to another.208 Moreover, on most definitions the term 
implies that the account holder has capabilities such that it can act so as to 
“hold the other agent responsible,”209 although this is a contested issue.210   
To capture this broad sketch more succinctly, we can use this initial working 
definition: 
Accountability1: an interaction between two agents, the 
accountable (A) and the account holder (H), in which A acts, or 
is expected to act, to meet the standards or expectations of H, 
and provides an account of her actions to H, and H has some 
ability to affect A’s interests based on H’s determination of 
whether such standards have been met.  
A’s providing an account to H can be fulfilled in a variety of ways: by providing 
evidence or giving a justification, for example.  As already mentioned, the 
stipulation that H have the ability to affect A, that is, reward or sanction A 
depending on whether standards are met, is an issue of debate. However, by 
and large, many seem to adopt the position reflected in Diane Leat’s comment 
                                                 
205
 Mulgan (2000 p. 555), Ebrahim (2003, p. 884). 
206
 Mulgan (2000 p. 555); Peruzzotti (2006, p. 45). 
207
 Mulgan (2000). 
208
 See above, ff. 2; Lloyd, et al. (2008). 
209
 Jordan (2007); Wenar (2006); O’Neill (2002); Gray & Bebbington (2006); Ebrahim & 
Weisband (2007); Mulgan (2000); Dubnick & Justice (2004). 
210
 D. L. Brown (2007); Ebrahim & Weisband (2007). 
90 
 
that accountability is only ‘real’ if there exists the possibility for sanctions.211 
We will return to this issue in 2.4.  
 
2.1.2   The argument against intrinsic value 
On this initial understanding, the interaction between A and H is generally 
taken to have merely instrumental, as opposed to intrinsic, value.212 What 
authors mean by this is unclear, as intrinsic value can be construed in several 
different ways. Given the emphasis on whether accountability’s value is 
dependent or independent of other entities or states of affairs, it seems that 
most discussants mean what is more commonly referred to in value theory as 
“final” value.213 Accountability, if it were to have such final value, would be 
worth pursuing for its own sake, regardless of its connection to other goals, 
simply on the basis that having accountable organisations is a good thing in 
itself.  
But this is not the conclusion drawn by many who endorse accountability1. 
The reason for this is not immediately clear, as neither instrumental nor final 
value is entailed by the above definition, and arguments against the final value 
of NGO accountability are rarely laid out in detail. The clearest articulations of 
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such a view are presented separately by Mark Philp and Leif Wenar.214 Wenar 
acknowledges the instrumental benefits of accountability in virtue of its role in 
bringing about other valued ends. For instance, A’s actions and decision-
making process are in some degree made transparent to H, such transparency 
increases knowledge and information-sharing, and being held to H’s standards 
provides incentives for A to be responsive to external expectations.215 In less 
abstract terms, requiring NGOs to adhere to external standards in evaluating 
their performance presumably leads to an improvement in that performance, 
by forcing them to achieve measurable results in a cost-effective manner.  
While it contributes positively to other valued ends, Wenar insists this is as far 
as accountability’s value goes: 
There is nothing intrinsically valuable about making one 
institution more accountable to another. Increasing 
accountability between institutions always involves costs, and 
these costs should only be born when they are outweighed by 
the benefits.216 
This does not constitute an argument for accountability’s instrumental value, 
as the second sentence does not support the conclusion offered in the first. 
Acknowledging that a practice or goal has costs does not mean that it is only 
instrumentally valuable. Its final value may be outweighed by a consideration 
of costs; however this does not support the conclusion that no such final value 
exists in the first place.217 
Why might Wenar be drawn to such a view? An initial reason lies in his 
further remark: “Reducing severe poverty is by far the most urgent goal of 
                                                 
214
 While Philp and Wenar are motivated by different problems—for Philp, it is the ambiguity 
of accountability’s meaning in democratic theory and for Wenar it is the lack of accountability 
in aid and development NGOs—both argue that accountability does not possess intrinsic 
value and is to be valued as an instrument only. Wenar (2006); Philp (2009).  
215
 Wenar (2006); Ebrahim &Weisband (2007). 
216
 Wenar (2006, p. 11). 
217
 Alternatively, something may have final value that is worth promoting despite any costs. 
92 
 
development aid, so increasing accountability between institutions will be 
important primarily insofar as this leads to more effective poverty relief.”218 
The corollary to this is that introducing an accountability mechanism does not 
always contribute positively to poverty reduction; as an illustration Wenar 
refers to the maladroit operations of USAID, the primary agency in the United 
States government responsible for distributing foreign aid. USAID’s budget is 
determined yearly by Congress and the Department of State, who are also able 
to specify in detail how USAID spends its money.219 Budgetary reports and 
program evaluations from USAID are frequent and detailed, with these 
accountability mechanisms filtering down to the local civil society groups and 
NGOs that USAID partners with in host countries. Such groups must in turn 
provide USAID with extensive reports on their projects and demonstrate 
success through purportedly rigorous and reliable measurements.220  
Despite strong accountability channels, USAID and its projects perform poorly 
in terms of creating sustainable, long-lasting benefits for developing 
countries.221 This is because, Wenar says, such mechanisms make USAID 
accountable to the foreign policy interests of the State Department, as well as 
to the special interest groups—namely, domestic agri-business and 
manufacturers—who place pressure on US congressmen and women. Catering 
to these interests allocates aid money in a way that does not significantly 
reduce poverty or assist the worst-off in the developing world. The operations 
of USAID demonstrate that, without adequate design, strong accountability 
mechanisms can create more harm than good with regards to poverty 
reduction.222 
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While this illuminates the angle from which Wenar views accountability, he 
does not offer enough detail regarding what it means for a thing to be 
intrinsically valuable in order for a premise stating the urgency of poverty 
reduction to make the argument valid. Even if poverty relief is of utmost value 
when it comes to the operations of development and aid NGOs, this does not 
mean that all other aspects of such operations are valuable only with respect 
to how they service that aim. There may be multiple bearers of intrinsic value. 
Moreover, the same bearer of value may be both instrumentally valuable and 
valued in its own right. For example, a rare stamp may have value both 
instrumentally, due to its function as postage, and intrinsically (for its own 
sake), due to its artistic qualities, historical significance, or rarity.223 
Analogously, a participatory method of accountability may both improve NGO 
performance and, at the same time, be of value to both the NGO and its 
beneficiaries in and of itself. 
The instrumental approach to accountability is ultimately shaped by the view 
that some specified end has a value with respect to the operations of NGOs 
that outweighs all else. For Wenar, this specified end is the alleviation of 
severe poverty. This is motivated by his conviction that the wealthy have a 
stringent moral duty to aid the poor. For those writing on NGO accountability, 
effectiveness is still an important specified end, even if one does not think this 
end is an important moral aim: if NGOs are going to do anything, several NGO 
researchers believe, they ought to (at minimum) be effective at doing what 
they say they will do. In terms of voice accountability, improved credibility or 
the fulfilment of democratic principles can operate as the ultimate source of 
value.224  
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In all cases, while the specified end may vary, accountability is viewed “as 
instrumental to the independently specified normative goal,”225 not as a 
normative goal itself. Insofar as accountability is seen as failing to deliver on 
such specified ends, there is motivation for Lisa Jordan’s question: Why should 
NGOs consider accountability practices worth pursuing at all? 
But again, this view rests more on stipulation than on argument to support the 
conclusion that accountability’s value is measured only in terms of its 
instrumental role in procuring other ends. Citing examples of how 
accountability fulfils an instrumental role and arguing for the importance of 
the ends that it achieves, while leaving unexplored accountability’s possible 
intrinsic value, is a weak argumentative strategy. I now turn to three 
distinctions relevant to a better understanding of accountability in sections 
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, which will form the basis of my defence of an alternative 
position.   
 
 
2.2   Mechanism and relationship 
 
The USAID case is meant to demonstrate how mechanisms of accountability 
can be insufficient for reducing poverty if they are poorly designed. While 
USAID is a government agency, there are analogous examples from NGO 
practice. In 2000, for example, a consortium of humanitarian aid organizations 
initiated work on a new self-regulatory framework based on their observation 
that successful accountability practices with donors and international 
institutions had not contributed positively to their abilities to service crisis-
                                                 
225
 Ibid. (p. 31). 
95 
 
affected populations.226 The way in which they viewed their relationship to 
those affected by disasters parallels Wenar’s assessment of the relationship 
between USAID and the global poor: their accountability mechanisms had 
negatively impacted their effectiveness.  
However, a vital reason explaining why these mechanisms are insufficient is 
omitted in Wenar’s diagnosis. The mechanisms that hold USAID or 
humanitarian aid NGOs accountable are counter-productive with respect to 
aid because they create relationships of accountability with the wrong parties. 
The upshot of this is not simply that the mechanisms have failed to reduce 
suffering, but rather, that the mechanisms have failed to reduce suffering 
because they failed to create the right kind of accountability relationships.  The 
problem does not lie with accountability as such; it lies with the fact that 
USAID isn’t being held accountable for poverty relief, and isn’t accountable at 
all to the poor. The mechanisms of accountability are the culprits in both 
cases, and the failure of mechanism can be explained via a failure to create the 
kind of accountability relationships necessary for making USAID accountable 
for poverty relief, or for making Oxfam’s delivery of emergency aid transparent 
and effective.227 
Bringing in mechanisms to point to the precariousness of accountability’s 
value occurs elsewhere when Wenar cites elections as an example of how more 
accountability may not always lead to a greater overall benefit. U.S. 
presidential elections are an important feature of an accountable government, 
he points out, but not one we would wish to implement quarterly instead of 
quadrenially.228 Yet, this tells us little about the value of relationships of 
accountability, as elections are mechanisms, and an increase in mechanism is 
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not on par with an increase in accountability. Increasing their frequency could 
give political officials less time and opportunity to reflect on their actions or to 
work constructively towards meeting expected standards. In other words, the 
type, quantity and frequency of the use of mechanisms of accountability can 
make agents less capable of being held to account.229  
The distinction between mechanisms of accountability and accountability as a 
relationship between two parties is often elided when authors speak of 
accountability’s instrumental value. It may be difficult to see the difference at 
first, given the language in which the accountability relationship is often 
described. For example, thinking of accountability as an “interaction,” as many 
do (and as it appears in our working definition),230 lends itself to a reduction 
into mechanisms, since an interaction typically implies a concrete event or 
series of events between two parties (literally, “reciprocal action”231).  
But we can think about the relationship of accountability less in terms of an 
interaction and more as a structural feature of the interaction that conveys the 
meaning of the relationship to the parties involved. The significance of that 
structure for the two parties is distinct from the significance of the specific 
activities they engage in that constitute their relationship. To use an analogy: 
friendship can involve many combinations of joint activities, the provision of 
emotional support, regular communication, or shared past experiences, and 
thus, can vary widely from one set of friends to the next. The common strand 
uniting these different sets of activities under the category of friendship is that 
two individuals stand in a particular kind of relation, one of mutual good will, 
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trust, and support to one another, that is constituted by concrete particulars, 
but not reducible to them. 
The distinction between mechanism and relationship structure232 is reflected 
in Onora O’Neill’s comments on accountability and trust in public 
institutions. Trust involves placing faith in an institution’s capacity and 
commitment to perform its purpose to the highest relevant standards, without 
relying on a guarantee that they will do so233. Accountability mechanisms 
attempt to implement guarantees. However, O’Neill notes, if they were 
successful at doing so, we should see a decrease in the mistrust of such 
institutions. Instead, public mistrust of its institutions is on the rise. This 
occurs, in part, because accountability practices create a multitude of 
unrealistic and sometimes mutually conflicting expectations for institutional 
performance while also crippling the ability of institutions to meet such 
expectations.234 In other words, the mechanisms serve to undermine the 
relationship between the public and its institutions. 
I highlight O’Neill’s work on trust because the upshot of her discussion is 
often overlooked due to the general conflation between mechanism and 
relationship.235 The counterpart to trust is not accountability, but heavy-
handed mechanisms of oversight. Keeping mechanisms separate from the 
relationship they constitute is important, because elsewise there is no way to 
identify the difference between a mechanism that fails to bring about 
accountability and a mechanism that succeeds, but is costly. If accountability 
is taken to be synonymous with its mechanisms, there is no conceptual space 
for engaging critically with mechanisms in terms of whether they count as 
adequate practices and procedures for interactions of accountability.  
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The NGO literature cites many examples in which engaging in accountability 
diverts attention from project objectives, negatively affects which projects are 
pursued (e.g. being forced to establish measurable baselines and indicators for 
change can turn NGOs away from projects less conducive to being evaluated 
in such a way), emphasizes short-term over long-term planning, and is costly 
in terms of staff time and finances. All of these are likely examples of how 
mechanisms can go wrong. But rather than conclude that accountability’s 
value is questionable, we can instead question whether these mechanisms 
really do structure relationships in a way that makes an NGO accountable to 
its stakeholders.  
One might question the degree to which a relationship of accountability 
remains uniform across the varied contexts in which NGOs act. David Lewis 
(2007) and others236 have highlighted the contingencies of accountability: how 
it varies from context to context, culturally and institutionally. In support of 
these claims, numerous case studies have shown that accountability practices 
can produce different effects, are subject to different conditions, and can 
express different values in different countries and institutional 
environments.237 Yet, here too the examples cited are often audits and 
communication or human resources procedures, which, like elections, are 
mechanisms.238 This does not support the conclusion that the structured 
relationship of accountability holds different meanings across different 
contexts. The meaning of the relationship can remain constant as a relation of 
equality between the account-giver and holder. However, context ought to be 
taken into account in developing and selecting the appropriate mechanisms 
for creating this kind of relationship when environments vary. For example, 
mechanisms that involve written reports by account givers or written feedback 
from account holders may be well-suited for NGOs in developed countries, 
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while face-to-face consultations will contribute more to instilling egalitarian 
relationships in contexts with low literacy rates.239 
Where do these considerations leave the value of accountability? The 
contention that accountability is contextually variant, has negative side-
effects, and is costly, applies primarily to mechanisms, not to the relationship 
that NGOs can create with other parties when they are accountable. 
Mechanisms of accountability are instrumentally valuable, insofar as they, in 
the first instance, succeed in supporting relations of accountability between 
agents, and secondarily prove useful for other valued aims, such as improved 
performance or an increase in public trust and confidence toward NGOs. The 
particular costs of individual mechanisms and their appropriateness for use in 
different regions requires closer attention, as the above authors have 
suggested. But this should be pursued in light of the general aim to establish a 
certain type of a structured relationship between an NGO and its stakeholders. 
At the same time, some mechanisms may also be valued for their own sake. 
Examples of these mechanisms include the participatory methods mentioned 
above, or processes of organisational learning that allow members of an 
institution to reflect on their work and its long-term effects. Regardless of how 
they affect an NGO’s performance and accountability relations with other 
agents, opportunities for reflection can be a final end, valued for the sake of 
the reflection itself. In this way, mechanisms of accountability have the 
potential for both instrumental and final-end value. 
Now we are in a position to revise our original definition to specify the 
accountability relationship in terms of its structure, rather than by reference 
to its mechanisms (the bolded sections reflect changes made to the original):  
                                                 
239
 Slim (2002). 
100 
 
Accountability2 is: a structured relationship between two agents, the 
accountable (A) and the account holder (H), in which A acts—or is 
expected to act—to meet the standards or expectations of H and 
provides an account of her actions to H, and H has some ability to 
affect A’s interests based on H’s determination of whether such 
standards have been met.  
Accountability as a type of relationship structure may have more than mere 
instrumental value. But to establish this, we must understand what this 
structure consists in. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 aim to provide this required detail. 
 
 
2.3   Ability and responsibility 
 
2.3.1   The Directionality Paradox 
If the source of the problem with USAID and the humanitarian NGOs was that 
they had accounting relationships with the wrong account holders, then it 
seems we ought to alter mechanisms so as to improve the relationship that 
NGOs and agencies like USAID have with the poor and disadvantaged. Those 
who are best positioned to hold NGOs accountable for their efforts at reducing 
suffering are reasonably those who stand to benefit the most from their 
successful accomplishment.  
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In practice, however, NGO accountability remains strongly oriented towards 
donors.240 In part this is because the nature of the relationship bends power 
asymmetrically in favour of donors: it is easier for a displeased donor to find a 
new NGO to fund than for an NGO to find a new donor.241 We will return to 
this consideration below. But the emphasis on donor accountability rests also 
on perceived problems with implementing accountability to those people 
targeted by aid projects. While many voices have advocated for greater 
accountability toward NGOs’ intended beneficiaries, this call for change has 
been hampered by the acknowledgement that such accountability is, at best, 
extremely difficult to implement and, at worst, conceptually incoherent.242  
For many writing in the NGO literature, the difficulty with increasing 
beneficiary accountability is considered a serious problem, since many NGOs 
stake their identity and authority on their ties to the poor and 
disadvantaged.243 If accountability to such people seems impossible, then it is 
unclear on what basis NGOs may claim to be adequate advocates of, or 
providers to, the poor. An organisation may be able to advocate for wildlife or 
for children without being expected to be directly accountable to animals or 
five-year-olds; however, to treat full-grown adults in the same way is to place 
them on par with children or with persons who lack the ability to make 
choices for themselves, a message that development and aid NGOs would 
prefer to avoid conveying to, or about, their beneficiaries.  
Those writing within the literature on global justice and duties of aid tend to 
conclude that, given that aid is a moral priority, if NGO accountability can 
make aid more efficient and effective, then accountability to donors or other 
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equally powerful regulatory bodies must be emphasized.244 Accountability to 
beneficiaries, while perhaps more desirable, is more difficult to achieve. Thus, 
the focus ought to be on strengthening donor accountability for improved 
poverty relief. It is better that NGOs be accountable to someone, the idea goes, 
rather than to no one at all.245 
The reasoning behind these views—that accountability to beneficiaries is 
extremely difficult or even conceptually incoherent—can be expressed in an 
argument I term the Directionality Paradox, named after the way in which 
accountability relationships for NGOs are often characterised in terms of an 
“upwards” “downwards” or “horizontal” framework. 
While the directions are not given a clear definition, NGOs are widely said to 
have “upward” accountability towards donors and states, “downward” 
accountability towards those targeted by their projects, as well as sometimes 
members, and “horizontal” accountability towards other NGOs and private 
institutions.246 Based on this, it can be inferred that accountability runs upward 
when it is directed to an account holder that has greater power over the agent 
or a greater opportunity to leave the relationship than the agent. 
Accountability runs downward when this asymmetry runs in the opposite 
direction: the agent has greater power over the account holder or greater 
opportunity to leave the relationship, at least prior to the point at which 
mechanisms are put into place.247  
If accountability requires the threat of sanctions in order to secure 
compliance, then, in order for accountability to work it requires the account 
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holder, H, to have certain powers over the accountable agent (A). As Wenar 
puts it: “Only power balances power, and it is in general only the rich and their 
agents who will be able to hold the rich and their agents to account.”248 On 
this basis, the notion of downward accountability seems conceptually 
confused: "we are… confronted with a situation that is the very opposite of an 
ideal accountability relationship… Accountability, to use the same metaphor, 
is always 'upwards'."249  
In other words, downward accountability results in a paradox:  
D1.  A ought to be accountable to those affected by her 
actions.  
D2. H is affected by A’s actions. 
Therefore:    D3. A ought to be accountable to H. 
D4. A can be accountable only to those who have the 
power to hold A accountable. 
D5. H does not have the power to hold A accountable.  
Therefore:  D6. A cannot be accountable to H. 
D7. Ought implies can. 
Therefore:  D8. A ought not be accountable to H. 
D3. ⊥ D8. 
The contradiction produced by D3 and D8 arises out of an agent being 
directed to act in a way that is impossible for her to act, on the basis of two 
conceptions of accountability that are at odds with one another, expressed in 
D1 and D4. The Directionality Paradox rests on two assumptions: the first is 
the assumption, noted just above, that accountability is defined by the 
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presence of sanctions. The second assumption is that the ability to hold to 
account is a necessary condition for the initiation of any accountability 
relationship. This first assumption will remain unquestioned until the next 
section. It is the second assumption that I wish to challenge here. 
 
2.3.2   The distinction defined 
The paradox arises out of the ambiguous phrase “can be accountable” in D4. 
Depending on how this is read, accountability can be conceived of either as an 
ability-based responsibility which A has to H in virtue of H’s abilities, or as a 
responsibility to recognise or create an ability that A has towards H in virtue of 
other substantive moral reasons, in this case, in virtue of what A has done to H 
(as expressed in D 1). This produces the paradox, since A both can, and cannot, 
be held to account by H (she can, in the sense that she has a responsibility to 
create an ability in H in virtue of her affecting H, and yet cannot, in the sense 
that H currently lacks the power or ability to hold her to account). The first 
reading of accountability, as an ability-based responsibility, is considerably 
more popular, but it is the one I argue we ought to drop.  
The notions of moral responsibility, accountability, and ability (or capacity250), 
can connect in various ways, particularly when it comes to the responsibilities 
of institutional agents.251 In this context, to say that accountability is an 
ability-based responsibility means that an agent has a responsibility to provide 
an account of its actions, and this responsibility is justified by appeal to the 
abilities possessed by that agent and its account-holder. Ability-based 
approaches to accountability rely on separate accounts of independently-
                                                 
250
 Capacity is a tricky term because it can be defined in a variety of ways. See: Green (2005); 
O’Neill (2001); Meckled-Garcia (2008). Agential capacity is discussed in chapter 4; to avoid 
confusion I instead use the term ‘ability’ throughout most of this chapter. 
251
 These connections are explored further in Chapter 4. 
105 
 
specified ends, such as those discussed at the end of 2.1. For instance, NGOs 
have the ability to alleviate poverty and donors are presumably best able to 
hold them accountable for doing so. If poverty alleviation is the specified end 
that has moral priority, then the abilities of the NGO obligate it to alleviate 
poverty to the greatest extent possible, and the ability of the donor obligates 
the NGO to be accountable to the donor. 
The ability-based approach to the grounds of accountability is part of a 
broader capacity-based approach to the grounding of all agent 
responsibilities.252 Those who advocate basing  responsibilities on capacities 
consider this approach to be ‘forward-looking’: it asks what the agent is 
capable of doing in the future with respect to a set of moral priorities, rather 
than basing obligations on attributive responsibility for what the agent has 
done in the past.253  Given a group of bystanders seeing someone drowning in 
a lake, it is reasoned, the bystander who is by far the strongest swimmer has a 
greater responsibility to jump in and save the victim.254 Similarly, if an 
institution or organisation has the capacity to act in a way to protect or realise 
human rights, then this can ground an obligation for it to do so.255  
We can identify how this differs from treating accountability as a 
responsibility to create abilities by highlighting the different ways in which 
they approach the accountability obligation. A relationship that has an 
accountable structure is one in which an agent is expected or required to 
provide reasons for its actions to another. We can understand this expectation 
or requirement in terms of an obligation. An accountable agent, therefore, is 
one that has an obligation, or substantive responsibility, to provide reasons for 
its actions to another, and to respond in some way to the account holder’s 
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evaluation. If this is the case, then in order for the agent to fulfil her 
responsibility, the account holder must have the ability to understand the 
account provided, the ability to evaluate, and, since we are still assuming that 
sanctions are a necessary feature of accountability, the ability to sanction or 
reward.  
The ability-based approach reads this set of abilities as a necessary condition: 
the account holder must have these abilities in order for the account-giver to 
be obligated to provide an account. But this approach ignores the fact that 
abilities may not be necessary as the grounds of accountability; rather, they 
may instead be necessary as the content of the responsibility. The trust shared 
with a friend can be the grounds of your obligation to not have an affair with 
your friend’s spouse. Trust can in other cases be the content of a 
responsibility: one ought to maintain a certain level of trust with one’s 
romantic partner by refraining from reading his or her private 
correspondence.  
To say that accountability requires H to have the ability to hold A to account 
provides a directive for what the accountable agent must do: she must ensure, 
in order for her account-giving to be authentic, that H has the ability to 
understand her account, that H has sufficient information available to 
evaluate the account, and that she (A) has made herself available to sanctions, 
where deemed appropriate by H.  
Therefore, we can resolve the Paradox in the following way: 
D1. A ought to be accountable to those affected by her 
actions.  
D2. H is affected by A’s actions. 
Therefore:    D3. A ought to be accountable to H. 
D4. A can be accountable only to those who have the 
power to hold A accountable. 
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D5.* H does not currently have the power to hold A 
accountable.  
Therefore:  D6.* A cannot currently be accountable to H. 
D7. Ought implies can. 
Therefore:  D8.* A ought to create H’s power to hold A to  
account.  
 
If we read D4 as describing the content instead of the grounds for an 
accountability obligation, then instead of eliciting the conclusion that A ought 
not be accountable to H, we can conclude that H’s current inability to hold A 
accountable gives A a reason to instil that ability in H. 
This perspective emphasises the active role of the agent (A) in ensuring her 
own accountability, by structuring her relationships in a way that allows for 
her to be held to account. Which account holders are selected and on what 
basis—in other words, on what grounds the responsibility to give an account 
rests—is a further question.  
However, before we address this question, we must further establish the 
advantages of understanding accountability as a responsibility to recognise or 
create abilities in others. We can do this by highlighting a significant problem 
with the conception of accountability as a responsibility based on the pre-
existing abilities of the account holder. 
 
2.3.3   A problem for accountability as a responsibility derived from 
abilities 
Using an ability-based notion of responsibility to argue for increased 
accountability to donors is flawed insofar as it may be targeting the wrong 
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ability. D5 leaves unspecified which power H lacks that prevents her from 
holding A accountable. It is presumed that the most important ability is the 
ability to sanction, but other powers can be required in order to hold an agent 
to account.  
To return to the bystanders at the pool, it may be the case that the stronger 
swimmer has the worst eyesight. In this case, another bystander with less 
swimming strength, but a better ability to spot the drowning swimmer while 
in the water, would be a better candidate. Arguments for greater 
accountability to donors emphasise, first, NGOs’ poor abilities to provide 
rigorous evaluations and measurements of the successes and failures of their 
projects and, second, donors’ capacities for delivering sanctions. But such 
arguments rarely, if ever, mention the donors’ capacities for properly 
evaluating NGO success and failure or dictating the terms of such evaluations. 
The empirical evidence suggests that this ability can be severely limited: 
donors often have a short-term outlook for project success that forces NGOs 
to plan in 2-5 year cycles rather than consider long-term solutions.256 They 
may ask that NGOs use certain means in achieving projects that are later 
determined to be ill-suited for the cultural context, or ask for reports that are 
detached from capturing what real success would entail.257 They may place an 
overemphasis on measurable results when the goals concern highly qualitative 
and process-related or structural phenomena, such as a strengthened civil 
society or democracy, women’s empowerment, or changing perceptions of the 
disabled or outcast minority groups.258 If capacities are the basis for 
establishing the responsibility of accountability, it is not evident that donors 
satisfy all the requirements for holding NGOs to account.259  
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2.3.4   Accountability as a responsibility to recognise and create abilities 
Our revised conception of accountability is now as follows: 
Accountability3: a structured relationship between two agents, in which 
the accountable, A, (i) fulfils an obligation to ensure that H is in a 
position to hold A to account, (ii) gives an account to H for a set of 
actions; (iii) recognises H’s determination of whether H’s standards 
have been met, and (iv) complies with H’s exercise of its ability to affect 
A’s interests.  
While we have been speaking of accountability as a responsibility, it ought to 
be understood more precisely as the fulfilment of an obligation. A may have 
the obligation to ensure H is in a position to hold her to account, yet fail to 
fulfil it; in such a case, A is not accountable.  
I argued above that the ability-based approach to accountability fails to 
provide a way of identifying the abilities relevant for picking out account-
holders. If the ability-based approach to establishing responsibilities is 
unsuccessful at clearly identifying the grounds for accountability obligations, 
then we must ask: On what other substantive reasons can the obligation of 
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accountability rest, if not the abilities of individual and collective actors to 
sanction? An immediate possibility is that this responsibility is triggered by 
the ways in which NGOs interact with other actors. A key question, then, is 
what kind of NGO interactions ground the responsibility to recognise and 
create abilities in others. We turn now to three different frameworks that offer 
answers to this question. There, I will argue for a framework that best explains 
why accountability holds intrinsic value as a structured relationship based on 
obligation. 
 
 
2.4   To control and to appraise 
 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 aimed to show that accountability can be understood as a 
responsibility that an NGO has to establish a type of structured relationship 
with another agent. However, the specific nature of this relationship and the 
grounds on which this responsibility are based were not detailed. In this 
section, I provide answers to both, discussing the kind of evaluation that can 
obtain between the account holder and the account giver, and the basis on 
which an NGO has a responsibility to create the opportunities for this 
evaluation. Until now we have maintained the assumption that accountability 
necessarily involves the capacity of the stakeholder to sanction the NGO. 
Against this, I will argue that sanctions are not necessary in the evaluative 
relationship that constitutes accountability, and that accountability without 
sanctions still has intrinsic value. 
Definitions of accountability are based on descriptive frameworks that give an 
abstract description of the relationship which motivates the request for 
accountability. At the same time, they provide a perspective from which the 
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value of accountability can be assessed. Such frameworks have been called 
‘models’260 or ‘normative logics’261, and they do three things: 
 Describe how the relationship came about. 
 Attribute motivations to the agents involved. 
 Identify a source of value. 
The two most common frameworks applied to NGOs are the principal-agent 
framework, borrowed from economics, and the democratic framework, 
borrowed from politics.  
An initial problem with these frameworks is that each emphasises one 
particular stakeholder relationship—donors for the former, beneficiaries and 
the public for the latter—and therefore offers an incomplete picture of the 
relationships that can serve as the grounds for NGO accountability. NGOs 
have “multiple bottom lines”262 when it comes to accountability: multiple 
parties to whom they are expected to be responsive for different objectives. As 
mentioned in 2.1, NGOs are expected to be accountable for effective 
performance, as well as for the authenticity of the claims they make. Other 
examples of objectives NGOs are expected to meet include empowerment, 
financial probity, and a commitment to their own mission and values. The 
parties to whom they are expected to be accountable are multiple: IGOs, 
donors, state agencies, beneficiary groups, and other NGOs. The principal-
agent and representative frameworks fail to capture all of these varied, 
important, relationships. 
Yet problems with these frameworks reach even deeper. Not only do the 
principal-agent and democratic frameworks limit their foci to single parties: as 
I argue, the starting points offered by each model fail to accurately depict an 
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NGO’s relationship to even these stakeholders. While they identify 
relationships that are morally important for an INGO, the principal-agent and 
representative frameworks do not capture what is relevant about these 
relationships for establishing relationships of accountability. I will instead 
argue that accountability based on a modified version of L. David Brown’s 
(2007) multi-party social action framework, which does not include the 
condition of sanctions, provides a better alternative. 
 
2.4.1   Principal-Agent framework 
By far, the most dominant descriptive framework in the discussion and 
practice of NGO accountability is the principal-agent framework, which casts 
NGOs as agents entrusted with resources who are enlisted to act on behalf of a 
principal.263 Under the principal-agent framework, the core relationship is 
formed when a principal contracts an agent to act on its interests. It attributes 
to the principal the motivation of having its interests met by the actions of the 
agent and attributes to the agent the motivation of opportunism, a tendency 
or interest to act in ways outside of, or contrary to, the interests of the 
principal. Accountability, on this view, is thus designed to restrain the 
opportunism of the agent and ensure that it acts in accordance with the 
principal’s goals, which operate as the source of value in the principal-agent 
framework. Hence the centrality of sanctions: the agent’s opportunism is 
constrained by clearly-defined incentives and the threat of punishment.264 In 
the principal-agent relationship, accountability cannot be a source of value 
itself, since it is only a solution to the principal’s problem of ensuring the 
agent realises her desired ends. 
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There are a number of shortcomings in motivating NGO accountability based 
on a principal-agent description of their relationships to others. For one, this 
framework posits only one relationship between two parties, yet NGOs have 
multiple relationships, in which they sometimes occupy the role of an agent 
and on other occasions the role of the principal.265 Advocacy-focused NGOs 
can operate as principals for political officials and policy-makers by applying 
high-profile, critical pressure.266 By adopting codes of conduct and 
accreditation schemes, Ebrahim (2007) says NGOs can also operate as 
principals to the broader non-profit sector, creating and enforcing a set of 
standards. At the same time, NGOs can be construed as agents for various 
principals, such as the poor in their interactions with governments, or donors 
in their interactions with both the poor and government officials.267 The 
principal-agent framework provides no resources for dealing with multiple, 
sometimes conflicting, bases for accountability, and therefore, does not seem 
capable of accurately capturing all relationships for which an NGO is expected 
or required to be accountable.268 
The framework is also descriptively inaccurate regarding the motivations of 
NGOs. The need for accountability does not primarily arise from opportunistic 
NGOs attempting to direct resources towards the self-interest of its 
employees.269 While this may occur in some instances, ineffectiveness in 
NGOs is for the most part attributed more to well-intentioned efforts that face 
difficulties in their execution.270 Sanctions and incentives designed to buffet 
against malign intentions are not only insulting, but fail to have any positive 
impact since they do not treat the actual causes of ineffectiveness. In fact, in 
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some cases they exacerbate them. This may be why many in the NGO sector 
find such processes tedious, pointless, and wasteful.   
A more significant worry for the principal-agent framework is that it describes 
a relationship quite different from the NGO-donor interaction to which it is 
applied. According to this framework, the morally relevant starting point is 
the principal’s decision to give money to the agent. It is this act that 
establishes the relationship and creates the expectation that the agent use its 
funds in a manner congruent with the principal’s interests.  
But the relationship between donors and NGOs does not necessarily begin 
with the former deciding, on their own initiative, to donate to the latter. 
Rather, NGOs engage in extensive awareness-raising campaigns, informing 
citizens of affluent nations on how they can have a positive impact on the lives 
of the poor, as well as on how their practices or their governments’ policies 
may be causing harm to distant others. They do so not only by appeal to facts, 
but by articulating moral arguments and ideas of social justice, and tying these 
to the concrete aims of individual projects and programming. By taking the act 
of donation as the starting point of the relationship, the principal-agent 
framework cuts out this important earlier stage, in which NGOs are engaging 
in activities—fundraising, advocacy, moral argument—that are of equal 
importance.271  
Thus, even the NGO-donor relationship diverges significantly from the 
principal-agent framework. In the former, there is an additional, initial stage, 
prior to the exchange of monies, in which the NGO initiates contact with the 
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donor and attempts to persuade and engage them. Not only does this 
engagement go beyond the provision of funding (they may be soliciting public 
support, or encouraging ethical consumerism), but even in cases where money 
is the object of solicitation, the understanding is not that the NGO will show a 
return to the donor on their money specifically (since the aim is not profit), 
but that it will put that funding towards the successful achievement of a 
general goal.  
The descriptive inaccuracy of the principal-agent framework leads to the 
development of conceptions of accountability for NGOs that are heavily 
technocratic, emphasize control, and are heavily weighted towards the 
viewpoints and values of donors, given that they possess the greatest ability to 
exercise sanctions. While this inaccuracy is noted by those critical of current 
accountability practices in NGOs, they often conclude that accountability’s 
value is, at best, still only instrumental and negotiable, turning a critical eye to 
calls for greater accountability.272 In such attitudes, there still appears to be 
some implicit acceptance of the principal-agent based definition of 
accountability, as a tool of governance273 and control towards independently 
specified ends. Instead, I argue we should seek to build a new conception, 
based on a more descriptively accurate framework. Toward that end, there is a 
second framework we can consider.  
 
2.4.2   The democratic framework 
The other main framework applied to NGOs is the democratic or 
representative model of agency, which describes NGOs as acting on behalf or 
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in the interest of a constituency as it engages in advocacy and other political 
processes.  
Sometimes a principal-agent framework is applied to the relationship between 
elected officials and their constituents. When this occurs, there is very little 
difference between the economic model discussed above and the political 
model of agency. A second version of the democratic framework, however, 
offers a distinct alternative. We can highlight the difference by comparing the 
two models in terms of the three questions answered by any framework for 
accountability.  
Within both versions of the democratic framework, the relationship arises 
when a constituency elects an individual to public office in order to represent 
their views in the political process and serve the public interest.274 The 
democratic framework then splinters into two types based on different 
descriptions of the actors’ motivations.  
On one description, the motivations of the public official and the electorate 
are identical to the principal-agent model: the public wants its ends met, and 
there is a problem of opportunism in the public official. The official must be 
constrained by the public in order to ensure she is using the powers of her 
office appropriately and not for her own self-interest.275 The purpose of 
accountability is to provide such a constraint.276 
Under the second version of the democratic framework, the public official is 
motivated to serve the public interest and to fulfil the responsibilities of her 
office. However, because political decision-making involves making hard 
choices, often on the basis of arguments for which there may always be room 
for reasonable disagreement, accountability is still important as it requires the 
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public official to justify her decisions to her constituents. This version of the 
democratic framework places less emphasis on incentives and sanctions, and 
greater emphasis on trusting public officials to perform their role with 
integrity.277 
The source of value also differs in this type of interaction, reaching deeper 
than simply the satisfaction of the electorate’s interests. The meeting of the 
“principals’” ends by their “agent”, the public official, at the same time satisfies 
the goal of adequate democratic representation of the people within the 
political institutions that govern their lives. This deeper source of value is 
what ties democratic accountability to questions of political legitimacy, i.e. the 
justification of the state’s right to rule, and also fully differentiates the second 
version of the democratic framework from economic principal-agent 
frameworks. On this second version, accountability can be construed as 
intrinsically valuable, on the basis that it is constitutive of citizens’ exercise of 
their autonomy.  
The democratic framework is assumed by those who demand NGO 
accountability through the question: “who do you represent?”278 NGO 
stakeholders in this framework are project beneficiaries or the public, and 
mechanisms of accountability tend to be modelled after features of democratic 
governance, most notably participatory methods that involve stakeholders in 
the design and evaluation of projects.279 While fitting NGOs into a democratic 
framework resonates with many current practitioner perspectives,280 neither 
version of this framework accurately captures what it is about an NGO’s 
relationships that ground obligations of accountability. 
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While some NGOs may make claims of representation, the relationships 
created through these claims differ significantly from those between 
constituents and their representatives, regardless of whether those 
representatives are elected.281 Therefore, while NGOs can be expected to 
justify these claims, it does not follow that the best way for them to do so is by 
meeting standards of representative accountability. Considering the second 
version of the democratic framework first (the one that treats accountability as 
intrinsically valuable), there are two ways in which the relationship it 
describes differs significantly from an NGO’s. 
First, within a political model of agency, the powers and prerogatives come 
first, thereby giving cause to the political agent’s obligation of responsiveness 
towards its constituents.282 In the case of NGOs and their beneficiaries, the 
NGO identifies its aims and principles first. Through these self-identified aims, 
it then receives powers and privileges, however, not strictly, or even 
predominantly, from those considered to be its constituents. Instead, an NGO 
exchanges claims of representation for greater powers and privileges provided 
to it by donors and international organisations such as the U.N., which reward 
NGOs considered close to the poor and marginalised with funding and a 
stronger voice in the shaping of global public policy. Therefore, the party who 
is represented is not the same party providing NGOs (the “representative”) 
with the main powers and privileges exchanged for that representation. While 
this may call for justification, it is distinct from the need for justification 
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triggered by relationships between constituents and their political 
representatives. 
Second, because the relationship between constituents and representatives 
begins with the former allocating defined powers and privileges to the latter, 
the second version of the democratic framework establishes an expectation of 
responsiveness towards the constituents that allows for the exercise of those 
powers to be justified. Accountability practices are then intrinsically valuable, 
as they partly constitute the legitimation of political power to those subject to 
it. But in the NGO case, relationships often begin with organisations 
identifying their principles and mission statements and then engaging 
simultaneously in two tasks: attempting to gain powers from others on the 
basis of those principles, and attempting to demonstrate that those principles 
are indeed sufficiently responsive to the perspectives of the poor and 
marginalised. 
More commonly, the first version of the democratic framework—that which 
bears similarities to the economic principal-agent model—is applied to NGOs. 
Here, NGOs ought to be accountable to the perspectives and viewpoints of 
their “constituents” so that their activity better represents and reflects those 
viewpoints. This is instrumentally valuable for serving some further, 
independently-specified, aim. This aim may be transparency and democracy in 
global civil society; making NGOs more internally democratic; or the 
improvement of an NGO’s image as a credible global actor.283 While the ends 
are democratic ideals instead of performance, it remains the case that NGO 
accountability only has instrumental value in virtue of its role in securing such 
ideals.  
An immediate question for this approach is what criterion we ought to use to 
categorise NGOs as representatives and thus, as a member of the class of those 
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subject to democratic forms of accountability. Terry MacDonald (2008) has 
argued that NGOs are capable of exercising “public power,”284 which she 
defines as “autonomy-constraining impact”285: the ability to affect others’ 
autonomous capacity for choice.286 In virtue of this power, she argues, NGOs 
ought to be democratically accountable. According to MacDonald, the 
purpose of accountability “is to give stakeholders some control over the 
activities of public political agents such as NGOs.”287  
While MacDonald is correct to highlight the moral relevance of NGOs’ 
abilities to affect the abilities of others, her construal of this as a “public 
power” that subjects NGOs to the application of a democratic framework is 
not the only, nor feasibly the best, interpretation of these abilities.288 
As many in the NGO literature have mentioned, representative forms of 
accountability, when enforced, seem capable of doing both too little and too 
much. They do too little by failing to provide the type of oversight that will 
solve the problem which motivates the value of accountability in the first 
place. Representation of the viewpoints of those affected by projects does not 
necessarily lead to improved service or advocacy.289 Similarly, if this 
framework of accountability is applied to NGOs on the basis that they affect 
the autonomy of other agents, this seems to do too much, requiring NGOs to 
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be accountable to the corporations and hostile governments whose illicit or 
unjust practices they are working against.290  
Moreover, an NGO’s ability to affect the abilities or interests of others can 
elicit moral obligations without appeal to a democratic framework. As 
MacDonald correctly points out, NGOs are able to affect the abilities and 
interests of others in a multitude of ways, through participation in formal 
consultations with international organisations of governance, international 
advocacy, and their ability to control large amounts of resources in conditions 
of scarcity.291 Her connection between this ability and the application of 
democratic accountability to NGOs rests on a form of the “all-affected 
principle,” which states, generally, that all those affected by a particular 
decision ought to have a say in how it is made.292  
While the all-affected principle plays a prominent role in democratic 
theorising, it is not necessarily a democratic principle, as much as it is a 
principle of equal treatment.293 The all-affected principle is important to 
accounts of democratic authorisation and legitimacy because it motivates the 
value of representation through an appeal to egalitarian concern: the interests 
of those affected by a decision are given equal treatment through a 
consultative process that ensures their viewpoints are represented in the 
decision. But it is possible to apply the all-affected principle more generally, 
without assigning a model of representative agency to the decision-maker. A 
decision-maker may have a moral reason to engage with those affected by 
their decision, not because his or her function is necessarily to represent those 
viewpoints, but because structuring their relationship in this way fulfils basic 
values of respect and equal concern. That is, affecting others’ interests can 
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trigger an obligation to structure one’s relationships to them in a manner that 
does not refer only to producing certain desired outcomes, such as 
representation or the curtailing of opportunism.   
This final point means that we can reject the problematic democratic 
framework while still maintaining that NGOs, in affecting the abilities of 
others, trigger obligations of accountability. In the following section, I argue 
that we can maintain this through a framework and conception of 
accountability that better reflects the relevance of the all-affected principle for 
NGOs. 
 
2.4.3   Accountability without sanctions 
2.4.3.1   The multi-party social actor framework 
If the principal-agent and democratic frameworks are inapplicable to NGOs, 
then we need a conception of accountability based on a more accurate 
description of NGO relationships. We need, in other words, a conception tied 
to the theoretical definition of NGO agency identified in the previous chapter, 
which characterised an NGO through its collaborative engagement with 
multiple other actors.  
We can begin by selecting a more suitable descriptive framework for 
understanding an NGO’s accountability relationships. L. David Brown’s (2007, 
pp. 93-5) multi-party social action framework offers a viable alternative to 
applying an economic or political framework to NGOs.  The multi-party social 
action framework uses as its starting point the perspective of an agent 
attempting to manage the negotiation of multiple, often ill-defined, 
relationships, which give rise to a diverse and sometimes conflicting set of 
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values.294 Rather than understanding NGOs as an agent for others—e.g. 
shareholders or constituents—it instead frames NGO accountability through a 
starting point of NGOs interacting with others as agents in their own right, 
negotiating goals and values. The model of accountability that Brown 
characterises through the multi-party social action framework is what he calls 
mutual accountability: “accountability among autonomous actors that is 
grounded in shared values and visions and in relationships of mutual trust and 
influence.”295 
While Brown’s multi-party social actor framework provides a more accurate 
description of the relationships for which NGOs have accountability 
obligations, his notion of mutual accountability relies too heavily on an NGO’s 
shared values with other actors. This kind of accountability is relevant to an 
NGO’s internal relationships, in which staff can be characterised as holding 
shared aims, or cases where an organisation works in collaboration with other 
NGOs on a campaign or self-regulatory initiative. In most of its external 
relationships, however, NGOs collaborate and engage with other actors on a 
variety of bases, with varying degrees of shared values and hostility. A multi-
party social action framework can still provide the basis for a workable and 
intrinsically valuable conception of accountability, but only if it shifts the 
focus from relationships built on shared values to collaborations which NGOs 
secure by making claims as norm-enacting agents. In many cases, these 
collaborations allow NGOs to exercise an important ability: the ability to alter 
and affect the abilities of others. Examples of the exercise of this ability 
include: making claims or plans with others to affect the abilities of 
beneficiaries, impacting state abilities through competition or support, 
engaging in capacity-building with GROs, negatively impacting the abilities of 
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transnational corporations, IEIs or IGOs through campaigns, and affecting the 
abilities of other NGOs to act in a given context.  
Within these interactions, an unequal balance of power is formed between the 
NGO and the agents whose abilities are affected by its actions. The 
conceptions of accountability we have considered thus far hold that, in order 
to rectify this inequality such that the NGO’s actions are justified, some form 
of sanctioning power must be provided to all affected. However, as I will now 
argue, this egalitarian commitment can be better reflected in a conception of 
accountability that emphasises moral appraisal over sanctions.  
2.4.3.2   The attitudes of moral appraisal 
I suggest formulating this conception through a distinction made famous by 
P.F. Strawson that contrasts two ways of relating to those who affect us with 
their actions.296 Strawson discusses cases where the actions of an agent are the 
same, but our feelings towards her are quite different, for example someone 
stepping on your hand intentionally, as opposed to accidentally while trying to 
provide you with assistance. While the physical pain may be identical, we have 
an added feeling of ill-will or resentment in the first case. Strawson’s view is 
that such feelings are central to understanding what moral responsibility really 
is: a set of social practices.297 Treating others as subject to our moral appraisal 
is captured by what Strawson calls our ‘participant reactive attitudes’ which we 
develop and express through our participation in relationships with others: 
We should think of the many different kinds of relationship 
which we can have with other people—as sharers of a common 
interest; as members of the same family; as colleagues; as 
friends; as lovers; as chance parties to an enormous range of 
transactions and encounters. Then we should think, in each of 
these connections in turn, and in others, of the kind of 
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importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us 
of those who stand in these relationships to us, and of the kinds 
of reactive attitudes and feelings to which we ourselves are 
prone. In general, we demand some degree of goodwill or regard 
on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us, 
though the forms we require it to take vary widely in different 
connections.298 
But there are instances in which we excuse individuals from negative reactive 
attitudes. One such class of excuses occurs when an agent towards whom we 
would otherwise have participant reactive attitudes experiences circumstances 
that no longer allow us to draw a connection between the action and the 
agent’s will or intention.299 For example, if the person stepping on your hand 
was pushed, or was attempting to help you out of a burning building. We can 
still consider her a responsible agent, just not fully responsible for the action 
in this particular instance. 
Another class of excuses is entirely different. Examples of these excuses are 
“He’s a hopeless schizophrenic” or “He’s only a child.”300 Towards such persons 
we do not experience reactive attitudes at all, nor do we view excusing their 
actions as a rare exception to otherwise engaging with them as fully 
responsible agents. Instead, persons for whom we make such excuses are 
objects of what Strawson calls “objective” attitudes:  
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see 
him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, 
in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as 
something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary 
account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; 
perhaps simply to be avoided.301 
                                                 
298
 Strawson (1962, p. 3). 
299
 These are vague and fuzzy notions that are simply here to serve as short-hand for whatever 
more fine-grained account of intentionality or capacity for agency one might prefer—one 
plausible such account is that the action in this case has been severed from the agent’s 
“judgment-sensitive attitudes” (Scanlon 1998). 
300
 Strawson (1962, p. 5). 
301
 Ibid. 
126 
 
Objective attitudes are what we adopt towards those we consider to be 
incapable of being morally responsible. They are controlled and motivated via 
incentives and sanctions in order to obtain desired behaviour.  
The kind of moral appraisal that constitutes reactive attitudes, on the other 
hand, is not primarily a sanction or incentive. Rather, appraisal of this sort 
speaks to the special force that moral reasons have for us, a force that has 
nothing to do with considerations of punishment or incentives. Scanlon, in 
articulating the difference between holding someone morally responsible in a 
way that makes them subject to appraisal, and holding them morally 
responsible in a more substantial way that makes them subject to a sanction, 
remarks with regards to the former, “…morality is not, fundamentally, a 
mechanism of control and protection but, rather, what I call a system of co-
deliberation.”302  
This offers an approach to the interaction between the agent and its account 
holder that is more compatible with the notion of accountability as an 
obligation than an approach that is based on sanctions and fosters objective 
attitudes towards NGOs. Instead of understanding an NGO’s accountability 
relationships to others in terms of behavioural control, punishment, and 
reward, we can view it as an obligation to recognise the ability for reactive 
attitudes in others, and to create the opportunity for those attitudes to be 
expressed and answered.  
 
2.4.4   Accountability as moral appraisal 
We can now fill in the remaining elements of a conception of accountability: 
in section 2.2, we identified accountability as a structured relationship, but did 
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not discuss in detail the nature of that structure. In 2.3, we specified that 
accountability was an obligation the account giver has to create and recognise 
abilities in other agents to hold her to account, but did not identify the 
grounds for this obligation. 
Relationships governed by reactive attitudes are structured by respect and 
equal concern. Expressions of reactive attitudes “seek reciprocal recognition of 
the (equal) dignity that they both claim (of the addresser) and presuppose (of 
the addressee).”303 When an NGO fulfils its responsibility to recognise and 
support the ability of other agents to understand its reasoned account of its 
actions, to evaluate that account, and to respond to it, it succeeds in 
structuring its relationship to those agents in a way that balances the power 
asymmetry that exists when one agent affects the abilities of another. 
Accountability relationships are valuable insofar as they are constituted by a 
balancing of power between two agents via the sharing of reasons and the 
mutual recognition of authority.304  
Section 2.3 argued that accountability can be understood as an obligation to 
create these relationships. One basis305 for this obligation is the exercise of an 
NGO’s agency which, as argued in Chapter 1, is dependent upon the 
collaboration with other parties that view the NGO as norm-enacting.  NGOs 
have the ability to affect the abilities of other agents in significant ways, 
enhancing or inhibiting their capacities to satisfy their interests and make 
autonomous choices. Importantly, it is not a mere application of the all-
affected principle that elicits an NGO’s obligations of accountability to those 
parties. How they are able to affect others also serves as part of the grounds for 
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this obligation. NGOs are only able to affect the abilities of others through 
collaboration—that is, through multi-party social actor relationships—with 
other agents such as donors, governments, other civil society organisations, a 
mobilised public, etc. In collaborating with an NGO, these other agents accept 
the NGO’s portrayal of itself as a norm-enacting agent. This acceptance 
reasonably includes the assumption that the NGO, as a norm-enacting agent, 
is respectful and structures its relationships to others in a morally appropriate 
manner. Therefore, an NGO ought to fulfil its obligation to create 
relationships of accountability with those affected by its activities, since, in 
doing so, it justifies the reasonable assumptions that make the exercise of its 
own agency possible. 
Moreover, by understanding accountability as the structuring of a relationship 
that provides the ability for moral appraisal, it is reasonable for NGOs to be 
expected to be accountable, even to those agents with whom they have a 
hostile or confrontational relationship. Many advocacy NGOs might object to 
this, as they feel they do not need to be accountable to the transnational 
corporations whose abilities to engage in certain trade or employment 
practices can be diminished or frustrated by their campaigning. If sanctions 
were a necessary component of accountability, this sentiment would be 
reasonable since an advocacy NGO’s campaign could be significantly impaired 
if the target of the campaign had the ability to remove their funding or 
political privileges. But according to the moral appraisal approach to 
accountability, NGOs simply have a responsibility to account for why they 
have affected others’ abilities in a given way and to offer those others the 
opportunity to engage with these reasons. The response from such 
stakeholders can take the form of an invited assessment, or an in-person 
deliberation about the veracity and justifiability of the NGO’s account, rather 
than as a set of material losses or other types of sanction. NGOs have this 
obligation, in part, due to their reliance on coordinating the opinions and 
actions of others in restricting a transnational corporation’s abilities, and the 
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reasonable assumption of those other parties that the NGO is an agent that 
conducts itself in a respectful manner. 
On this understanding of accountability, based on the multi-party social actor 
framework, the motivation of the NGO is presumed to be a motivation to 
collaborate with and affect others, with an eye towards delivering on its 
mission. Accountability, then, consists partly in the moral appraisal of the 
NGO, an appraisal the NGO is responsible for acknowledging and responding 
to. The source of value in this framework is the process of justification to 
others, and the relationships to others that are partly constituted by there 
being this type of accountability. Accountability is, thus, not merely 
instrumental to, but constitutive of, these relationships through which an 
NGO’s agency is exercised. On this conception of accountability as moral 
appraisal, accountability is valued for its own sake:  
Moral Appraisal Accountability: a structured relationship between 
two agents, in which the accountable, A, (i) fulfils an obligation to 
ensure that H is in a position to morally appraise A’s actions, (ii) 
gives an account to H for a set of actions; (iii) recognises H’s 
determination of whether H’s standards have been met, and (iv) 
provides a reason-based response to H’s appraisal.  
To say A is accountable, then, is to say that A fulfils this obligation for at least 
one of its relationships (an organisation may be accountable with respect to 
one party but unaccountable with respect to another). To say that A is 
unaccountable is to say that A has a relationship for which this obligation is 
required, but not delivered on. USAID’s failure to be accountable to the poor is 
an example. To say that A is not subject to accountability obligations is to say 
that A does not have any relationships for which this obligation is elicited.  
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2.5   ‘Moral-appraisal’ versus ‘Mission’ accountability 
 
The previous three sections have laid out an alternative to the view that NGOs 
should be motivated towards accountability only on the basis of its 
instrumental value. I will now discuss how my proposed alternative—
accountability as moral appraisal—is distinctive from another similar 
conception, that of accountability to mission.     
Given the aforementioned problems with using the principal-agent and the 
democratic frameworks as the basis for NGO accountability, other conceptions 
of accountability have been suggested that, like our conception, are tailored 
more specifically to the kind of agent NGOs are and the types of relationships 
they have. A paradigm example would be “mission accountability.”306 It is 
instructive to note the differences between mission accountability and the 
conception of moral appraisal accountability, and the advantages of the latter.  
As discussants of NGO accountability have expressed their discontent with the 
current “regimes”307 of accountability imposed on NGOs, they have also 
explored ways of understanding how accountability can be of importance to 
an NGO in virtue of its own interests, not the interests of its donors or public 
critics. A constellation of approaches clusters around the idea that the mission 
or values of an NGO determines the ends that accountability should serve. On 
this view, NGOs ought to be accountable to themselves and to others for how 
well their projects and activities serve the core values and aims of their 
organisational mission. This approach emphasizes the importance of adapting 
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to changes in the social environment and the value of organisational learning. 
Such an approach relies just as much on recognising failures and their causes 
and improving on mistakes as it does on identifying success.308  
While it shares some similarities in speaking specifically to the nature of NGO 
agency and emphasizing the importance of an NGO’s mission and values, the 
mission accountability approach differs from moral appraisal accountability in 
two respects. First, most versions of this account appear to treat the mission as 
the given “bottom line,” so to speak, accepting the missions of NGOs at face 
value. Viewing accountability as a process of moral appraisal, on the other 
hand, subjects the mission statement to scrutiny and requires organisations to 
give an account for its appropriateness.  
This difference is not always recognised by those who define mission 
accountability. For example, in her version, Mary Kaldor includes a feature 
that seems close to moral appraisal:  
External or strategic accountability, sometimes called political 
responsibility (Jordan and Tuijl, 2000), is about accountability 
towards the beneficiaries, the people that the NGO is trying to 
help; it is about the extent to which an NGO remains true to its 
stated mission or goal […].309 
Similar to Kaldor’s construal of mission accountability, moral appraisal 
accountability also directs the attention of an NGO towards the interests of its 
beneficiaries, its mission, and, most importantly, how the two are intertwined. 
But moral appraisal accountability also demands a critical reflection on the 
adequacy of the NGO’s claims and how its projects and activities reflect the 
values embodied in such claims. Kaldor, on the other hand, treats the mission 
as an unquestioned standard of evaluation. This occurs in the above quotation, 
where she equates accountability to beneficiaries with accountability for how 
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well an NGO has carried out, and been true to, its mission (see italics). The 
primacy Kaldor places on mission as a source of accountability is evident again 
when she writes: “Broadly speaking, moral accountability arises from the 
mission of the civil society actor. Who is responsible for ensuring that the 
activities are designed to fulfil the mission?”310 The complementary questions 
posed by moral appraisal accountability would be: “Is the mission justified? 
How does it affect the abilities of others to act? Who is given the opportunity 
to offer moral appraisal of the appropriateness of the mission?” 
A second difference is that accounts of mission accountability still lean 
towards an instrumental account of accountability’s value, where it is 
presented as a strategic choice rather than an obligation: 
One could argue that NGOs should take up the issue of 
accountability because it is the right thing to do (Edwards, 
2002). This argument is not relevant to all NGOs but any NGO 
that promotes democratic rights (transparency, participation 
and recourse for minority voices) is going to be more credible if it 
practices what it preaches. For NGOs that practice aggressive 
advocacy and are often accused of staking out the moral high 
ground, undertaking a serious accountability discussion within 
the organization…can help to deflect public attacks on NGO 
credibility. Without it, an NGO is open to attack.311  
Again, mission accountability shares a commonality with the moral appraisal 
view: the claims that NGOs make are of fundamental importance for directing 
their accountability practices. But crucially, where the mission accountability 
view treats this as a way of managing an NGO’s public face, and views 
accountability practices as pertaining only to NGOs working on democracy 
and transparency, the moral appraisal conception identifies any claims made 
by NGOs that enable it to affect the abilities of others to be the basis for their 
accountability responsibilities. The reason NGOs should take up 
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accountability is because it is the right thing to do. It is the right thing to do, 
in part, because it delivers on what others must reasonably assume about an 
NGO when deciding to collaborate with them, collaborations without which 
an NGO’s agency would be impotent. Moral appraisal accountability reaches 
deeper to tie accountability practices to the constitutive elements of an NGO’s 
agency, and thus provides a stronger basis for its justification as an actor. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Accountability can serve numerous valued purposes. But its value is not 
limited to such purposes. Those in the NGO sector have (rightly) become 
disillusioned with calls for NGO accountability, because these calls often result 
in increased mechanisms of control and sanction over NGOs by those who 
already hold positions of power. The concern that organisations like GiveWell 
or New Philanthropy Capital show towards effectiveness fails to take into 
consideration what uniquely positions NGOs to do what they do, and how 
accountability is important in a manner that goes beyond performance 
improvement. Those in the NGO sector could also stand to recognise this 
importance, instead of abandoning the idea of accountability as anything 
other than something to be pursued strategically. Accountability is a concept 
we use to convey whether an agent or institution has fulfilled a particular set 
of responsibilities, not a term we simply use to describe a set of relationships, 
nor merely an instrument for achieving independently specified and valued 
ends. Moreover, it need not make NGOs significantly vulnerable to hostile 
others, such as corporations or corrupt states, as it does not require a 
sanctioning mechanism. 
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Recall Lisa Jordan’s statement: “No one has really made a positive argument as 
to why NGOs should undertake a risky, expensive, difficult exercise to create 
meaningful and concrete accountability mechanisms.” The reply to this is that 
the creation of such mechanisms is what is required for an NGO to fulfil its 
obligation to structure its relationships with the parties whose abilities it 
affects in a way that allows for those parties to engage in moral appraisal of the 
organisation. Why is this moral appraisal valuable? As Brown points out, 
conceptions of accountability can be regulative, focusing on constraining the 
agent’s activities, or constitutive, “in a deeper sense in that they shape the 
experience of actors and the social systems in which they are embedded.”312 
Moral appraisal accountability is a constitutive conception, shaping an NGO’s 
relationships to others in a way that justifies an NGO’s activities, both to those 
affected by their actions, and to those who agree to collaborate with an 
organisation in affecting the abilities of others. 
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CHAPTER 3   INGOS AS INTERMEDIARY 
AGENTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the primary motivations for 
increasing NGO accountability is to improve performance and help donors 
identify those organisations to which they should contribute. One sub-type of 
NGO for which the issue of effectiveness is particularly important is the 
international humanitarian aid and development NGO, a class of organisation 
including CARE, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Oxfam. 
The effectiveness of INGOs working in development and emergency relief 
(hereafter referred to collectively as INGOs) has gained significance, in part, 
due to the large philosophical scholarship that has emerged from the 
discussion of the moral implications of severe poverty.313 Peter Singer, whose 
single story of a child in a pool sparked the contemporary discussion on duties 
of assistance, famously argued that this duty is strengthened by the sheer ease 
and certainty with which an average individual could save a human life 
through a donation to aid organisations. This claim placed the operations of 
INGOs at the centre of Singer’s argument, as he presented Oxfam and similar 
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organisations as a means through which individuals could fulfil their 
obligation to assist.  Critics of Singer have objected that INGOs do not save 
lives as reliably and efficiently as his argument claims, thereby undermining 
the stringency of our obligation to assist—at least, by means of INGO 
donation.314 
This prompts two important questions regarding INGO obligations with 
respect to resource allocation. The first regards the content of this obligation: 
what would it mean for an INGO to allocate its resources in an efficient 
manner? That is, what kind of decision-making procedure should an INGO 
adopt in order to allocate resources justifiably? The second question regards 
the grounds for this obligation: To what extent, and on what basis, might 
INGOs be morally obligated to allocate their resources in a particular manner? 
If individuals in affluent nations hold a stringent moral obligation to reduce 
the suffering of those oppressed by severe poverty, what implications might 
this duty have for the obligations of an INGO?    
This chapter examines Thomas Pogge’s answers to these questions and their 
import for the moral agency of INGOs. Pogge’s arguments for assistance315 
have focused more on the reform of global institutions and policies, rather 
than on the provision of assistance by individuals. Still, Pogge has also 
discussed the role of INGOs in relation to individuals’ obligations to the poor, 
conceiving of aid organisations as a mechanism through which citizens of 
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affluent states can off-set the harm of poverty, while also working to change 
the institutional system that causes it. 
Pogge frames INGOs as primarily intermediary agents. Their role is 
understood as providing obligatory assistance on behalf of the global wealthy, 
who are unable to directly assist the poor on their own. In his contribution to 
a volume on the ethics of human rights and aid NGOs, Pogge develops the 
implications of grounding a moral principle for INGOs in the moral 
obligations of their donors in detail.316 He argues that if affluent citizens have a 
stringent obligation to alleviate poverty because poverty constitutes a serious 
moral wrong, then it cannot be the case that INGOs have full discretion as to 
how they spend their limited resources.317 INGOs act as intermediary agents 
for their donors and, therefore, must use certain moral criteria to guide their 
decision-making. Pogge’s suggestion for a set of moral criteria is embodied in 
a single cost-effectiveness principle that directs INGOs to maximally reduce 
harm with respect to their limited pool of resources.  
I argue here that this approach faces several problems. Trying to justify a 
prioritarian principle for NGOs through a deontic argument for an individual’s 
obligation to aid, as Pogge does, is frustrated by the different ways in which 
consequentialism and deontological theories conceive of moral harm. This 
argument is presented in 3.3, after a discussion of Pogge’s argument for the 
obligation to aid (3.1), and his prioritarian principle for INGOs (3.2). In 3.4, I 
argue that Pogge’s broader strategy also fails since it rests on an inaccurate 
view of INGOs as intermediary agents. Intermediary agency is based on the 
principal-agent framework used to describe economic agents, which, as 
argued in 2.4.1, does not accurately describe the relationship between an INGO 
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and its donors. INGOs do not merely accept donations, they solicit them. This 
solicitation often involves constructing moral arguments and articulating new 
social norms. INGOs that rely on this solicitation are obligated to conduct 
themselves according to principles and values that are consistent with one 
another. After exploring an alternative to Pogge’s account suggested by Lisa 
Fuller, I argue that an INGO’s management of its resources ought to be 
directed in part by consideration of maintaining consistency in the values to 
which it commits itself through its moral engagement with others. 
 
 
3.1   Pogge on the obligation to aid 
 
3.1.1   Poverty as a violation of the duty not to harm 
Providing assistance to those in extreme need is classically understood as a 
less stringent requirement, on the basis that it is a “positive” as opposed to a 
“negative” duty. While there are a number of ways to define the categories of 
positive and negative obligation,318 Pogge opts for the general 
nonconsequentialist distinction between harming and failing to aid.319 He talks 
of negative duties as those requiring that one “ensure that others are not 
unduly harmed (or wronged) through one’s own conduct”320 and positive 
duties as those requiring one to “benefit persons or shield them from other 
                                                 
318
 The broadest basis is via a distinction between action and omission. However, this 
distinction has been subject to powerful criticism. See: Rachels (1975; 1979); Shue (1996, in 
particular chps. 2 & 3).  
319
 For a discussion of this general distinction, see Kamm (2007, chp. 1). 
320
 WPHR, p. 136. An identical quote from 1st edition also quoted by Cruft (2005, p. 29).  
139 
 
harms.”321 On this account, positive and negative duties do not map neatly 
onto the categories of action and omission: one can both alleviate or cause 
harm through acting or refraining from action.322 In order to maintain 
consistency with Pogge’s arguments, for the remainder of this chapter we will 
rely on his harming/not aiding understanding of negative and positive duties, 
putting to one side the controversy over the merits of such a distinction.        
One way of arguing for a more stringent obligation to assist that does not 
directly confront the positive/negative distinction is the utilitarian line of 
argument made famous by Peter Singer. As a utilitarian, Singer would reject a 
differentiation between positive and negative types of duty, yet he offers an 
argument that is consistent with reading the obligation to aid as a positive 
duty. Given the great increase in well-being that can be achieved at such a low 
personal sacrifice to affluent individuals, Singer reasons that our positive 
obligation to aid is considerably more stringent than we have traditionally 
thought.323 The simplicity of Singer’s argument has garnered it wide appeal, 
yet it remains vulnerable to a number of objections, including the above-cited 
concern regarding INGO effectiveness, as well as the rejection by some “moral 
minimalists”324 of the existence of obligations that go beyond respecting 
people’s negative civil or political rights.  
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Pogge’s approach is well-known for its distinctive strategy of attempting to 
meet this moral minimalism on its own terms by casting the obligation to 
assist as arising out of the violation of a negative duty. In order to support this 
conclusion, Pogge advances an institutional account of duties based on a 
framework of moral cosmopolitanism.325  
Moral cosmopolitanism326 consists of three basic tenets: the ultimate units of 
moral concern are individuals (individualism), this status applies equally to 
each such individual (universality), and they are units of moral concern to 
everyone (generality).327 It grounds principles and constraints of two types. 
The first type sits at the level of individual interactions and grounds principles 
of ethics. This ‘interactional’ form of cosmopolitanism “assigns direct 
responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to other individual and 
collective agents.”328 The other type, ‘institutional’ cosmopolitanism, grounds 
principles of social justice, and assigns the responsibility for fulfilling human 
rights to institutions, with individuals having only an indirect responsibility 
for the outcomes of the institutional scheme in which they participate.329  
On this institutional understanding of human rights, individuals have the 
responsibility to create and uphold institutions that secure the content of 
human rights for all its members. If we limit ourselves to meeting only 
negative rights, our responsibility as individuals is as follows: “One ought not 
to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably 
leaves human rights unfulfilled without making reasonable efforts to aid its 
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victims and to promote institutional reform.”330 Because the responsibilities of 
individuals are indirect and require only the omission of harm, Pogge’s 
approach is, in theory, less demanding than an interactional approach such as 
Singer’s, which ascribes direct responsibility to individuals for alleviating 
world poverty.  
However, Pogge’s institutionalism also provides a way to strengthen the 
obligation to aid, while accepting—for the sake of argument—the moral 
minimalist view that the only duties we have are negative. By linking the 
responsibilities of individuals to the effects of far-reaching institutions, 
Pogge’s account expands the range of what we are responsible for, specifically, 
what harms we are responsible for: “The institutional view thus broadens the 
circle of those who share responsibility for certain deprivations and abuses 
beyond what a simple libertarianism would justify, and it does so without 
having to affirm positive duties.”331 Even if an individual does not act directly 
to cause harm to another person, under the institutional view, he violates a 
negative duty through his cooperation within a broader system through which 
others are harmed.332  
Pogge contends that citizens of Western or wealthy states (as well as the 
wealthy elite within poor states) persistently commit indirect violations of the 
negative duty to refrain from harm through their participation in a global 
institutional order that unnecessarily imposes radical inequalities and severe 
deprivations upon the poor. To reach this conclusion, Pogge claims, we do not 
need to take into account the past injustices of slavery, colonisation, or the 
assassinations carried out with the aid of Western intelligence agencies on 
democratically-elected leaders in developing countries throughout the 60s and 
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70s, each of which was not only morally deplorable in its own right, but also 
conceivably had a causal impact on the functioning of developing societies 
today.333 Nor must we show that those living in poverty across the world have 
currently and historically been denied rightful access to their portion of the 
planet’s shared natural resources.334  
While he thinks both arguments can be made,335 Pogge focuses much of his 
attention on the claim he considers most convincing to those sceptical of an 
obligation to assist: the legal and economic systems in which we currently 
participate impose severe poverty on many others through rules that operate 
to the advantage of the most affluent. Because the poverty that these rules 
create constitutes a severe harm, our cooperation with them violates our 
negative duty to avoid cooperation with coercive institutional orders that 
impose serious harms on others.336  
Two examples Pogge uses to illustrate the injustice of the current global order 
are internationally recognised resource privileges and borrowing privileges. 
These privileges refer to the practice of accepting any group or individual in 
control of the coercive apparatus of a given state (in most cases the military, or 
some sort of armed forces) as the legitimate head of that state, who can then 
sell the state’s natural resources or take out loans in the name of that 
country.337 Such practices serve the interests of transnational corporations, 
since they can negotiate favourable contracts for resource extraction. They 
also work to the advantage of citizens of wealthy states by maintaining low 
prices for basic resources. The harm caused to the poorer, resource-rich 
countries is more than merely material: such resource and borrowing 
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privileges also incentivise instability in developing countries, as competing 
factions and would-be dictators are motivated to gain power in anticipation of 
the benefits that it will accrue to them.338  
3.1.2   Intermediate duties and compensatory obligations 
If we accept Pogge’s empirical claim that global political and socio-economic 
institutions have caused great harm, the question remains as to how moral 
responsibility for this harm is attributed to individuals based on their 
participation in global institutions, and what is the nature of the obligation 
arising out of this participation. 
3.1.2.1   Attributing moral responsibility for severe poverty 
What is it about their connection to institutions that in turn are causally 
linked to severe poverty that makes individuals morally responsible for a 
human rights violation? Pogge’s view identifies five jointly sufficient and 
individually necessary conditions339 for determining whether an affluent 
person has violated a negative institutional duty to refrain from harming:  
1. There exists an institutional order imposed on individuals that 
produces human rights deficits. 
2. The individual has cooperated in imposing this institutional order 
and/or has benefited from this institutional order. 
3. The global institutional order “forseeably gives rise to substantial 
human rights deficits.”340 
4. Such deficits “must be reasonably avoidable in the sense that an 
alternative design of the relevant institutional order would not produce 
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comparable human rights deficits, or other ills of comparable 
magnitude.”341 
5. “[T]he availability of such an alternative design must also be 
foreseeable.”342  
Under these conditions, an affluent person has what Pogge in some places 
calls a “remedial”343 and in other places an “intermediate”344 duty to off-set the 
harm caused.  
3.1.2.2   Intermediate duties 
Intermediate duties, Pogge says, are “moral reasons to prevent or to mitigate 
harm that one otherwise will have caused or participated in causing.”345 For 
example, while I am not typically required to sacrifice my hand to save your 
life, if I am the one who has placed you in this peril, this gives me an 
intermediate duty to sacrifice my hand to save you.346  
The stringency of an intermediate duty is greater than that of a positive duty, 
less than that of a negative duty. Imagine, for example, that a drunk driver 
runs over two children, injuring them both severely. They will die unless he 
pays for their expensive operations, the cost of which is equal to the amount it 
would cost for him to save three other children who are at risk of dying 
through no actions of his own. Because he bears a special relationship to the 
suffering experienced by the first two children (in so far as he caused it), the 
driver has a reason to prioritise their well-being even if he can achieve greater 
overall gains in well-being by giving his money to others. However, if the 
children he has injured require organ donations, the driver is not permitted to 
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kidnap other children in order to steal their organs. His intermediate duty to 
the children he injured outweighs his positive duty to others he may be 
capable of assisting, but does not outweigh his negative duty to refrain from 
harming others.347 
Citizens of Western states cannot easily extricate themselves from the 
institutions that impose severe poverty, and, even if they actively work 
towards reforming such institutions, this reform will predictably take many 
years before it is fully achieved. In light of this, Pogge has sought to protect his 
account of intermediate duty against the criticism that it is overly demanding 
and, thereby, unfeasible. He claims that affluent citizens’ intermediate duties 
elicit for each an obligation to provide a feasibly prescribed amount of 
compensation to those they have harmed. If an individual compensates 
accordingly, her continued cooperation and benefiting with respect to harmful 
institutions is no longer wrong.348 In order to round out his view on the 
obligation to assist, we now turn to variations on setting the level for this 
adequate compensation.  
3.1.2.3   Specifying obligations of compensation 
The idea that a person has an obligation to “compensate for their share of the 
collective harm,”349 as Pogge puts it, can be construed in several ways.350 At 
least three run throughout his writings: 
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Proportional to Cause: You are obligated to compensate proportional to 
your causal contribution to the harm caused. 
Proportional to Ability: You are obligated to compensate proportional to 
your comparative ability to eliminate the harm caused. 
Proportional to Total Alleviation: You are obligated to compensate 
proportionally, based on the total amount required to eliminate the harm 
divided by the number of people obligated to provide compensation. 
While he is, in principle, attracted to the Proportional to Cause construal, 
Pogge dismisses it as a workable basis for setting compensatory obligations, 
since it is empirically complex and, therefore, too difficult to work out with 
any precision.351 While many others have endorsed something similar to a 
Proportional to Ability view on agents’ obligations towards eliminating world 
poverty,352 Pogge does not explicitly discuss or endorse this. Rather, it creeps 
into his discussion when he is considering Proportional to Cause. For example, 
after posing himself the rhetorical question, “How much is enough for a 
person to compensate?” Pogge writes: 
One can estimate that the typical affluent person, by the time of 
his or her death, bears responsibility for roughly one poverty-
related death, for about 200 human life-years spent in severe 
poverty, and for about 20,000 hours of children suffering intense 
pain from hunger and diarrhoea. But this sort of rough 
calculation underestimates our responsibility. Most of us belong 
to some subset of the world’s affluent that could single-handedly 
bring about the needed global institutional reforms.353 
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Here, Pogge remarks that setting compensation based on Proportion to Cause 
may not exhaust the extent of our responsibility to assist. If we have greater 
abilities or opportunities than others to bring about institutional reform or 
eliminate some of the institutional causes of poverty (that is, if we are part of 
the subset that, as a group, could single-handedly bring about reform), then 
we have an obligation to do more. Our obligation to compensate may be 
proportional in some respect to our comparative advantage in affecting the 
rules of global institutions. 
While in many instances he indicates that we have reason to do more, Pogge 
tends not to emphasise Proportional to Cause and Proportional to Ability. 
While he does not indicate problems with either, as Pogge has stated 
numerous times, his argumentative strategy is shaped by his aim of providing 
the strongest, most broadly acceptable version of his argument.354 This 
involves responding to the criticism that a stringent obligation to assist is too 
demanding of average moral agents, since working out our specific obligatory 
contributions is too difficult in light of the empirical complexity involved.355  
Therefore, Pogge’s official line on how to set the required level of 
compensation for each individual is the considerably less demanding (but still 
very far from the current practices of average moral agents) Proportional to 
Total Alleviation (PTA). On this approach, defended in detail by Liam Murphy 
(2000), an individual’s required rate of compensation is whatever would be 
necessary to eliminate the overall harm if every culpable person contributed 
their share. Thus, if the eradication of world poverty required 1% of the 
collective income of citizens of wealthy states, then each citizen would be 
obliged to donate 1% of her annual income to poverty eradication.356 
Regardless of the merits or demerits of the demandingness objection and the 
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endorsement of PTA as an approach to setting the rate of compensation, for 
the remainder of this chapter it will be assumed that citizens are obligated to 
compensate some set ‘sum’ to the alleviation of worldwide deprivation. 
3.1.2.4   INGOs as an instrument for compensation 
With some idea as to how to set the level of compensation, we can imagine a 
citizen of an affluent state who is now prepared to fulfil her intermediate duty 
to the global poor by providing her fair share of compensation.  One of the 
ways in which she can do so is by donating to an international aid and relief 
organisation. In Pogge’s view, this provides the basis for thinking about the 
ethical obligations of an INGO, specifically with respect to how they allocate 
their funds: 
Intermediate moral reasons may have much wider relevance … 
An INGO is not merely an actor in its own right but is also an 
agent and trustee for its contributors, entrusted with fulfilling 
their moral responsibilities. As citizens of rich and powerful 
countries, we may well have been (and still be) participating in 
causing much of the harm that INGOs are working to reduce.357 
By accepting donations, INGOs assume the role of an intermediary agent, 
dispensing aid and reducing suffering in a way that their donors are incapable 
of doing themselves. Since affluent citizens have an obligation to provide 
compensation to the poor, they should be keen to see the positive effects of 
their donation maximised. Therefore, Pogge contends, these donors need to 
be able to trust that an INGO will spend its limited resources in the best way 
possible, that is, in an efficient and well-informed manner guided by "carefully 
formulated moral priorities."358 In order to do this, INGOs must have some 
idea of how to prioritise their projects. Pogge concludes that 1) a significant 
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moral requirement of INGOs is generated by their acceptance of donations 
from individuals who are morally obligated to provide compensation to the 
kind of people generally targeted by INGO projects (the severely poor), and 2) 
that this moral requirement directs INGOs to use a cost-effective harm 
reduction principle to allocate their resources.  
 
 
3.2   The (ABCD*) Principle 
 
3.2.1   The four moral commitments 
In order to guide INGOs in their decision-making, Pogge offers the following 
principle: 
(ABCD*): Other things being equal, an INGO should govern its 
decision making about candidate projects by such rules and 
procedures as are expected to maximize its long-run cost-
effectiveness, defined as the expected aggregate moral value of 
the projects it undertakes divided by the expected aggregate cost 
of these projects. Here aggregate moral value, or harm 
protection, is the sum of the moral values of the harm 
reductions (and increases) these projects bring about for the 
individual persons they affect.359 
(ABCD*) is the product of four separate moral commitments, factoring in a 
concern for risk and uncertainty. These considerations flesh out Pogge's 
account of the “moral value” of a harm reduction: (A) it is morally more 
important to protect a person from greater serious harm than from lesser; (B) 
in trying to protect from harm, we should prioritize the worse-off; (C) 
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aggregate harm protection is measured as a linear function of the number of 
persons protected; and (D) other things being equal, the choice-worthiness of 
a project is inversely proportional to its cost.360 The consideration for risk and 
uncertainty (represented by the asterisk in (ABCD*)) means that the moral 
value of an INGO's decision can only be evaluated ex ante, that is, in terms of 
expected gains and losses.  
With these in mind, Pogge's principle can be expressed as the requirement 
that an INGO prioritize its projects according to cost-effectiveness, defined as 
expected moral value divided by expected cost. Expected moral value is 
determined by how many people are protected, to what extent they are 
protected (i.e. how serious the harm is), and the level of harm they suffer 
relative to others. 
There are four features of Pogge’s principle that are helpful to note.  
First, it is sufficientarian: the level of harm a person is considered to suffer is 
measured in relation to a minimal baseline set at the standard of living 
necessary for human beings to meet their “ordinary needs and 
requirements.”361 Second, it is prioritarian: a smaller reduction in harm may be 
morally more valuable than a larger reduction in harm, if it occurs for a person 
who is proportionately worse off than the person who would receive the larger 
reduction. 
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Third, the principle is broadly consequentialist, as it guides INGOs by 
reference to the predicted outcomes (i.e.  predicted harm reduction) of their 
projects.362 This emphasis on outcome means that (ABCD*) will preclude a 
number of deontic considerations or principles that INGOs commonly use to 
guide and justify their decisions on resource allocation. I address one such 
consideration below. Another is considered in 3.4. 
Finally, the less obvious characteristic of the (ABCD*) principle is its 
underspecification, which allows for some flexibility as to how an INGO uses 
it. The emphasis on harm reduction could provoke the reply that the diversity 
of INGOs and the projects they work on would be severely undercut if all were 
assessed according to (ABCD*). Pogge anticipates such a response by 
highlighting the underspecification of (ABCD*) and, in particular, 
propositions (A) and (B).363 In following (A), an organisation must specify for 
itself the criteria for what constitutes harm and how a scale of harm (ranging 
from serious to none) is structured. Depending on how they do so, this will 
affect their calculation of the expected improvements of a given project.364 
Committing to the prioritarian proposition (B) still allows organisations 
discretion to determine how badly off someone is with respect to others and 
what factors about a person and her life (for example, how far back into one’s 
life span one should look to calculate harm) should be taken into 
consideration when determining this. Finally, different weights can be 
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assigned to expected harm reduction and the position of the potential 
beneficiaries relative to others (in other words, weighting (A) against (B)).365  
In this way, two organisations with the same budget may be able to justify very 
different projects using (ABCD*), depending on how they operationalize harm 
and the importance of how possible beneficiaries fare relative to one another. 
While he notes different ways of approaching answers to these considerations, 
Pogge refrains from endorsing any one in particular.366 
 
3.2.2   Distributive fairness 
Despite this flexibility, Pogge discusses a number of ways in which the 
consequentialism of the (ABCD*) principle places constraints on INGO 
decision-making which, if adopted, would signal a significant and 
controversial departure in their practices. One example is the use of 
participatory methodologies to identify INGO priorities and carry out 
projects.367 Another is the issue of whether INGOs ought to accept donations 
from morally questionable donors—this is discussed in 3.4. Here I will focus 
only on Pogge’s comments on distributive fairness.  
Pogge devotes considerable attention to what he cites as an expressed INGO 
concern for distributive fairness.368 One variant of this commitment that he 
discusses in length is nation-based distributive fairness—that is, spreading 
resources somewhat equally across countries. An alternative to distributive 
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fairness is to focus INGO projects exclusively in nations where they would be 
most cost-effective, thereby saving more lives for the same amount of money. 
According to some calculations, this would mean that Ethiopia, India or 
Uganda should receive a larger chunk of aid, while countries like Venezuela or 
Nigeria should be avoided.369 Given their professed interest in securing the 
content of basic human rights for all human beings, it would be 
uncomfortable for most INGOs to explicitly direct their projects towards a 
handful of cost-effective nations while completely ignoring others.370 But is 
this discomfort justified? Is distributive fairness morally relevant?  
Pogge thinks not, on the basis that nation-based distributive fairness is in 
contradiction with a commitment to universal individualism, the idea that, "in 
the moral assessment of conduct and social institutions, their impact on any 
person matters equally, irrespective of who this person is."371 Barring a 
plausible account of the moral significance of national boundaries, which in 
Pogge’s eyes is nonexistent, INGOs cannot offer justified reasons for 
distributing fairly across nations when more lives can be saved by focusing on 
only the most cost-effective regions.  
Universal individualism, a principle appealing to INGOs in virtue of its 
affirmation of egalitarianism, can operate as a potent weapon against nation-
based distributive fairness when paired with proposition (C) of the (ABCD*) 
principle. Accepting (C), which states that it is morally more important to save 
more people over fewer people, commits us to choosing to save 1,000 people 
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over only saving 50 people. For, if we chose to save the 50, how could we 
explain to the 1,000 that one of the 50 was worth 20 of them? If this is the case, 
and we accept universal individualism, then, Pogge argues, it should not 
matter if the 1,000 we are saving are Ethiopians and the 50 are Chadians.372 
The reason why we should prefer to save 1000 Ethiopians over 50 Chadians at 
the same cost is because that is what it means to treat Ethiopians and 
Chadians as equal. 
Pogge applies the same reasoning to show that any category which an INGO 
suggests as a basis for distributing fairly across different groups will not hold 
up to the demands of (C). Attempts to distribute fairly on the criterion of 
rural/urban communities, gender, religious denomination, etc. are 
unjustifiable if they lead to the overall saving of fewer lives. In each case, 
saving the life of someone because of their gender or where they live, when it 
would cost the same to save two lives of someone who does not meet that 
criterion, is to treat people unequally. 
One might reply by asking why it is easier to save Ethiopians than Chadians, 
or urban slum dwellers over rural peasants, or members of a majority religious 
denomination over members of a minority religious denomination. In some of 
these cases, the factors that make it costlier to save certain people compared 
to others are also factors we consider to be morally more weighty. For 
instance, there is some evidence that poverty relief is more cost-efficient in 
countries whether there is better governmental infrastructure, some 
commitment to democracy, and low levels of civil unrest or violence.373 This 
means we may be prioritising the wrong people—the Chadians are more 
difficult to help because they suffer from greater injustices at the hands of the 
global system and are therefore in greater need of our aid than the Ethiopians.  
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Pogge’s reply to this is that the (ABCD*) principle accommodates these 
concerns. If the Chadians suffer from worse governmental infrastructure, this 
may mean that they suffer a greater harm. And if they suffer a greater harm, 
then, according to (B), their interests should be given greater weight. The 
concern that INGOs have for distributing across different groups may be 
maintained if they can argue that certain groups, though costlier to help, also 
suffer a greater degree of harm.374 But if this is the case, then they are still 
deciding in a way that is consistent with (ABCD*). Their decision to spend the 
money on those more costly to assist is no longer justified by distributive 
fairness, but by the principle of cost-effective maximal harm reduction. 
Distributive fairness on its own, Pogge contends, should play no role in an 
INGO’s allocative considerations.375 
 
 
3.3   INGOs and the supposed transfer of obligation 
 
3.3.1   Intermediate duty as a grounds for the (ABCD*) principle 
Pogge holds that INGOs ought to follow the (ABCD*) principle because they 
act in part as intermediary agents for their donors, who in turn hold strong 
intermediate duties to assist the global poor due to their cooperation in the 
institutions that impose such poverty. But it is not clear how the obligations of 
the donors, acquired through a rights violation, transfer to an INGO, a 
separate agent with its own pre-identified aims and values.  
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Suppose, for example, that the driver in Pogge’s original case ran over the 
children while on holiday in a foreign country. Choosing not to bother with 
legal proceedings, the prosecutor simply has the driver deported. But the 
driver is aware of his intermediate duty to assist the children and wishes to 
fulfil it, so he contacts a charity in the foreign country that provides free 
medical aid to children and donates to them. Does the charity now have an 
obligation to assist specifically those two children hit by the drunk driver? It 
does not seem that it does, so long as the charity has not made any promise to 
the driver to target the aid to his victims. This organisation may in fact be up 
front about their policy of not coordinating aid from any particular donor to 
any particular child, for logistical reasons. Perhaps the driver donates to them 
anyway, in the hopes that it will somehow reach the children he has injured. 
Or perhaps the employees of the charity are personally moved by his guilty 
conscience and make an effort to deliver the aid to his victims. The point is, if 
they do so, the aid of the particular children is entirely optional and not 
morally required, provided they have not taken the driver’s money on the 
promise of directing his aid to the children in question. 
The relationship between donors and development and relief INGOs is similar. 
INGOs define themselves through aid-related aims and it is reasonable to 
expect them to work hard to succeed at those aims. But an INGO’s 
effectiveness with respect to its self-set priorities is an entirely separate matter 
from the way in which Pogge motivates (ABCD*). INGOs may have good 
reasons to maximise harm reduction with their resources, but these reasons 
are not necessarily rooted in their acceptance of funds from donors who have 
causally contributed to this harm.  
In contrast, Pogge believes that if it accepts money from a donor and its donor 
has a moral obligation, this is sufficient for the INGO to acquire an obligation 
with respect to how it spends its funds. The structure of his argument is as 
follows:  
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(1) A has an obligation to assist C.  
(2) A cannot directly assist C herself. 
(3) B is able to assist C. 
(4) A gives money to B. 
Therefore:  B has an obligation to assist C with A’s money. 
As it stands, the conclusion does not follow from (1)-(4) alone. Pogge requires 
one or more additional premises to support his conclusion that an INGO (B) 
has an obligation to assist a specific other (C) with A’s donated money. One 
way in which an INGO may acquire such an obligation is if this is a specific 
condition of the donation. So we might add the following to complete Pogge’s 
argument: 
(5) If A gives money to B on the condition that B assist C with A’s money, 
and if B accepts A’s money under that condition, then B has an 
obligation to assist C with A’s money. 
Premise (5) draws on the norms associated with promise-giving and certainly 
reflects a widespread standard within current donor-INGO relationships, 
where funding is sometimes predicated on the donor’s request that money be 
spent on specific projects or regions. INGOs are expected to make good on 
these requests if they accept the funding, and it is precisely because of this 
expectation that some INGOs refuse to accept certain types of grants or 
funding from particular donors.376  
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But premise (5) does not complete Pogge’s argument so much as it provides a 
competing alternative. Premise (5) bases B’s obligation on the act of promise-
making to A, making premise (1) to a certain degree irrelevant: it does not 
matter to B’s obligation whether A has a pre-existing obligation to C or not. 
Pogge’s argument, in contrast, relies largely on premises (1) and (4): B has an 
obligation to C because A has given B money, and because of the nature of the 
obligation A has toward C. His view is that an INGO is obligated to follow the 
(ABCD*) principle in virtue of its donors’ intermediate duties to the poor, not 
in virtue of a promise or acceptance of conditional donations. 
It seems that Pogge’s view here is motivated by his particular conception of 
intermediary agency.377 Under premise (5), an INGO becomes an intermediary 
agent for a donor with respect to C only when it makes certain promises about 
C to the donor. But Pogge’s understanding of intermediary agency is not as 
limited: he appears to think that one acts as another agent’s intermediary 
agent whenever one is engaging in an activity and accepts money from an 
agent who has an obligation with respect to that activity. More precisely, 
Pogge seems to think that intermediary agency entails premise (6): 
(6) If A has an agent-relative reason to give money to B, and A gives money 
to B, then B ought to spend A’s money in such a way as to satisfy A’s 
agent-relative reason for giving. 
An intermediate duty elicits agent-relative reasons: an agent is required to 
assist specifically those harmed by her actions. Here, I understand agent-
relative reasons to be reasons for acting that refer in some way to the agent for 
whom they are reasons. A doctor that does not want to participate in a risky 
operation may say this is because it is she who would be responsible for 
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anything that went wrong. Similarly, it matters to a donor that her donation 
has maximal effectiveness in reducing the harm suffered by those harmed by 
her cooperation in unjust global institutions. If we accept Pogge’s claim in 
premise (6)—that an agent can transfer her agent-relative goal by paying an 
agent who in virtue of that payment becomes her intermediary—then we can 
construct the rest of his argument (beginning with premise (6)) as follows: 
(7) Donors have agent-relative reasons to provide aid to the severely poor 
(because of their intermediate duty). 
(8) INGOs provide aid to the severely poor. 
Therefore [from (7) and (8)]:  
(9)  Donors have agent-relative reasons to give money to INGOs. 
Therefore [from (6) and (9)]: 
(10) If donors give money to an INGO, the INGO ought to spend their 
money in such a way as to satisfy their donors’ agent-relative reasons 
for giving. 
Premise (6) is implausible; at best, its justification awaits a more detailed 
account of intermediary agency and the transfer of moral obligation via such 
agency than what Pogge provides. However, for now I intend to grant Pogge 
the argument from (6) to (10). This means we will accept for the remainder of 
3.3 his view that INGOs can become intermediary agents, and thus acquire 
obligations, simply by accepting money from a donor whose donation is 
motivated by a moral, agent-relative reason (but who does not make her 
donation conditional on the INGO acting in any particular way). 
Even granting Pogge his account of intermediary agency, he still needs to 
show how accepting premise (10) leads to a justification of the (ABCD*) 
principle. For this, he must rely on the following premise: 
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(11)  The (ABCD*) principle allows an INGO to satisfy its donors’ agent-
relative reasons for giving. 
There are two ways in which this premise might be justified; I will now argue 
that neither is successful, and that, therefore, this premise is false. Even if we 
accept Pogge’s claim that INGOs, as intermediary agents, ought to satisfy their 
donors’ agent-relative reasons for giving, it does not follow that this commits 
INGOs to using the (ABCD*) principle.  
 
3.3.2   Agent-relative reasons and the (ABCD*) principle 
In order to justify the (ABCD*) principle, there must be some explanation as to 
how adopting a broadly consequentialist principle assists INGOs in better 
fulfilling the agent-relative goals of their donors. We will consider two 
options: 1) The (ABCD*) principle assists INGOs in maximising overall harm 
reduction relative to their projects; 2) The (ABCD*) principle assists INGOs in 
maximising harm reduction with respect to the harm caused by their donors. 
3.3.2.1   Maximise harm reduction relative to their projects? 
A citizen of an affluent nation must be confident that, when she provides the 
appropriate amount of compensation required of her, she is at the same time 
fulfilling her intermediate duty to the greatest extent possible.378 This implies 
she ought to seek out the INGO she thinks will do the most with her limited 
donation. Imagine that this donor is presented with a chart depicting each 
INGO’s causal contribution to overall harm reduction across the globe for a 
particular year. Let us say for the moment that it is unclear to which of these 
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harms the donor has causally contributed the most, but that she is certain she 
causally contributed to at least some of the harm that was reduced in that 
year.  
Figure 1. Individual INGO contribution to overall harm 
 
Perhaps the donor expects that the organisation that makes the greatest 
contribution to the overall reduction of harm will accomplish the most with 
her donation. Based on that assumption, and the chart, she would be swayed 
by her intermediate duty to put her donation towards INGO P, as it is 
comparatively more effective at harm reduction than any of the other INGOs. 
Her decision is not based on how well INGO P coordinates or organises with 
other INGOs to jointly reduce overall harm; it is based only on her obligation 
to reduce as much of the harm she has caused as possible, and on her 
determination that the organisational attributes that enable INGO P to 
outperform other INGOs at harm reduction will also maximise the probability 
of her donation’s success if it goes to them. She concludes she ought to give to 
INGO P because of the specific contribution their activities make towards 
harm reduction. 
This offers an initial option for justifying premise (11): The donor’s agent-
relative reason to assist is grounds for an INGO adopting the (ABCD*) 
Overall harm reduction 
INGO P
INGO Q
INGO R
INGO S
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principle because the principle allows the latter to ensure that their 
organisation is the most efficient and effective in reducing poverty and that 
therefore the donor’s compensation will be as uniquely harm reducing as 
possible. The (ABCD*) principle is therefore authoritative for an INGO insofar 
as it matters morally to the INGO that its activities are harm reducing, not 
merely that harm is reduced.379  
But the contribution to overall harm reduction made by an INGO using the 
(ABCD*) principle is a poor indicator of which organisation will do the best 
job at fulfilling our imaginary donor’s agent-relative obligation. Her donation 
to INGO R, for example, might in fact do more, as it could allow INGO R to 
scale-up their harm reduction activities significantly. The INGO that 
maximises its contribution to overall harm reduction is not necessarily the 
organisation that will maximise an individual donor’s contribution to overall 
harm reduction. 
Moreover, there are significant problems with INGOs adopting this approach 
to poverty alleviation. A form of agent-relative reasoning is already present in 
INGO evaluation, in the guise of impact measurement. The idea behind 
impact measurement is that long-term positive changes in the areas targeted 
by an INGO (e.g. well-being, rates of poverty-related death or illness) ought to 
be counterfactually dependent upon their projects. This counterfactual 
dependence is supposedly reached by ‘measuring impact’, i.e. comparing 
baseline measurements to data collected towards the end of a project.380 While 
it is questionable that this kind of measurement produces sufficient evidence 
for the claim that the INGO was singularly efficacious, it reflects a long-held 
concern of INGOs to demonstrate that their organisation in particular is 
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making a positive causal difference. An INGO does not want to see merely that 
poverty was reduced, class attendance raised, or childhood deaths averted, but 
that these effects came about specifically due to its activities.381  
Aside from other issues concerning the measurement of NGO effectiveness,382 
there is a further concern that the efforts of INGOs might be more effective if 
they did not focus so much on demonstrating singular causal efficacy. INGOs 
as a sector might be more successful if organisations were motivated by the 
pursuit of poverty reduction as a shared aim to be reached jointly, rather than 
by an attempt to identify what each is specifically responsible for 
accomplishing.383 In other words, the suggestion is that INGOs ought to treat 
poverty reduction as an agent-neutral goal, one which could be universally 
adopted by any agent, and is satisfied when the appropriate outcome is 
secured, regardless of which agent secures it.384 
In fact, it is Pogge himself who makes such a point, in the very same article on 
INGOs, in a section on fundraising. Pogge suggests that when INGOs are 
driven by an agent-relative concern to maximise the impact of their own 
organisations they compete with one another for fundraising.385 This results in 
reduced overall effectiveness towards the goals shared by such organisations, 
as INGOs may pursue less effective projects that are more likely to garner 
greater funds, or may crowd each other out, leaving fewer INGOs overall to 
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work towards poverty relief.386 In this way, Pogge observes, an agent-relative 
approach to the work of INGOs is collectively self-defeating: if each 
organisation acts to maximise its own individual impact, then each will be less 
successful than if they all pursued poverty relief as a collective goal. Therefore: 
“Because the agent-neutral goal is morally more plausible and because the 
agent-relative goal is directly collectively self-defeating, INGOs ought to be 
committed to the agent-neutral goal.”387 
An interesting question is why INGOs do not treat poverty reduction as more 
of an agent-neutral goal. Here Pogge’s analysis gets the cart before the horse. 
INGOs compete, not because they are driven on their own to act on agent-
relative reasons, but because agent-relative reasoning is currently encouraged 
by donors and donor agendas.388 Many donors adopt precisely the attitude 
that Pogge’s account of intermediate duties endorses: they want to see that 
their moral obligations are being fulfilled, that their money is having a 
concrete, definable impact, that their INGO has made ‘a’, or possibly ‘the’, 
difference.  
It seems reasonable that if INGOs collaborated to achieve poverty reduction as 
a shared agent-neutral goal, their efforts might be more effective.389 But the 
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robustness of this prediction is not what is at issue. Pogge endorses agent-
relative reasoning for donors, as they must seek to off-set the harm of poverty 
insofar as it is harm to which they contributed. Yet, he rightly rejects applying 
the same kind of agent-relative reasoning to INGOs’ pursuit of harm 
reduction. When INGOs pursue their aims in an agent-relative manner, their 
efforts to alleviate poverty can produce sub-optimal results. Therefore, it 
cannot be the case that INGOs ought to adopt the (ABCD*) principle out of a 
concern for maximising their unique contribution to poverty alleviation. 
Moreover, an INGO’s contribution to overall harm reduction is at best an 
imperfect indicator of whether it will make the greatest relative contribution 
with a donor’s money. This approach to justifying premise (11) therefore fails, 
as it cannot provide an adequate explanation that moves us from the 
intermediate duties of donors to the prioritarian obligation of INGOs.  
3.3.2.2   Maximise harm reduction relative to the harm caused by the donor? 
A second and more obvious option for justifying premise (11) is suggested by 
Pogge’s comment, quoted earlier in 3.1.2.4., that as intermediary agents INGOs 
are responsible for fulfilling specifically their donors’ moral obligations, and 
that those obligations arise out of the donors’ causal connection to those 
whom INGOs work to assist. This suggests that the decision faced by the 
donor as she acts on her agent-relative reason for aid is better captured by 
Figure 2 than Figure 1.  
In Figure 2, she wants to pick the INGOs who are most accomplished at 
reducing Type 1 harms. Rather than pick the INGO that contributes most to 
overall harm reduction (INGO P), she must meet her intermediate duty by 
donating to those organisations that, at the margin, will most reduce suffering 
for the victims of the violation of her negative duty with her donation (INGO 
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S). An INGO’s relationship to its donors therefore grounds its obligation to use 
the (ABCD*) principle if it allows them to maximally alleviate harm (as an 
agent-neutral goal), with respect to the subset of harms that were identifiably 
caused by their donors.   
 
 
 
An initial worry here is that it is not clear how an INGO can determine 
whether the harm it is reducing was caused by its donors or whether it is due 
to some other factor—perhaps natural disaster. Directing INGOs to aid the 
worse off will not necessarily target those we (the donors) have most reason to 
help, if the worse off are suffering harm that we did not cause. Those who we 
harmed may still be better off than others. While there is a probable overlap 
between these two categories (the darker middle section in Figure 3), those to 
whom we have an intermediate duty do not necessarily match up one to one 
with those given priority within the (ABCD*) principle. INGOs therefore may 
not be able to tell if the harm they are off-setting constitutes a fulfilment of 
their obligations to their donors. 
 
INGO P INGO Q INGO R INGO S
Type 1 Harm: caused
by donors
Type 2 Harm: other
causes
Figure 2. Harm reduced per INGO 
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Pogge considers this problem, imagining the daunting questions that face the 
citizen of an affluent nation who wants to do the right thing—How much have 
I contributed to harming others? Which harms are harms caused by me and 
require compensating, and which were not? How much do I owe? He answers:  
Fortunately these unmanageable complexities can be largely 
avoided. The massive harm in today’s highly interdependent 
world cannot be neatly sorted into harm that the government 
and citizens of some rich country are, and harm they are not, 
materially involved in causing … Even when people are harmed 
by clear-cut natural disasters, such as an earthquake or a long-
standing congenital defect, social factors are heavily involved in 
causing the resulting harms … INGOs and their contributors 
therefore rarely face actual hard choices between morally less 
valuable harm reductions that we have intermediate moral 
reasons to achieve and morally more valuable harm reductions 
that we have only positive moral reason to achieve.390 
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Targeted by 
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by global 
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(ABCD*) 
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For Pogge, almost all harm related to global poverty falls under the category of 
harm caused by unjust global institutions, and, therefore, qualifies as harm 
that affluent individuals have intermediate moral duties to alleviate and offset. 
INGOs, then, are not required to ascertain which harms have causal links to 
their particular donors when they choose how to allocate their resources. 
Even if we grant this simplification, there is a further problem in trying to use 
donors’ intermediate duties to ground the (ABCD*) principle for INGOs: the 
(ABCD*) principle directs INGOs to avoid helping some of the most visibly 
and clearly identifiable victims of the unjust global order. 
Recall that the (ABCD*) principle compels INGOs to pull out of countries in 
which it is costlier to operate due to civil war or extreme lack of infrastructure. 
Instead, Pogge says, they ought to focus their efforts on places where it is less 
costly to save a life, such as India. But why is it so costly to save a life in some 
countries? In some, such as Sudan, it is because those countries are rich in a 
type of resource, such as oil, which contributes to their instability. And why do 
resources contribute to destabilisation and, thus, increase the cost of saving a 
life in these countries? Because of one of the key features of injustice in our 
shared global institutional order: the recognition of resource privileges for any 
tyrant or rebel group that happens to control the coercive forces of a given 
state, as Pogge himself discusses several times in WPHR and elsewhere.  
In 3.2.2 we considered an attempted objection to Pogge’s argument against 
distributive fairness. This objection fell short because appeals to why some 
people are costlier to save could count as reasons to prioritise them if they also 
showed that such people suffered a worse harm. The scale would be tipped in 
their favour according to commitment (B). Therefore, Pogge replied, those 
appeals can be made consistent with the (ABCD*) principle.  
The present objection, however, does not cast the instability of these less cost-
effective countries as an added harm. Rather, it appeals to Pogge’s own 
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arguments for how the global institutional order creates and sustains poverty. 
In WPHR, Pogge specifically cites several countries that have been affected by 
the policy of unjustified resource privileges, two of which are Nigeria and 
Venezuela.391 In his article on INGOs he cites a study by economists Collier 
and Dollar which he suggests INGOs can use to identify countries with the 
highest and lowest rates of cost-effectiveness.392 Yet, two countries ranked low 
in cost-effectiveness by this study, therefore qualifying as countries INGOs 
should avoid, are Nigeria and Venezuela.393 This is a problem internal to 
Pogge’s account that indicates the crucial premise (11) supporting the (ABCD*) 
principle cannot be justified. If we are going to accept a deontic argument that 
bases our obligation to aid in the specific, unjust, policies and practices of our 
institutions, then it is a contradiction to say that INGOs should use a principle 
that directs them to avoid aiding the places that are the most clearly 
identifiable victims of such practices.  
In other words: even if the poor in Sudan are equally badly off or even 
somewhat better off compared to the poor in India, on Pogge’s account, there 
should be an added reason to save the person in Sudan, because of the greater 
impact of the unjust institutional order, via resource privileges, when 
compared to the person in India. The moral wrongness of poverty rests not in 
the sheer deprivation experienced by the poor, but in the fact that this 
deprivation was imposed upon them by others through unjust institutions and 
practices. In places where the imposition of this deprivation is strongest, lives 
may be much costlier to save. Pogge’s (ABCD*) principle can therefore direct 
INGOs away from the people who, by his own account, are most deserving of 
aid.  
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3.3.3   Conflicting types of harm 
Ultimately, the justification of the (ABCD*) principle for INGOs cannot be 
based on the intermediate duties of individuals because they operate on 
different understandings of harm. Pogge’s work is characterised by what he 
calls an “ecumenical spirit” 394: he seeks the strongest support for his 
conclusions by offering parallel and incompatible arguments that appeal to 
different starting points, often giving greatest attention to those starting 
points most hostile to an obligation to assist. Pogge notes that an implication 
of this ecumenical spirit is that some of his arguments for the obligations to 
aid are based on different notions of harm.395 This does not pose a problem for 
him so long as each of his arguments for the obligation to aid remains self-
contained and internally consistent.  
Yet in his discussion of INGO obligations, Pogge attempts to base a principle 
of harm reduction on another argument that conceives of harm fundamentally 
differently. In order to convince those most hostile to the existence of a 
stringent duty to assist, Pogge must frame the harm of poverty as a deontic 
harm that arises out of the violation of a negative duty. Therefore, with respect 
to individual obligation-bearers, Pogge understands harm in deontic terms, as 
the violation of a duty: “On my view, you harm others insofar as you make an 
uncompensated contribution to imposing on them an institutional order that 
foreseeably produces avoidable human rights deficits.”396 It is this notion of 
harm that is meant to be the reason why INGOs should commit themselves to 
making tough decisions with the (ABCD*) principle. And yet, when defining 
harm for the application of the (ABCD*) principle, he describes it in terms of 
the human rights deficits (disutility) experienced by an individual: “In the 
present context, I propose to define harm as shortfalls persons suffer in their 
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health, civic status (civil and political rights, respect within their community), 
or standard of living relative to the ordinary needs and requirements of human 
beings.”397 In virtue of this conflict between two different conceptions of harm, 
a prioritarian principle for INGOs cannot be justified by appeal to their 
donors’ deontic obligations to the poor. Premise (11), on which Pogge’s 
(ABCD*) principle rests, is therefore false. 
However, we have not yet addressed the claim that INGOs acquire at least 
some sort of (non-promise-based) obligation by accepting money from 
morally obligated donors. In other words, the claim that INGOs are 
intermediary agents, reflected in premise (6), has yet to be contested. In the 
following section, 3.4, I now argue that, outside of any promises they make to 
a donor, INGOs are not intermediary agents at all.   
 
 
3.4   Are NGOs intermediary agents? 
 
In the previous section we saw that Pogge’s attempt to justify—without 
assuming the role of promise-keeping—the (ABCD*) principle for an INGO 
through a donor’s intermediate duty is unworkable. This also poses a general 
problem for viewing an INGO’s obligations as based on a transfer of obligation 
from their donors, as it is not clear whether a stronger formulation of this 
transfer can be presented. In absence of an alternative to Pogge’s argument, 
we can conclude that viewing INGO obligations as the result of a transfer from 
their donors’ moral duties, absent of a promise, is unconvincing. A may have 
an obligation to assist C and, therefore, gives money to B because she is unable 
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to provide this assistance directly. However, unless this gift is conditioned on a 
promise made by B to specifically assist C, then B is under no obligation to 
assist C. If B uses A’s money to assist D instead, this poses a problem for A, 
since her obligation has not been fulfilled, but it is not a problem for B. Put 
more concretely: if an INGO does not use its donors’ money to assist those to 
whom those donors have intermediate obligations, then, in the absence of any 
promise to do so, this poses a moral problem only for the donors, not the 
INGO.  
As mentioned, Pogge’s argument is based in part on his view that INGOs are 
intermediary agents acting on behalf of their donors. In 3.4.1 I discuss why 
Pogge is motivated to think of INGOs in this way, and revisit some reasons as 
to why such a view is ill-suited for INGO agency. In 3.4.2 I discuss Lisa Fuller’s 
objection to Pogge’s construal of INGO agency, using Pogge’s problem of the 
“discriminating contributor” as a focal point. I then develop an alternative 
solution, based on the multi-party social actor framework introduced in 
Chapter 2. 
 
3.4.1   Pogge on intermediary agency  
The temptation to understand the moral agency of INGOs as a form of 
intermediary agency, in which their obligations are parasitic on those of their 
donors, is motivated by the idea that the only available alternative is to view 
INGOs as free agents acting without any obligations at all. In defending the 
(ABCD*) principle, Pogge explains that he thinks INGOs must be obligated in 
some way, since it is unjustifiable for their employees to simply say: “ ‘this is 
our INGO, and we are morally free to raise money for any cause we like and 
spend it as we deem fit.’ ”398 He takes issue with this anything-goes attitude 
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because it complements the traditional view of poverty alleviation as a 
supererogatory ‘good deed’ that is considered an act of charity rather than one 
of obligation. If we are going to reject the notion that our contributions to 
reducing severe poverty are a matter of optional charity rather than moral 
requirement, then we must expect INGO staff to undergo a similar paradigm 
shift, viewing their project design and resource allocation as constrained by 
stringent moral considerations rather than determined by their organisation’s 
self-set priorities: 
My willingness to criticize where others do not may be related to 
my seeing INGOs not primarily as venues for ‘helping,’ but as 
instruments for undoing a fraction of the vast harms the affluent 
countries are inflicting on the poor and marginalized in the so-
called developing world.399 
For Pogge, treating INGOs as intermediary agents is an implication of taking 
seriously our obligations of assistance to the poor. 
In light of the arguments against the principal-agent framework presented in 
Chapter 2, Pogge’s treatment of INGOs as intermediary agents acting on 
behalf of their principals, the donors, presents too narrow a perspective on 
their agency.  As argued in 2.4.2, the principal-agent framework is limited in 
its focus and produces inaccurate depictions of an NGO’s relationships to its 
donor. As a type of NGO, an INGO is not necessarily a “venue”400 or 
“instrument”401 which individual moral agents use to pursue their charitable or 
obligatory goals. This characterisation portrays INGOs as proxies that simply 
adopt the moral ends of other agents. Rather, INGOs’ involvement in 
individual agents’ understandings of their moral obligations and how they 
might fulfil them is considerably more active than what the framework of 
intermediary agency offers. These organisations do not merely adopt the ends, 
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and thus obligations, of their donors: they are actively involved in shaping the 
ways in which donors identify appropriate ends and understand their moral 
obligations. 
Considering these other ways in which INGOs interact with donors means 
that, in rejecting the idea that INGOs are agents of their donors, we need not 
accept the position that they have no obligations whatsoever with respect to 
how they design projects and allocate funds. As I will now illustrate, Pogge’s 
(ABCD*) principle is not the only alternative to an ‘anything-goes’ attitude.  
 
3.4.2   Integrity and the “discriminating contributor” problem 
Lisa Fuller’s reply to Pogge’s work on INGOs similarly argues that his view 
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of an INGO’s unique agency.402 As 
mentioned, the (ABCD*) principle dissuades INGOs from engaging in certain 
practices, such as distributive fairness or participatory planning, if these 
detract from the goal of maximising harm reduction. Pogge also suggests at 
one point that INGOs ought to be open to accepting limited donations from 
racist donors (e.g. white donors who specify their funding be directed only to 
other whites), if doing so will result in saving more lives.403 This is not a far-
fetched hypothetical: many INGOs as well as domestic NGOs face dilemmas 
over whether to accept funding from a donor who holds views that are 
publically controversial, raise questions of conflict of interest for the NGO, or 
are in direct contradiction to some of the organisation’s stated values or 
aims.404 In such cases, Pogge argues, it is wrong for organisations to allow 
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queasiness over a potential donor’s motivations or beliefs to outweigh the 
value of the good that can be achieved with their donation. 
Applying Bernard Williams’ concept of integrity, Fuller reads these non-
consequentialist commitments to participatory methods, respect for past 
relationships, and racial equality as part of an arc of projects and beliefs that 
constitute an INGO’s integrity:  
An INGO, if it were to allow itself to contradict its own 
principles … would cease to be the sort of moral agent that is 
appropriately designated to handle this type of work, since by its 
actions it has become alienated from its central purpose of 
working for the just treatment of all human beings.405 
Fuller claims that in treating INGOs as instruments for providing assistance to 
the severely deprived, Pogge dismisses the commitments that allow them to 
perform this role successfully. It is precisely its non-consequentialist 
principles, such as the refusal to collaborate with agents of discrimination and 
oppression, which enable an INGO to improve the well-being of the 
disadvantaged and protect human rights.  
This sketch faces an initial problem as an alternative to Pogge’s insofar as it is 
question-begging against his claims about INGO priorities. Someone like 
Pogge believes that the just treatment of human beings is precisely what is 
captured by a principle like (ABCD*) because it leads to a maximal, priority-
weighted reduction in severe deprivation. If INGOs define themselves as moral 
agents in terms of a concern for justice and the remediation of human rights 
deficits, then they have more reason to constrain themselves by such a 
principle. Failure to do so amounts to prizing a fidelity to principle over 
substantial improvements in people’s life chances, a choice that Pogge finds 
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unjustifiable: “…I do not know how one can answer the question how many 
extra deaths this ‘standing up for principle’ can justify. What is the correct 
exchange rate between racism spurned and additional lives saved?”406 While 
an INGO may find it anathema to collaborate with unsavoury characters, given 
the grim calculus of international aid, they may not be able to afford an 
across-the-board rejection of such collaborations. In so doing, far from being 
alienated, Pogge might say, INGOs are brought closer to their central purpose 
of serving humankind through a principle like (ABCD*).  
There are two ways to develop Fuller’s idea in reply to this objection. The first 
would highlight the similarity between hers and Pogge’s views, by contending 
that when INGOs remain principled, this better satisfies the (ABCD*) 
principle in the long-term. According to such a reply, Pogge underestimates 
the importance of an INGO’s core commitments to non-discrimination and 
participatory processes as a necessary condition for the success of any aid 
project. An INGO’s principles make it ideally situated to deliver aid, not 
because of the principles themselves, but because the content of these 
principles is responsive to the perspective and interests of the poor and 
marginalised, and this responsiveness, in turn, is the necessary ingredient for a 
successful aid project. Indeed, Pogge himself seems open to such a view. Given 
that “judgments about the long-term impact of alternative projects [are] 
highly speculative”, there is a large “range of diverse projects that can 
reasonably be judged consistent with (ABCD*).”407 
This, however, masks what I take to be the real alternative Fuller is offering to 
Pogge’s understanding of INGO moral agency.408 Her point is that INGOs are 
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ideal candidates for poverty reduction because of their commitment to 
specifically non-consequentialist principles. The challenge posed by the case 
of the “discriminating contributor” is whether the good that can be done with 
the contribution outweighs the INGO’s deontic concern for equal respect and 
non-discrimination. How might we motivate the importance of such concerns 
for the agency of an INGO? 
In the previous chapter, we discussed how the multi-party social actor 
framework provides a more accurate basis for understanding how NGOs rely 
on collaborations with other actors in order to exercise their agency. An 
NGO’s accountability obligations, I argued, are triggered in part by its reliance 
on these collaborations to alter the abilities of other actors. Another manner 
in which NGOs can interact with others in a way that triggers obligations is by 
shaping their moral values and evaluative judgments.  
Contemporary examples of NGOs’ abilities to change values and form a new 
moral consensus include the NGO-led boycotts against Nike and De Beers, 
and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). For the campaigns 
against Nike and De Beers to be successful, NGOs not only had to raise 
consumers’ awareness of the conditions of child workers in Nike plants 
overseas or the conflict-sustaining origins of De Beers’ products. They also had 
to convincingly argue that the practice of child labour was harmful and wrong, 
or that a purchase of jewellery made with De Beers’ ‘blood diamonds’ 
constituted financial support for mass violence and rape. ICBL also stands out 
for achieving a significant change in global legal norms through the 
ratification of the International Treaty on Landmines in 1997. This was the 
                                                                                                                                          
accountability and legitimacy characteristic of political institutions. They are already an 
established part of the international political scene…” 
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outcome of significant campaigning by ICBL, which included both the 
provision of facts, and the use of persuasive moral argument.409 
In order for these campaigns to be successful, the other actors mobilised by 
the INGOs must assume that these organisations act in a manner consistent 
with the principles and values that they advocate. This is because their 
engagement with the INGO is motivated and shaped by their commitment to 
certain moral principles espoused by the organisation, and the INGO’s 
presentation of itself as an organisation that enacts such norms or principles. 
If an INGO acts in a manner that is inconsistent with these principles, this 
would lead others to question its ability to perform adequately as an arbiter 
with respect to these values. More importantly, the parties upon whom the 
INGO depends in order to act could come to question the INGO’s own 
commitment to their defining principles, and thereby question the value of 
their collaboration with the INGO.410 If Team Sweat, an INGO that advocates 
for improvements in Nike’s supply chain, argues that it is wrong to buy 
products made through exploitative working conditions, then their own 
activities and collaborations must maintain consistency with their account of 
what constitutes exploitation and why it is wrong. If they were, for instance, to 
collaborate with competitors of Nike who themselves also engage in 
exploitative practices, they would be wronging their supporters by violating 
the very norms upon which this support is conditioned.411  
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3.4.3   Revisiting the problem of discriminating contributors 
NGOs that place this kind of moral engagement at the centre of their work 
have a stronger reason to say no to an offer from a discriminating contributor. 
To focus our attention, let us consider an actual example of this problem: the 
donation made to the British Legion by a member of the British National 
Party, a party with a ‘whites-only’ membership clause that declares a 
commitment to "the continued creation, fostering, maintenance and existence 
of an indigenous British race.”412. This example also helps to demonstrate how 
the shaping of moral norms and the challenge of donors with morally 
questionable beliefs applies generally to all NGOs, not only INGOs working in 
aid and development. 
In 2009, a member of the BNP held a fundraising event, after which she split 
the proceeds evenly between donations to the BNP and the British Legion. The 
British Legion’s acceptance of the donation was highlighted in the media and 
criticised by many, including those working for similar veterans’ charities. The 
head of a veterans’ association in Scotland, for example, voiced his objection as 
follows: “Look at the armed forces and you have multi-ethnicity. What would 
you do with BNP money - not spend it on soldiers of Afro-Caribbean descent? 
It's a complete nonsense. We're very saddened they (other charities) feel they 
have to take this money, and they obviously have to clear their own 
consciences."413 
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But other veterans’ charities were more sympathetic, citing a severe lack of 
resources as a larger problem for them than the political or moral views of 
their potential donors: 
The case illustrates a dilemma faced by other service charities 
approached by the BNP. Tommy Moffat runs FEBA, a charity 
which is negotiating £50,000 a year from the BNP to keep open 
its veterans' drop-in centre in Hamilton, Lanarkshire. ‘We're at 
the bottom of the darkest pit, where we could close the doors 
within the next two to three weeks, and it would be a tragedy for 
our ex-service personnel. We're desperate,’ he says.414 
If we take NGOs to be intermediary agents, then a veterans’ charity may be 
inclined to accept a donation from the BNP if it is significant enough to 
considerably raise the well-being of its beneficiaries. However, doing so can 
undermine the very basis on which such charities rely to exercise their agency. 
Insofar as a veterans’ association’s activities involve moral claims and altering 
people’s views of their moral obligations to former soldiers, they ought to 
avoid inconsistency with those activities by rejecting collaborations with 
actors that undermine or contradict their moral activism. If we maintain that 
an NGO’s agency is constituted by the collaborative activities in which it 
engages, then failure to maintain consistency results in a fracturing of their 
agency,. Given that the British Legion appeals actively to a sense of national 
unity to encourage donations, and campaigns on the slogan “Standing 
shoulder to shoulder with all who serve,”415 the decision to accept funding 
from the BNP violated the very basis on which they enlisted collaborations 
with others. Therefore, they ought not to have accepted it.416 
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3.4.4   Concluding remarks on intermediary agency  
Pogge could contend that my account of NGO agency and the importance of 
maintaining consistency across its norms and activities does not offer an 
adequate alternative to the notion that INGOs are free agents with free reign 
over their resources. That is, the contention is that my discussion has not 
presented a comparable alternative to the (ABCD*) resource allocation 
principle. 
The moral importance of a principle of resource allocation for an INGO is that 
it brings considerations of effectiveness into the planning process. The INGO 
that takes resource allocation seriously aims for the best possible achievement 
with its limited funds. While Pogge’s (ABCD*) principle takes account of risk 
and uncertainty, it does not capture the types of planning and reasoning that 
an NGO must engage in throughout the lifetime of a project in order to 
manage new complexities that threaten to disrupt well-made plans or turn 
efficient projects into money pits. As indicated by the literature on NGO 
performance, a set of standards regarding the causal claims an NGO must rely 
on to ensure effectiveness is equally important to efficiency as a principle that 
provides general weights for organisations to use in determining cost-
effectiveness.417 
I turn in the following chapter to a consideration of what these standards 
might look like, and how an NGO’s ability to meet these standards can qualify 
it as an agent of justice. While this chapter has sought to demonstrate that 
NGOs should not be understood primarily as intermediary agents acting on 
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behalf of their donors, the following chapter 4 discusses a methodology that 
an NGO as an agent in its own right can be required to use in its attempts to 
accomplish positive material change, including the alleviation of serious harm. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The proposal under consideration in this chapter was Pogge’s derivation of 
moral principles for INGOs based on the obligations of their donors. This 
failed for two reasons. First, Pogge employs a deontic argument for the 
obligation to aid that does not fit comfortably with his consequentialist 
principle for guiding the dispersal of aid. Deontic arguments carry the baggage 
of agent-relative reasons, which can be counterproductive for overall poverty 
reduction.  
Deontic arguments also conceive of moral harm in terms of a violation of a 
duty, thereby harbouring a concern for coherence between the justification of 
an obligation and the way in which it is carried out. Consequentialist 
principles treat harm in terms of the content of a human rights deficit, not 
how it occurred, and therefore, do not look at the agents behind the harm. 
They identify material harm and guide us toward maximally reducing it. In 
conditions of scarcity, this requires us to assist those who are least costly to 
save. When we turn our attention to the task of reducing poverty, these two 
notions of harm come into conflict with one another. Those who are less 
costly to save may not be identical to those whose suffering is more directly 
the result of a negative human rights violation.  
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A further criticism dealt with the pervasive idea that INGOs are to be 
understood normatively as intermediary agents for obligated individuals. Any 
account of INGO principles that rests on such a notion of their agency—
whether deontic or consequentialist—will fail. Conceiving of NGOs in general 
as intermediary agents fundamentally misinterprets what NGOs are and the 
nature of their relationships to others. The mere act of donation is not 
sufficient for an organisation to assume the obligations of its donor.  
Instead, using the theoretical characterisation of an NGO as an agent that 
relies on its collaborations with others for its agency, and consideration of the 
NGO activity of moral claim-making, I argued that we ought to approach 
problems such as the “discriminating contributor” through an analysis of the 
collaborative activities of a particular NGO. If accepting a donation from such 
a contributor is inconsistent with the values invoked in the other collaborative 
activities the NGO relies on for its agency, then accepting such a donation 
produces a fractured organisational personality. Either the NGO must refuse 
the donation, or give up its activity of moral claim making. 
While maintaining consistency with its values is an important obligation, it 
does not directly address the issue of effectiveness. This issue is now taken up 
in the following chapter, where I consider the comparative capacities for 
justice between NGOs and the state, and argue that the requirement of 
effectiveness ought to be framed in terms of the efforts an organisation makes 
at articulating and verifying a theory of the causal pathways for positive 
change. 
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CHAPTER 4   THE CAPACITIES OF VOLUNTARY 
ASSOCIATIONS FOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed one role INGOs might play in connection to 
the demands of global justice: as dispensers of economic assistance to the 
global poor.  But NGOs, those operating internationally as well as 
domestically, also engage in protecting and fulfilling human rights, improving 
labour and wage practices, promoting gender equality, facilitating processes of 
criminal justice in post-conflict settings, and advocating for just tax reform.418 
For such NGOs and many of those who interact with them, these activities 
illustrate the way in which NGOs work to realise the ideals and principles of 
socio-economic and civil justice. 
And yet, within contemporary political philosophy, NGOs are rarely 
considered to be subjects of justice, due to their classification as “private 
associations.”419 Following Rawls, many hold that justice is primarily 
understood as applying to “the basic structure of society”420: “a society’s main 
political, social, and economic institutions.”421 The task of a theory of justice is 
to work out the principles which structure and regulate these institutions, as 
they provide the background conditions against which private transactions 
                                                 
418
 Albrow & Seckinelgin (eds.) (2011). 
419
 Rawls (1971, p. 7). 
420
 Ibid. (p. 3). 
421
 Rawls (1993, p. 223). 
185 
 
can take place fairly and freely. What defines the basic structure of a society, 
and which institutions qualify as part of the basic structure, has been a 
significant topic of debate in the literature. On one interpretation, the basic 
structure is characterised by its coercive power, “which determines in a 
relatively fixed and general way what people may and must do.”422 On another 
interpretation, institutions qualify as part of the basic structure in virtue of 
their far-reaching impact, that is, their “profound and pervasive influence on 
the persons who live under its institutions.”423  
Voluntary organisations such as NGOs can be excluded as subjects of justice 
on both of these interpretations of the basic structure. If we take the basic 
structure to be defined by coercive power, then NGOs, as voluntary 
associations, fail to coerce and thus, fail to qualify as subjects of justice. On the 
“pervasive impact”424 interpretation, voluntary associations such as NGOs can 
be cast as unable to influence people’s life chances in a manner as deep and 
substantive as state institutions.  
Each of these views, I believe, rests on an implicit assumption about the nature 
of voluntary association. The first assumes that voluntary associations, in 
virtue of their voluntariness, do not trigger any further demand, or any 
significant demand, for justification to their members.425 Therefore, they lie 
outside the scope of justice426 because they cannot trigger obligations of 
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distributive justice. The second view is based on the ill-defined concept of 
agential capacity. Voluntary organisations such as NGOs cannot be agents of 
justice, it is argued, because they lack the requisite capacities to meet 
principles of justice,427 including the capacity to deeply impact people’s lives. 
This chapter aims to undermine both of these reasons for excluding NGOs 
from the responsibilities of justice. 
In 4.1, I discuss Thomas Nagel’s (2005) “involvement of the will” thesis as an 
example of an argument for the view that the grounds of justice rest in the 
nonvoluntary engagement of individuals’ wills. I present both Andrea 
Sangiovanni’s (2007) version of this argument, which rests on a weaker claim, 
as well as Nagel’s own, more restrictive view. The weaker and more palatable 
presentation of voluntarism by Sangiovanni illustrates—as Sangiovanni 
himself notes—that an appeal to the absence of exit costs cannot be the basis 
for Nagel’s claim that voluntary relations trigger no additional need for 
justification since it admits to a difference in degree, not in kind, of 
association. I then provide a positive argument against Nagel, arguing that 
when we engage in voluntary relations, we make claims about our intentions 
and values that can make us liable to obligations and expectations of 
justification from others. Finally, I argue that Nagel’s attempt to ground justice 
in legitimate state authority is better read as a claim about the necessary 
means for achieving justice. Nagel confuses the claim that the state provides 
the necessary means for practically achieving justice, with the claim that the 
state serves as the grounds for justice.  
In section 4.2, I turn to Saladin Meckled-Garcia’s (2008) argument for statism, 
which has the potential to fix the problems in Nagel’s position. Meckled-
Garcia’s explanation of the role of agency and agential capacity in fixing the 
domain of a moral principle gives us a way to connect means to grounds: the 
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grounds of justice are the existence of agents of justice, who are, in turn, 
identified by their capacities, or means, for realising justice. After explaining 
Meckled-Garcia’s argument, I argue that his account is unclear on the 
definition of agential capacity, and I offer two possible understandings of this 
concept: capacity as a causal power and capacity as a moral power.  
In 4.3, I compare state institutions and NGOs with respect to their causal 
powers for justice and argue that these powers vary based on institutional 
context, not institutional type. Therefore, justice cannot be restricted to the 
state on the basis of considering causal powers alone. I conclude by 
considering the moral powers required by an agent of justice. States possess a 
moral power distinct from the powers of NGOs. Yet this, I argue, does not 
separate them in kind, but by degree, as the moral power of an NGO is just as 
important, if not necessary, for the realisation of justice in actual societies. 
 
 
4.1   Nagel on sovereignty and justice 
 
4.1.1   Nagel’s ‘involvement of the will’ thesis 
In “The Problem of Global Justice” (2005), Nagel opens his discussion by 
distinguishing two different conceptions of justice.428 On the cosmopolitan 
conception, “the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of 
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fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the 
institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for 
the fulfilment of that duty.”429 The cosmopolitan conception of justice casts 
real-world institutions as contingencies that we can, and should, manipulate 
so as to better realise the universal moral value of equal concern. Insofar as the 
current state system has yielded a serious departure from this value, it 
constitutes an obstacle to justice and ought to be significantly revised or 
dismantled. In contrast, the political conception, attributed to Rawls, holds 
that principles of justice are grounded, not in a notion of universal moral 
concern, but in social institutions that create the need for such principles “by 
putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not 
have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be 
evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the 
content of justice.”430 Consideration of what justice demands begins with an 
account of the moral significance of the relations amongst members of a 
shared institutional system. 
Nagel is interested in developing an argument for the political conception, 
which requires him to explain both the special relation that prevails amongst 
co-citizens, and the moral significance of such a relation. In particular, this 
relation must be morally significant in a manner that justifies its status as the 
exclusive grounds for demands of justice, thereby explaining why obligations 
of justice do not extend beyond the boundaries of a state to the rest of 
humanity. For Nagel, not only is this relation the exclusive grounds for justice, 
it is the exclusive grounds for any moral requirements above and beyond 
“basic humanitarian duties”: obligations of assistance to those in life-
threatening need, and a respect for basic universal human rights such as the 
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rights against violence or enslavement.431 Nagel is therefore a “dualist” 432 with 
respect to moral principles: he holds that there are two distinct moral spheres 
governed by separate moral requirements.433   Dualism can be contrasted with 
“pluralism,” the position that there are multiple moral spheres each with their 
own set of regulative principles, as well as “monism,” the view that the same 
moral principle or set of principles applies across a universal domain. Monism 
is more common amongst cosmopolitans, who hold that the same principles 
of equal concern apply globally, or utilitarians, for whom the principle of 
utility applies to the regulation of institutions as well as interpersonal conduct. 
Nagel’s dualism places even greater weight on the importance of assigning the 
limits of justice, as relations that fall outside this limit are regulated only by 
the most basic moral requirements.  
Nagel thinks that an account of the moral significance of relations between co-
citizens is available if we clarify Rawls’ idea of morally arbitrary inequalities as 
the trigger for the demands of justice. Rawls’ development and defence of his 
principles of justice are guided by the conviction that a just society is that 
which seeks to eliminate or reduce as much as possible the inequalities in life 
prospects caused by morally arbitrary factors such as a person’s race, gender, 
or natural talents. According to Nagel, this idea is not, as read by some 
cosmopolitan critics, grounded in a universal dictum against inequalities 
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caused by morally arbitrary features, but is instead motivated by the claim that 
such inequalities gain a special moral significance when they arise within 
particular societal structures: “What is objectionable is that we should be 
fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and 
political institutions that generates such arbitrary inequalities.”434 The 
existence of coercively imposed legal and political institutions is, Nagel 
contends, what gives normative force to an account of socio-economic justice. 
Neither the generation of arbitrary inequalities alone, nor the pervasive impact 
of these inequalities on the life prospects of an individual, are sufficient to 
operate as the basis for demands of egalitarian justice. If they were, then 
cosmopolitans could easily point to membership in a particular state as a 
characteristic that is as equally morally arbitrary as race or gender and 
conclude that, since this membership has a pervasive impact on our life 
prospects, the scope of principles of justice cannot be restricted to the internal 
relations of individual states.  
Nagel thinks this cosmopolitan extension of the grounds of justice is 
unavailable since inequalities call for special justification only when they arise 
through coercively imposed institutions. This is because shared coercive 
institutions engage with their members’ wills in a particular, morally relevant 
way. Nagel describes this special “involvement of the will”435 as follows: 
Without being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the 
collective life of a particular society. The society makes us 
responsible for its acts, which are taken in our name and on 
which, in a democracy, we may even have some influence; and it 
holds us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming to its 
norms, thereby supporting the institutions through which 
advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed. 
Insofar as those institutions admit arbitrary inequalities, we are, 
even though the responsibility has been simply handed to us, 
responsible for them, and we therefore have standing to ask why 
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we should accept them. This request for justification has moral 
weight even if we have in practice no choice but to live under 
the existing regime. The reason is that its requirements claim 
our active cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done 
without justification—otherwise it is pure coercion.436 
According to Nagel, the state exerts a monopoly of force that binds each 
citizen equally and, thus, is exercised equally in each citizen’s name, in a way 
similar to Rousseau’s notion of the general will.437 In order for this exercise of 
power to be justifiable to all subjected to it, the laws through which this power 
is exercised must provide equal consideration to all citizens. This means that 
egalitarian principles of justice are grounded in the idea that equal 
consideration to all affected by a collectively-imposed coercive power is a 
necessary condition for the justification of that power. It is necessary because, 
in order for the system of law to rule in the name of each and every citizen, it 
must be justifiable to all, and this justifiability consists in it satisfying the 
condition of equal consideration. If a system of law allows for inequalities on 
the basis of arbitrary considerations, Nagel says, then, we as citizens under 
that law may request a justification, since these inequalities are being 
permitted in our name. Voluntary enterprises, such as universities or tennis 
clubs (or, as Nagel argues, institutions of global governance438), do not involve 
the will of their members in the same way, and therefore, do not trigger the 
same demands for justification. Justice is therefore not owed to participants 
within these types of relations. This is Nagel’s involvement of the will thesis: 
demands of justice operate as a special kind of moral justification that applies 
only to relations which coercively place requirements on the wills of their 
participants.  
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Despite his emphasis on the necessity of “the required active engagement of 
the will” of citizens for the application of justice, Nagel’s argument is 
ambiguous about what this engagement consists in, and what about it bears 
the moral significance that makes this engagement alone the exclusive 
grounds for principles of justice. If egalitarian principles are only triggered as a 
solution to a particular type of normative problem, then Nagel’s account must 
explain how this normative problem is unique to those living collectively 
under shared coercive institutions.  We will now consider two possibilities. 
One possibility is that the wills of citizens are engaged nonvoluntarily because 
of their inability to exit the state, rendering Nagel’s view as the claim that 
justice applies only to nonvoluntary enterprises, defined in terms of their exit 
costs. Nagel’s argument has faced convincing criticism when his argument is 
read in this manner, but none of these critics question the basic claim 
regarding the benign moral status of voluntary relations. I argue that this 
assumption is also unjustified, and that, moreover, Nagel’s argument reflects a 
confusion between the grounds of justice and the means for achieving justice. 
 
4.1.2   No exit 
Nagel’s comments follow Rawls’ distinction between the basic structure of a 
society and the various voluntary associations within it, suggesting that his 
“involvement of the will” thesis is based on the notion that state institutions 
are morally special insofar as they constitute “a structure we enter only by 
birth and leave only by death.”439 Andrea Sangiovanni (2007) claims that this 
offers the most plausible reading of Nagel’s argument, since a straight-forward 
understanding of the thesis—that citizens are involved as co-authors of a 
shared system of law—does not sufficiently distinguish state institutions from 
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voluntary associations such as tennis clubs.440 Members of clubs are just as 
much the “authors” of their clubs’ by-laws and decisions as co-citizens are the 
authors of their state laws. This indicates, Sangiovanni says, that authorship as 
a mode of engaging with a citizen’s will cannot be sufficient alone.441 
Therefore, he suggests interpreting Nagel’s argument as a statist approach to 
global justice that appeals to the high exit costs associated with state 
membership.  On this interpretation, the special normative problem that gives 
rise to egalitarian demands is the special need to justify nonvoluntary 
arrangements to their participants:  
1) Principles of justice are special moral requirements that apply only 
to relations that require moral justification above and beyond an 
appeal to basic humanitarian morality.442 
2) Only nonvoluntary relations require moral justification above and 
beyond an appeal to basic humanitarian morality.443  
3) The relation between a state and its citizens is nonvoluntary, while 
relations that constitute nonstate enterprises are voluntary.444  
C: Therefore, only the relations between states and their citizens are 
those to which principles of justice can apply. 
This construal of the argument makes Nagel vulnerable to many counter-
examples that undermine premise (3). Despite Nagel’s attempt to highlight 
particular features of global political and economic institutions that 
supposedly disqualify them as justice-relevant coercive bodies,445 critics have 
argued convincingly that the WTO, World Bank, U.N. and other similar 
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institutions engage authoritatively and nonvoluntarily with individuals in a 
way indistinguishable from Nagel’s account of state-citizen relations.446 If the 
moral significance of the involvement of the will is, in fact, based on this 
involvement being nonvoluntary, then Nagel’s argument fails based on 
premise (3) alone.   
Rather than pursue an already successful line of criticism, I will instead add a 
further reason to reject Nagel’s view. Even if Nagel were to succeed in showing 
that states are uniquely nonvoluntary institutions, this version of his argument 
still fails due to the voluntarist premise (2). While Nagel states something 
close to (2) in his argument,447 he does not discuss in detail how voluntary and 
nonvoluntary schemes impinge on the autonomy of their participants in 
distinct and morally significant ways. To support premise (2), Nagel must 
explain in virtue of what consideration nonvoluntary relations are morally 
problematic in a way that voluntary arrangements are not. Sangiovanni 
attempts the following explanation on Nagel’s behalf:  
Say that you feel disadvantaged by a set of norms and regulations set by 
a voluntary association, and you demand a justification. Because you 
have an eligible option to leave the association, we say that the 
standards for justifying the rules need not be as stringent as a 
nonvoluntary association. When you have viable options that are not 
excessively burdensome, ‘love it or leave it’ is a reasonable reply. If a 
nonvoluntary organization imposes a disadvantage on you, things look 
very different. Because you have no viable alternative to compliance, 
the disadvantage must receive a special and more stringent 
justification, precisely given your lack of alternatives.448 
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This defence expresses a popular understanding of the different moral 
standings of voluntary and nonvoluntary relations, one which treats the moral 
acceptability of an association as a function of its exit costs.  
An initial objection to this outlook is that it underestimates the depth of value 
that individuals can accord to their voluntary associations, such that an appeal 
to excessively burdensome options ultimately undermines the distinction it is 
employed to support.449 The disadvantages imposed through a nonvoluntary 
organisation supposedly carry special moral weight because of the lack of 
viable, nonburdensome alternatives. Yet, while one may have viable options 
with respect to a voluntary organisation, the nature of the burden of 
withdrawing from such organisations is significantly underestimated by the 
voluntarist position. For example, Sangiovanni frequently uses a tennis club as 
an example of a voluntary association that does not impose on its members’ 
wills in the same way as a nonvoluntary state. But imagine a tennis club that 
functions as the primary social hub for a given town. Membership in the club 
provides key social capital: friendships, networking opportunities, social 
standing, etc. If such a club were to adopt a new policy charging a higher rate 
for those of a particular religious orientation, or for those with lower incomes, 
it is not merely callous, but straight-forwardly false to say that such a practice 
is not as morally problematic as it could be, in virtue of the fact that 
membership is voluntary.450  
The burdens of leaving a voluntary association that are evident when that 
association is valued instrumentally for some other good—e.g. the tennis club 
valued not only for tennis but also for the opportunities to network—are 
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increased when membership has an intrinsic value. ‘Love it or leave it’ is not a 
genuine option for committed Catholics who hold deep reservations over the 
Church’s stance on gays or women. Nor is it an adequate response to members 
of an environmental cooperative who discover their fellow cooperative 
members have been buying factory farmed eggs, or to members of a human 
rights NGO who disagree strongly with the organisation’s decision not to act 
on a particular rights violation. In such cases, the presence of viable options 
for exit is, to a large degree, immaterial to the reason why an individual may 
seek a justification for decisions or practices she objects to within a voluntary 
association. In fact, these circumstances raise the question as to how to 
determine the set of options a person has with respect to her membership 
within a given association. While the Catholic has other options for religious 
practice and the NGO members have options with respect to NGOs they can 
support or human rights campaigns they can participate in, both might 
reasonably claim that the intrinsic value of being a Catholic, with its 
concomitant rituals, or of being a member of a particular NGO with which 
they have a shared history or identity, is unrivalled.  
This objection may only serve to broaden the category of what we would 
consider “nonvoluntary” relations, if we tie that category to the presence or 
absence of excessively burdensome options. Or, more likely, it indicates an 
approach that admits of degrees when it comes to the stringency of moral 
requirements, based on a scale of varying degrees of nonvoluntariness. As 
indicated in the quote above (“the standards for justifying the rules need not 
be as stringent as a nonvoluntary association”), Sangiovanni would agree; he 
views a scale of varying stringency as a natural conclusion of any approach 
that identifies exit costs as the trigger for further moral requirements. At most, 
he says, the voluntary/nonvoluntary distinction yields a pluralist account of 
moral requirements organised along a spectrum in which “…the more 
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significant the costs of exit, the more stringent the justice norms which should 
apply.”451  
But Sangiovanni’s weaker claim here, which admits of degrees, would not 
satisfy Nagel, who believes that either we have obligations of justice, or we 
must meet only a minimum humanitarian morality. Indeed, Nagel considers 
the possibility of a “‘continuous’ sliding scale of requirements of justice” that 
depends not on exit costs, but “on a scale of degrees of collective 
engagement.”452 He rejects this, however, on the basis that a continuous 
account of requirements of justice is in want of a plausible moral basis.453 So 
Sangiovanni’s appeal to exit costs cannot be the correct understanding of the 
involvement of the will thesis; something more than the lack of viable options 
must characterise the moral significance of the nonvoluntary involvement of 
the will in order to support Nagel’s dualist, not pluralist, premise (2).  
I turn now instead to what I argue is Nagel’s actual understanding of the moral 
significance of the nonvoluntary relations between the state and its citizens. 
While Sangiovanni’s explanation demonstrates that an appeal to exit costs is 
too weak to support his dualist premise (2), it does not offer a positive 
argument against Nagel that gives an account of how voluntary relations can 
trigger special demands for justification.454 Nor does it address what I will 
argue is the basic confusion regarding the relationship between state 
institutions and justice at the heart of Nagel’s argument. 
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4.1.3   Confusing Legitimacy with Justice 
Sangiovanni discards Nagel’s notion of authorship as the explanation for how 
states engage specially with the wills of their citizens because he does not 
think it sufficiently sets states apart from voluntary associations, whose 
members also serve as authors of their by-laws and decisions. As we saw 
above, Sangiovanni’s own explanation, based on the lack of viable options 
available to subjects of nonvoluntary relations, also fails to yield a firm 
distinction in kind between states and non-states.  
The accurate reading of Nagel’s argument, I believe, involves both 
considerations. Nagel clearly rejects the idea that it is the nonvoluntary nature 
of our membership in a state that alone grounds principles of justice, since it is 
this idea that cosmopolitans use to draw an analogy between state 
membership and other nonvoluntary aspects of our lives, such as race or 
gender. Distributive justice is contingent on nonvoluntary association with 
others, Nagel says, but what matters for grounding demands of justice is not 
the lack of options that characterises such associations, but what we are being 
nonvoluntarily engaged in.  
For Nagel, what we are nonvoluntarily engaged in as citizens is respect for, 
and obedience to, state authority and its laws. Authorship, then, is relevant to 
the distinction between state and non-state associations, as the authorship 
exercised by citizens arises through the acceptance of obligations created for 
them by state authority; in other words, the authorship that grounds demands 
of justice is a product of legitimate rule:  
Justice, on the political conception, requires a collectively 
imposed social framework, enacted in the name of all those 
governed by it, and aspiring to command their acceptance of its 
authority even when they disagree with the substance of its 
decisions. Justice applies, in other words, only to a form of 
organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to 
impose decisions by force, and not to a voluntary association or 
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contract among independent parties concerned to advance their 
common interests.455 
Nagel, like Rawls, adopts a Kantian approach to political legitimacy, which 
“offer[s] a justification of the state’s right legitimately to use force under 
certain circumstances, and then offer[s] a justification of the state’s general 
powers to change its subjects’ normative situation that makes essential 
reference to this prior right.”456 Legitimacy pertains to the justification of state 
coercion, which, if successfully achieved, establishes the state’s authority, or, 
‘right to rule.’ Importantly, Nagel conceives of the state’s right to rule as a 
claim-right, implying that legitimate authority entails a corresponding pro 
tanto obligation held by individuals under that authority.457 It is this entailed 
obligation that seems to form the basis for Nagel’s views on the grounds of 
justice. 
The reason coercive institutions require a special moral justification is not 
merely because their membership is nonvoluntary, and nonvoluntary 
arrangements impose significant exit costs. They require a special moral 
justification because, in order to justifiably exercise coercion, the state must 
act legitimately, and if it does so, then its subjects are enjoined to “obey” and 
“actively cooperate” with them. To borrow Joseph Raz’s (1986) oft-repeated 
phrasing, the state’s legitimate political authority alters the normative 
situation of its subjects,458 and this is what Nagel is referencing when he 
speaks of the special engagement of the will that serves as the trigger for 
obligations of justice. 
For Nagel, since we can never actually consent to our membership in a 
particular state, the idea is to show that such institutions could be justified to 
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reasonable individuals.459 In order to meet such a standard of hypothetical 
justification, at minimum state institutions must be based on an equal 
consideration to the interests of those obligated by them. Egalitarian justice, 
then, provides the necessary justification that allows us to truly see ourselves 
as shared authors of state authority instead of as its captives. 
Nagel thinks that equal consideration as a form of justification demarcates the 
state as the sole grounds for justice because this justification is sought only on 
the basis that members of a political society cannot consent to their 
membership. For members of voluntary relations, consent is already present. 
Therefore, Nagel might reason, contra the state, that there is no need for any 
further justification of voluntary relations, since our consent removes the need 
for such justification. The only relations that require further justification, and 
thus trigger moral requirements beyond basic humanitarianism (i.e. justice), 
are those which are nonvoluntary, namely, the relations shared by co-citizens. 
If it is true that consent removes the need for special justification such as 
equal consideration in the context of voluntary associations, then this may 
explain why Nagel thinks that legitimate authority, which is necessitated only 
by non-consensual membership, provides exclusive grounds for the demands 
of justice.  
On Nagel’s view, the acquisition of a special obligation via voluntary 
association operates in the same way as a promise: I consent to meeting you at 
4:00 on Tuesday, and thereby obligate myself to do so. The reason we do not 
need an account of obligation or moral requirement for voluntary associations 
is that any obligations that apply to them are exhausted by the terms that 
establish the association. By consenting to joining a tennis club, or to 
becoming your friend, or to paying membership dues to Amnesty 
International, I promise to conduct myself according to the terms of those 
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associations, whatever they may be. I am obligated to conduct myself in that 
fashion insofar as I have given my word to do so and ought to keep it.460 But I 
do not have any further obligations above and beyond this: as Nagel says, 
further moral requirements (e.g. requirements of justice) cannot “emerge 
merely from cooperation and the conventions that make cooperation 
possible.”461 The norms and obligations regulating cooperative associations are 
“exhausted by the terms of their agreement… [and are] …not independently 
norm-generating.”462 
But members of a shared voluntary association can demand further 
justification from one another, and can acquire obligations to one another, in 
a way that goes beyond the terms of their voluntary interactions. Nagel’s 
picture of associational obligations misrepresents the value that people accord 
to voluntary associations and therefore ignores how this value can generate 
obligations in a manner that does not appeal to promise-making. Voluntary 
associations are constituted by coordinated activities organised around a 
collectively shared goal, ideal, or belief. These activities are possible only if 
members of the association feel justified in forming certain expectations about 
the actions and beliefs of one another. One way to justify your expectation 
that Ann will perform a certain action is if she makes a promise to do so. But 
another way to justify your expectation is if Ann merely states her intention to 
perform a certain action. In the context of your coordinated interaction, Ann’s 
statement of intention operates as an obligation-triggering commitment, 
because Ann is aware that you are engaged in a joint activity with her and that 
you will form expectations regarding her behaviour based on her stated 
intentions. Talbot Brewer has argued that in such associative contexts, the 
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expression of intention—an “internalist”463 commitment—grounds an 
obligation—“externalist”464 commitment—in two ways:  
The first sense is that when we act on them 
[intentions/internalist commitments], we make possible a kind 
of cooperative activity or relationship that would otherwise be 
impossible, and in a healthy association these cooperative 
activities or relationships are valuable to others. The second 
sense is that if we occasionally stray from the shared principles, 
ideals or values that structure some association, this strains the 
trust on which associations depend by giving associates a reason 
to doubt each others' sincerity or moral seriousness. Our 
deviations tinker with the life stories of our associates, casting 
doubt on whether our shared activities really do answer, and 
have answered, to the description under which our associates 
find them worthwhile.465 
A number of our most important associations—friendship, religious affiliation, 
marriage—do not generate their obligations via the terms of a contract, as the 
object of a promise, but as an expression of shared intention or a commitment 
to core values and ideals which others rely upon as part of the fabric of their 
life plans. While some voluntary associations may not generate expectations, 
or demands, of egalitarian justice, others might, depending on the principles 
and values around which they are defined. Labour unions, pro-poor 
cooperatives, and fair trade associations committed to an ethos of 
egalitarianism are each examples of voluntary associations that can trigger 
demands for internal distributive justice as necessary for answering to the 
description under which their members find them worthwhile. Fair trade 
associations that use a 100 : 1 as their executive to farmer pay ratio or a pro-
poor cooperative that does not distribute its earnings in a manner justifiable to 
all who contributed to creating them are associations that have violated the 
obligations they generated when they identified themselves by values of 
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equality, economic empowerment, and social justice. As discussed in the 
previous chapter (3.4), NGOs elicit collaborations that compel them to be 
consistent with the values they espouse, as these values are what make those 
collaborations worthwhile for the other parties involved. Thus, voluntary 
associations can generate new obligations if those obligations are necessary for 
delivering on the commitments that make their activities possible in the first 
instance. 
In sum, Nagel’s main argument for restricting the domain of justice to state 
institutions fails in two main respects. First, the exit costs reading of his 
argument undermines his conclusion, since the exit costs for withdrawing 
from institutions of global governance are comparable to those associated with 
state citizenship. In contrast to the dualist position Nagel attempts to defend, 
this exit costs reading supports the view that there is a plurality of moral 
requirements we acquire through our membership in different institutions 
and organisations. Second, Nagel’s attempt to link justice exclusively to 
legitimate institutions rests, in part, on the claim that voluntary associations 
can generate no additional obligations beyond those elicited by the promises 
members make to one another, and this claim, I argued, is false. 
There is, however, a third possible reading of Nagel’s argument that, while still 
problematic, suggests a strategy through which his conclusion can be justified. 
Nagel is seeking the grounds for demands of justice, yet at certain points he 
seems to confuse this task with the identification of the means necessary for 
practically achieving or implementing justice. Rather than argue that coercive, 
obligation-imposing institutions are the normative grounds for justice, Nagel 
might claim that such institutions are necessary for justice, in the sense that 
only they meet certain operational, logistical, or justificatory requirements for 
the fulfilment of principles of justice. He hints at this idea earlier in his article: 
“What creates the link between justice and sovereignty is something 
common to a wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend on 
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the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be 
achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force.”466 
While Nagel moves on to argue that the state’s monopoly of force is the 
unique grounds for justice, this comment here suggests a different, more 
indirect relationship: practically speaking, justice requires the large-scale 
coordination of many people, and this kind of coordination can be achieved 
only through the exercise of a monopoly of force. The state may indeed be the 
grounds for relations of justice if it can be shown that it constitutes or 
monopolises the necessary and sufficient means for realising justice. The 
connection between states and justice, on this reading, is indirect, running 
through an account of what is necessary for achieving justice and what 
abilities the state uniquely possesses with respect to that task. 
In order for this strategy to work, however, Nagel would need an account of 
how the means for satisfying a moral requirement can be used to settle the 
scope of that requirement, as well as an argument supporting the claim that 
only the state provides the necessary means for justice. I turn now to such an 
account offered by Saladin Meckled-Garcia. 
 
 
4.2   Agent-capacities 
 
If justice is to be restricted to the state, statists such as Nagel require an 
account of what is unique about the state that would justify this restriction. 
Several formulations of Nagel’s “involvement of the will” thesis failed to 
provide this justification. In this section and the next, we consider a new 
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strategy, in which justice is state-based in light of the claim that only state 
institutions possess the requisite abilities to deliver on the demands of justice. 
 
4.2.1   Introducing agential capacity 
Several recent discussions of Rawlsian statism467 have drawn attention to the 
way in which it is supported by considerations embedded within the method 
of moral constructivism itself.468 Saladin Meckled-Garcia’s (2008) particular 
contribution to this strategy stands out for targeting the notions closest to the 
heart of the constructivist method: agency and agential capacity.  
Agency plays a central role in constructivist accounts of moral reasoning. 
Constructivist methodology is occupied with explaining how moral principles 
can be arrived at through an argument (the ‘constructive procedure’) that is 
grounded in a consideration of a type of interaction or practical standpoint. 
One of its main motivating ideas is that the function of moral reasoning is to 
guide action, which it can perform only if it is appropriately sensitive to the 
standpoint of a moral decision-maker, i.e. a moral agent. Therefore it is a 
necessary condition for a moral principle that it identify for whom it is a 
directive.469 Directives that merely specify a desirable end or state of affairs 
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without identifying an agent responsible for realizing that goal fail to operate 
as actual moral principles on the constructivist view. 
In connection to this, constructivists also hold the view that “the correct 
regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing,”470 
implying that different moral spheres (e.g. agents, practices, interactional 
problems, institutions) can require different moral principles. For example, 
the development of principles that identify parental obligations begins with a 
consideration of the goods and the range of actions available within a parent-
child relationship.  The international responsibilities of states, in contrast, are 
constructed with an eye to the goods and activities that constitute 
international relations. Constructivists, in other words, are pluralists with 
respect to moral requirement.  
Meckled-Garcia refers to this feature of constructivism as “domain-
restriction,”471 and explains how it makes an analysis of agency integral to the 
construction of a moral principle:  
The fundamental idea behind differentiating spheres and agents 
is that moral principles express specific values discoverable in 
different domains of human relationship. They do so by defining 
the morally appropriate behaviour of an agent in a domain. […] 
What gives focus to these considerations of value expressed by a 
principle for the distribution of benefits and burdens, is 
precisely the powers an agent has to effect such a distribution. 
These we can call an agent’s ‘moral powers’. They combine a 
consideration of what an agent should be expected to do and 
what they are capable of doing in respect of such a distribution. 
This supports the differentiating approach because, plausibly, 
different agents have different moral powers, and are 
consequently bound by different primary principles.472 
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I will refrain here from a more detailed discussion of the method of moral 
constructivism, as the aim is to focus on the work being done by the notion of 
agential capacity. While he uses the phrase “moral power” in the above 
excerpt, Meckled-Garcia later replaces this, or uses it interchangeably with, 
the term “capacity.”473 According to Meckled-Garcia’s extrapolation of 
constructivism, a moral principle regulates a domain of activity by embodying 
the value(s) appropriate to that activity. These values are determined by two 
considerations: 1) a consideration of the kind of benefits and burdens being 
distributed by the activity, 2) the capacities of the agents involved to effect a 
certain distribution. Because they hold that the function of a moral principle is 
to guide activity, constructivists are committed to the “ought implies can 
principle”: an agent cannot be held morally responsible for an action which 
she cannot reasonably perform.474 The “crucial”475 role of agency, then, is to 
guarantee that a constructed principle will not violate the ought implies can 
principle, by bringing considerations of what an agent can do into the process 
of working out a principle’s content and scope.    
The use of agency to settle questions of domain restriction provides a way to 
solve the challenge unanswered by Nagel’s argument: how to link the means 
for justice to the grounds of justice. Agent-capacities are the morally relevant 
aspect of agency needed to identify the appropriate agents for a particular 
principle. If we identify the capacities required of an agent to fulfil the duties 
issued by a principle of justice, then we can use that account to assess whether 
a particular institution or individual should be held responsible for meeting 
those duties as an agent of justice. The grounds of justice are established 
through a consideration of which agents have the means, or capacities, to 
deliver it. Meckled-Garcia’s particular diagnosis is identical to Nagel’s: only 
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authoritative state institutions operating domestically have the necessary and 
sufficient capacities to effect the relevant distribution of benefits and burdens 
governed by a principle of justice. Therefore, principles of justice are bounded 
doubly by state borders and by the outer limits of state legal and political 
institutions. The relations of compatriots are the only grounds for justice. I 
turn now to a brief discussion of Meckled-Garcia’s argument, through which 
we can develop a better idea of the notion of agential capacity. 
 
4.2.2   Assessing the capacity for justice: Meckled-Garcia’s statism 
4.2.2.1   The overall argument 
Meckled-Garcia defines the moral powers of an agent of justice as the ability 
to continuously effect an appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens for 
all members of a cooperative system.476 The essential challenge to maintaining 
such a distribution over time is the accumulation of private choices and 
interactions that impact individuals’ life prospects, creating unjustifiable 
inequalities. In order to avoid these inequalities and “secure justice for those 
citizens”477, an agent of justice must be capable of making continual 
adjustments to the overall distribution.  
According to Meckled-Garcia, individuals and private organisations, such as 
schools or universities, lack this ability in the domain of domestic justice, and 
international and state institutions lack this ability in the domain of global 
justice. He concludes that the only agents that possess the requisite moral 
powers for distributive justice are state institutions operating with respect to 
domestic distributions. This means that the relevant agents necessary for 
fulfilling principles of global justice cannot be identified, since no agents 
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possessing the necessary moral powers for global justice exist. Cosmopolitan 
principles of justice fail to identify a relevant agent and are to be rejected on 
the grounds that they are “incomplete.”478  
Meckled-Garcia supports these conclusions by arguing that non-state actors 
(IGOs as well as NGOs) fail to qualify as agents of justice for three reasons: 1) 
they do not have the knowledge necessary for preserving a pattern of 
distribution over time, 2) they do not have the capacity to control the actions 
of others in affecting the distribution, and 3) it would be unreasonable to 
expect these actors to acquire the abilities identified in (1) and (2).  
4.2.2.2   The domestic domain: states as solitary agents of justice 
In the domestic case, individuals and private organisations cannot predict the 
long-term consequences of their contributions towards decreasing inequality, 
nor can they calculate the total effect on burdens and benefits that their 
isolated action may have.479 Here, Meckled-Garcia is repeating a familiar point 
of Rawls’: individuals and private organisations only have epistemic access to 
“local circumstances.”480 Therefore, they are not in a position to determine the 
justness or fairness of their decisions and agreements. As Rawls argues, “It is 
obviously not sensible to impose on parents (as heads of families) the duty to 
adjust their own bequests to what they estimate the effects of the totality of 
actual bequests will be on the next generation, much less beyond.”481  Only a 
position from which the entire distribution and its long-term effects can be 
assessed, a position available to parties setting the background rules and 
conditions against which individuals interact, can meet the epistemic 
requirements for accomplishing a just distribution.  
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The challenges that individuals and private organisations face in exercising the 
abilities described in (1) are magnified by their lack of capacity with respect to 
(2). A major contribution to the epistemic deficit faced by non-state agents is 
their inability to control what others within the system are doing to affect the 
distribution. Ann cannot predict the long-term justice-relevant consequences 
of her donation to a disadvantaged group because she cannot control the 
actions of those within that group. Its members may use the donation to 
economically dominate others by, for example, converting the long-term 
consequences of her donation from a contribution to justice into a 
contribution to injustice.482  
While he does not discuss NGOs specifically, the challenges Meckled-Garcia 
highlights for individuals and private organisations attempting to meet the 
demands of justice echo familiar problems associated with the practices of 
humanitarian and human rights NGOs. Projects intended to improve the 
circumstances of a disadvantaged population can end up worsening those 
circumstances by funnelling money to corrupt regimes or supplying food and 
other aid to violent militias.483 Even in cases where corruption and violent 
conflict are not an issue, many human rights NGOs have struggled with the 
experience of promoting the rights of a minority group only to find that 
another rights deficit (e.g. the rights of women) within that group either 
remains unchanged or is exacerbated.484 In line with Meckled-Garcia’s 
analysis, these problems are often attributed to the limited information NGOs 
possess regarding the long-term implications of their projects and their 
inability to control the actions of those around them, including those targeted 
by their aid.  
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Meckled-Garcia’s third reason for excluding individuals and private 
organisations as agents of justice does not extend so easily to NGOs.  He 
argues that it would be unreasonable to expect individuals to develop the 
capacities necessary for maintaining just distributive patterns over time 
because continually adjusting for changes in distributions would divert their 
attention away from their other responsibilities as family members, 
employees, or citizens. Similarly, requiring universities or museums to act as 
agents of justice would direct them away from their primary functions as 
educational and cultural institutions.  
This concern does not seem to hold in the same manner for NGOs, as many of 
these organisations define themselves around a contribution to the aims of 
social justice. It seems more reasonable, therefore, to expect NGOs to develop 
the necessary epistemic and regulatory capacities to acquire the responsibility 
for securing justice. Yet, the kind of justice at issue here—distributive 
justice—is broader and more wide-scale than the social justice goals pursued 
by many NGOs. Moreover, the duties Meckled-Garcia has in mind are perfect 
duties: duties which constrain an agent to acting in specific ways and fulfilling 
specific tasks. If we were to expect NGOs to conform to these duties the result 
would be to require NGOs to allocate resources in a particular manner, 
regardless of the other commitments by which they define themselves.485 The 
concomitant obligations of justice would likely prevent NGOs from pursuing 
other, non-distribution-related social justice goals considered to be as 
fundamental to their identity as good curation is to the identity of a museum. 
Individuals and private organisations have the ability to significantly influence 
overall distributions through an accumulation of private transactions and 
activities. But Meckled-Garcia, following Rawls, argues that this “horizontal 
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impact”486 is distinct from the ability to continually adjust over time for the 
distributive disruptions resulting from that impact.487 This latter task, of 
correcting for unintended inequalities, is constituted in the setting of 
“background conditions”488 for free and fair transactions, and reaches beyond 
the capacities of individuals and private organisations insofar as it requires the 
ability to alter the social rules bearing on individuals’ life prospects and on the 
fairness of their private agreements.489 In order to set background conditions, 
an agent of justice must be able to, among other things, establish rules for 
property ownership and control access to education and health services. 
Meckled-Garcia contends that an agent can perform these tasks only if it 
meets “the authority condition”: possession of the capacity to allocate rights 
and duties to individuals within a cooperative system.490 Only authoritative 
state institutions, with the concomitant public system of law, can meet the 
authority condition and thereby fulfil the duties described by a principle of 
justice.491 This is because, as Rawls states, “there are no feasible and 
practicable rules that it is sensible to impose on individuals that can prevent 
the erosion of background justice…the rules governing agreements and 
individual transactions cannot be too complex, or require too much 
information to be correctly applied…”492 They are therefore the only relevant 
agents of justice identifiable in the domestic domain. 
4.2.2.3   The global domain: the absence of agents of justice 
While state institutions meet the authority condition domestically, Meckled-
Garcia argues that neither they nor any other institutional agent does so with 
respect to international distributions. In the international sphere, there is a 
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plethora of actors that operate in ways that have far-reaching and serious 
effects on individuals’ life prospects. These include not only states themselves, 
but major intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations and 
World Trade Organization, as well as transnational corporations and INGOs. 
As with individuals in the domestic sphere, Meckled-Garcia concedes that 
these actors are capable of deep horizontal impact through their isolated 
activities and policies. However, none of these actors has the ability to allocate 
rights and duties internationally; even states only satisfy the authority 
condition with respect to their own people and cannot assign rights and duties 
to those outside their borders. For this reason, Meckled-Garcia argues, there is 
no comparable “basic structure,” or set of agents possessing the capacity for 
justice at the international level.493 
A cosmopolitan might reply to this by insisting that principles of justice may 
operate internationally in lieu of a centralised authority if we hold states 
responsible for their fulfilment. On this suggestion, the horizontal impact of 
state agreements and practices can be evaluated according to how closely it 
approximates a just distribution, and states can be held responsible either for 
their own negative horizontal impact, or for doing their fair share to correct 
the overall accumulation of distributional unfairness over time.494  
But Meckled-Garcia rejects this reply, for the same reasons that he finds it 
unreasonable to treat individuals and private organisations as agents of justice 
in the domestic case. States lack the knowledge necessary for achieving a just 
global distribution (reason (1)) insofar as they are unable to predict the long-
term consequences of their economic policies on the life prospects of others. 
Encouraging a particular import from a developing country or adopting a tax 
on currency trades could, in the long-run, have a disastrous economic effect 
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that would ultimately lead to a less fair distribution.495 These epistemic 
problems are fuelled by the fundamental lack of control that states have with 
respect to the complex social, political and economic factors that converge to 
affect a given population’s life prospects (reason (2)). Ultimately, regulations 
are the best that states can do to control the consequences of the international 
market, and these are not sufficient for maintaining a just distribution over 
time.496 In order to correct for the accumulated effects of private transactions, 
states must have the authority to control “prices, exchange rates (the strength 
of each currency), capital flows and investment, which sectors of the economy 
get developed, speed of development, property ownership regimes, and 
employment patterns.”497 Given that they lack this authority outside their 
borders, states do not have the necessary capacities to be held responsible for 
securing global distributive justice. Meckled-Garcia concludes that since 
neither of the options necessary for completing cosmopolitan principles of 
justice is workable— neither non-state international actors that satisfy the 
authority condition, nor states that satisfy the authority condition globally—
these principles fail to offer a robust alternative to statism.  
 
4.2.3   An alternative perspective on capacity: O’Neill and agents of 
justice 
Meckled-Garcia’s comparative analysis of agent-capacities yields a firm 
distinction between states and non-states as two distinct types of agency with 
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distinct sets of responsibilities. Yet, as I will argue, he offers no explanation for 
why agential capacity—what an agent can do and can be expected to do—
issues distinctions in kind instead of degree. In 4.2.4 I will show how current 
understandings of agential capacity conflate two distinct types of powers, or, 
more concretely, make two distinct types of claim about an agent. In order to 
illustrate how this problem is endemic to the concept of agential capacity, we 
will examine Onora O’Neill’s more pluralist assessment of the agency required 
for justice. Comparing O’Neill’s view to Meckled-Garcia’s illustrates the 
ambiguity of agent capacity, as each reach divergent conclusions regarding the 
suitability of NGOs as agents of justice despite appealing to the same 
constructivist notion of agential capacity.  
Like Meckled-Garcia, O’Neill (2001; 2005) has criticised cosmopolitan theories 
of justice as being incomplete, on the grounds that they do not yield specific 
obligations or identify specific duty-bearers. She also urges an attendance to 
obligation and obligation-bearing agents as the “active aspects of justice,”498 
claiming that an adequate moral principle must at the very least take into 
account the distinctive capacities and vulnerabilities an agent possesses with 
respect to justice. Principles that fail to do so, O’Neill says, “will be no more 
than gesture.”499  
Yet, in contrast to Meckled-Garcia, O’Neill thinks that an agent-centred, 
obligation-focused approach to justice will point away from statism and 
toward a more pluralist account of the agents responsible for justice. She 
draws on Amartya Sen’s notion of capability to provide a means for identifying 
these agents and their obligations: 
From the point of view of achieving justice—however we 
conceptualise it—agents and agencies must dispose not only of 
capacities which they could deploy if circumstances were 
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favourable, but of capabilities, that is to say, of specific, 
effectively resourced capacities which they can deploy in actual 
circumstances. Capabilities are to capacities or abilities as 
effective demand is to demand: it is the specific capabilities of 
agents and agencies in specific situations, rather than their 
abstract capacities or their aggregate power, that are relevant to 
determining which obligations of justice they can hold and 
discharge – and which they will be unable to discharge.500 
O’Neill’s assessment emphasises the distinction between the potentiality of an 
agent and that agent’s option set for concrete action. Where constructivists 
such as Meckled-Garcia think moral reasoning needs to be realistic about 
agents’ capacities to effect a given distribution, O’Neill pushes even further, 
demanding a sensitivity to the practical conditions in which agents act and 
seeking “a seriously realistic starting point for normative reasoning.”501 It is not 
enough that an agent have the capacity to meet the demands of justice, for the 
same reason that having the capacity to learn French will not get me very far 
on the streets of Paris if I have not actually studied the language. Capacities 
describe the abstract abilities of an agent—the realm of possible activities or 
skills available to us—whereas capabilities describe what a given agent can 
actually do in a given situation.502 In the absence of favourable conditions or 
real opportunities, one’s capacities can “lie barren,”503 with the agent unable 
(i.e. lacking the capability) to engage in a given activity. Someone may have 
the capacity to work as an agricultural labourer, O’Neill says, but lack the 
capability to do so if the “social and economic structure”504 in which she lives 
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does not support or provide this opportunity.   Similarly, an institution may 
have the abstract capacity to direct the distribution of a large amount of 
goods, yet lack the capability to do so in hostile environments that prevent 
that agent from using that capacity effectively. Capabilities make moral 
requirements practicable for real agents, operating as the mechanism through 
which the values specified within a moral requirement can be realised in the 
world.   
While her emphasis on capabilities over general capacities lends her account a 
greater sensitivity to context, O’Neill’s application of this concept in 
identifying agents of justice and their obligations bears a key similarity to 
Meckled-Garcia’s. O’Neill distinguishes between “primary” and “secondary” 
agents of justice, defining the former as those that have the capacity to assign 
roles and capacities to other agents, to coerce, and to coordinate amongst 
agencies.505 In theory, an individual may have this capacity (for example, the 
chief within a tribal system of law), yet in our world, states operate as the most 
viable candidates for primary agency.506  
However, O’Neill argues that non-state actors, such as INGOs and TNCs, may 
play a key role as secondary agents of justice, and that, depending on the 
political context in which they act, this role can increase greatly in 
importance.507 This is where the distinction between capacity and capability 
becomes particularly salient for assigning obligations of justice in O’Neill’s 
view. In good circumstances, secondary agents of justice are obliged to follow 
the requirements and rules issued by primary agents who, presumably, define 
their required contributions to justice. But there are also contexts in which 
states fail to serve as strong primary agents of justice, namely those involving 
rogue states that actively pursue injustice or dependent states that lack the 
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resources or ability to function properly as a state. In such cases, the typical 
capacity of the state is not effectively translated into the capabilities needed to 
uphold principles of justice: 
When states fail as agents of justice, the problem is not, 
therefore, simply a general lack of power. It is rather a lack of a 
specific range of capabilities that are needed for the delivery of 
justice – and specifically for the coordination, let alone 
enforcement, of action and obligations by other agents and 
agencies.508 
In these cases, secondary agents may contribute to justice by supporting and 
assisting state institutions to become better primary agents, by either lobbying 
them or helping them to develop the necessary capabilities. INGOs are clear 
candidates for operating as secondary agents of justice because, O’Neill says, 
their raison d´être is to alter the operations of state institutions to support a 
more just society.  
O’Neill’s view is mixed on the possibility of INGOs, or any typically-secondary 
agents of justice, acting as primary agents. Secondary agents may take on 
significantly greater responsibilities for justice within weak or failed states, but 
they lack the capacity to coerce or assign duties that O’Neill considers to be 
fundamental to primary agency. Instead, INGOs can engage in other 
important justice-related activities, such as advocacy or funding good 
governance reforms. The capabilities of any particular INGO will be 
determined largely by the specific political context in which they operate; in 
weaker states, an INGO’s contributions to justice will carry much greater 
significance than in strong, stable states. Ultimately, however, O’Neill seems 
to conceive of the principal aim of secondary agents as providing support to 
the improved long-term functioning of state institutions. While they can be 
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vital in assisting or reforming failed states, INGOs “cannot themselves become 
primary agents of justice.”509 
And yet, despite her claim that INGOs cannot operate as primary agents of 
justice, even in cases of failed states, her concluding comments suggest that in 
those cases the distinction between primary and secondary agency may be a 
moot point:  
In the end, it seems to me, any firm distinction between primary 
and secondary agents has a place only where there are powerful 
and relatively just states … once we look at the realities of life 
where states are weak, any simple division between primary and 
secondary agents of justice blurs. Justice has to be built by a 
diversity of agents and agencies that possess and lack varying 
ranges of capabilities, and that can contribute to justice—or to 
injustice—in more diverse ways than is generally 
acknowledged…510 
Several authors sympathetic to cosmopolitanism have developed O’Neill’s idea 
into a capacity- or capability-based approach to assigning responsibilities for 
global justice.511 For the sake of clarity, I will primarily use the term “capacity” 
in reference to these views—indicating where necessary O’Neill’s more specific 
notion of capability—until the end of this chapter where the value of 
distinguishing between capacity and capability is made clearer.  
Cosmopolitanism is sometimes targeted by an over-demandingness objection 
on the basis that it demands states of affairs that require large collective action 
to achieve, without offering a clear, nonarbitrary way of assigning feasible 
obligations to individuals that, if successfully fulfilled, will reliably lead to the 
achievement of global justice.512 If ought implies can, this objection goes, then 
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cosmopolitan duties fail to meet this important condition for moral 
requirements.  
Agent capacities provide cosmopolitans with the reply that ‘can implies ought’: 
NGOs, corporations, the global wealthy, and international institutions can be 
expected to bear greater responsibilities for justice, based on their 
comparatively greater capacities for promoting equality, alleviating poverty, 
and making the necessary reforms to address the root causes of global 
injustice.513  
Regardless of the merits of such a strategy, at the very least this line of 
argument only places greater weight on the notion of agential capacity as a 
determinant of moral obligation. Given that so much in the global justice 
debate hinges on how capacities are ascribed, it is worth considering what 
exactly an assessment of an agent’s capacities consists in.  
 
4.2.4   Capacities as causal or moral powers 
In order to perform their function of identifying the relevant principle for a 
particular agent (or the appropriate agent for a given principle), agential 
capacities need to be linked to particular responsibilities. With respect to 
justice, for Meckled-Garcia this link is the authority condition, the ability to 
assign rights and duties. He argues that only the state possesses duties of 
justice and only with respect to domestic distributions because these are the 
only contexts in which the authority condition is satisfied.  
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Now, it cannot be the case that the capacity that identifies agents of justice is, 
by definition, the authority condition. If this were Meckled-Garcia’s argument, 
then it simply begs the question against those who think non-state actors can 
be agents of justice as well. Meckled-Garcia defines an agent of justice as an 
agent that can assign rights and duties, yet this is precisely what is at issue: 
must an actor be able to assign rights and duties in order to be responsible for 
socio-economic justice? O’Neill’s definition of a primary agent of justice as 
that which can coerce and assign roles to others faces a similar problem. As 
argued above contra Nagel, justice is not analytically equivalent to political 
authority or legitimacy: it must be argued that either of the latter two is a 
necessary condition for the former, not stipulated in a definition. In order to 
defend his claim that non-state actors cannot be responsible for justice, 
Meckled-Garcia must show that the capacities required for effecting socio-
economic justice either necessarily include, or depend upon, the prerogative 
to assign rights and duties. 
First, however, we need a more specific understanding of what it means to 
have a capacity for justice. Initially, we may think of a capacity for justice in 
the same way that we think of an individual agent’s capacity for reflective 
awareness, or capacity for reason. In this case, to say an agent has a capacity 
for Φ is to say that the agent is able to engage in Φ-ing. But if we consider 
Meckled-Garcia’s phrasing, that a capacity for justice is the ability to effect a 
just distribution,514 then an individual agent’s capacity for reflective awareness 
seems disanalogous to an agent’s capacity for socio-economic justice in a 
crucial way: the former denotes an ability to engage in a process or activity, 
whereas the latter is concerned with an ability to produce certain outcomes or 
ends. An agent exercises her capacity for reflective awareness by simply 
engaging in reflection; this need not lead to certain outcomes in order for the 
capacity to be attributed to her. A capacity for justice, described by Meckled-
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Garcia, is different insofar as it is defined in relation to principles of justice 
that specify required states of affairs. This capacity can be specified in terms of 
processes—for example, processes that assign powers or duties to other agents 
or accumulate the necessary information for maintaining a distributive 
pattern—but these processes are relevant only insofar as they reliably produce 
the outcomes required by a principle of justice. A capacity to effect a just 
distribution, thus, implies a causal connection between what an agent is able 
to do, and the event or outcome to which the capacity refers. We can define 
this conception of capacity as follows: 
Capacity as a causal power: An agent has a causal power for Φ if the agent 
has the ability to perform an action that operates as a cause for Φ.  
Causal power for justice: The ability to perform the actions that operate as 
causes for the states of affairs required by a principle of justice. 
The understanding of what it is to operate as a ‘cause’ is left intentionally 
broad and vague in this definition. Different theories of causation will produce 
different conditions for describing an agential action as causal. But the task of 
assigning agent capacity is such that we do not need to settle on any one 
theory.515  
A focus on an agent’s actual causal powers in the world is what O’Neill’s 
realistic notion of capabilities is intended to deliver. Causal powers are 
contingent on institutional and social context, and, as I will argue in 4.3, 
differentiate actors in terms of degree, not kind.  
What can we make then, of the claim that a system of authoritative law, 
through which rights and duties are assigned and enforced, is causally 
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necessary for effecting a just distribution? I believe the correct answer is that 
this is not a claim about causal power at all, but is instead a normative claim 
about the way in which an actor must be able to affect the normative situation 
of others in order to operate as an agent of justice. Indeed, Meckled-Garcia 
explains that what he means by capacity is an agent’s “moral powers,” a term 
Rawls used to characterise his liberal conception of a citizen. But Rawls does 
not provide a clear definition of a moral power, and Meckled-Garcia offers 
little explanation as to how he has adapted Rawls’ idea for application to 
institutions and collective agents.516 As a result, Meckled-Garcia conflates two 
distinct types of claims one can make about such agents. To see this, consider 
the key part of the passage quoted above in 4.2.1, in which Meckled-Garcia 
introduces the importance of an agent’s capacity: 
What gives focus to these considerations of value expressed by a 
principle for the distribution of benefits and burdens, is precisely the 
powers an agent has to effect such a distribution. These we can call an 
agent’s ‘moral powers’. They combine a consideration of what an agent 
should be expected to do and what they are capable of doing in respect 
of such a distribution.517 
One way of reading this is as a causal claim about an agent with respect to a 
distribution. Meckled-Garcia’s main arguments against non-state and global 
justice facilitate this reading because of his insistence that the authority 
condition is necessary for reliably securing a just distribution over time. 
But instead Meckled-Garcia may intend to say the following: States possess a 
moral power, which in turn, is necessary for possessing the causal power that 
when acted upon is necessary and sufficient for achieving a just distribution. 
Let us define a moral power, and a moral power for justice, broadly as follows: 
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Capacity as a moral power: An ability an agent has that allows it to affect the 
normative situation or status of others. 
Moral power for justice: The ability to affect the normative situation of 
others in a manner that allows for the distribution of goods and opportunities 
required by principles of justice. 
The definition of capacity as a moral power is based on Joseph Raz’s (1986) 
account of political authority. Despite its connection to state agency, I will 
argue below that capacity as a moral power can have broader application, as 
there are different ways in which agents can affect the normative situation of 
others.518 As Raz discusses, capacities as moral powers are distinct from the 
mere ability to affect another person. In order to get you to trim your tree 
branches that hang over his yard, your neighbour has the ability to affect your 
interests by burning his trash near your shared fence. You may indeed decide 
to trim them in response to his threat. However, you have no obligation to do 
so: your neighbour is unable to assign to you a duty to trim your tree 
branches.519 He has not altered your normative situation. Moral powers, 
distinct from causal powers, refer to the ability to alter a person’s normative 
status, and one significant example of this power is the assignment of rights 
and duties.   
Assessing whether a collective or institutional agent qualifies as an agent of 
justice in terms of its moral powers hinges on an account of how institutions 
of justice must be able to affect the normative status of individuals. One of the 
ways in which institutions can do this is through the justified assignment of 
rights and duties, a power widely viewed as being exclusive to state 
institutions. This means that what we took to be the most plausible version of 
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Nagel’s argument—that only legitimate political authorities are the grounds of 
justice since only they can provide the means for justice—can be justified if 
Meckled-Garcia’s argument is successful. This argument is: 
1) Only agents that can justifiably (have the moral standing to) assign 
rights and duties can assign rights and duties. 
2) Only agents who can assign rights and duties can causally effect a just 
distribution. 
3) Only agents who can causally effect a just distribution are agents of 
justice. 
4) Only state institutions operating domestically can justifiably (have the 
moral standing to) assign rights and duties. 
C: Only state institutions are agents of justice. 
The following section deals primarily with assessing premise (2): there, I 
examine the causal powers NGOs possess for justice and argue that Meckled-
Garcia’s claim about the comparative causal powers of states and NGOs is 
unsupportable. I then consider the comparative moral powers of states and 
NGOs. While the ways in which state institutions and NGOs can affect the 
normative situation of others is distinct, I argue that both qualify as moral 
powers for justice. The role of the state is to provide a system of rights and 
obligations through which the demands of justice can be negotiated and met. 
NGOs play a significant role both in shaping how these demands are 
understood and actualised in real, concrete situations, and in accumulating 
and using material resources for positive change, which can include the 
realisation of justice, particularly (but not only) when state institutions are 
weak.  
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4.3   Capacity as a causal power 
 
4.3.1   Causal capacities for justice 
Causal capacities for justice involve causal claims at two levels. First, the 
attribution of a causal capacity is itself a causal claim about an agent with 
respect to a particular event or outcome. Causal capacities for justice require 
us to assess the effectiveness of policies and projects. Here we are interested in 
establishing unique contributions: had there been no intervention, would the 
outcome be better, the same, or worse with respect to the desired goal? 
Counterfactuals are, therefore, the kind of causal claim we have in mind when 
attributing the capacity for justice to an agent.520 
With respect to comparing the causal capacities for justice held by states and 
NGOs, we are interested in examining whether a collective agent is able to act 
so as to effect a specified distributive goal. Typically, these actions take the 
form of social and economic interventions designed to shape “the positions of 
relative advantage and disadvantage in individual life expectations”521 within a 
given population. These interventions will typically be causally efficacious only 
if an agent is able to collect and organise relevant evidence, make predictions 
on the effects of different projects or policies, and implement chosen projects 
and policies successfully. Causal claims, therefore, enter in at a second level in 
attributing causal capacities for justice: in order to bring about a just 
distribution, an agent of justice must be able to successfully formulate its own 
causal claims and predictions with respect to the different interventions it can 
take. With these considerations in mind, we can assess an agent’s causal 
capacity for justice by examining its ability to: 1) collect or gain access to the 
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relevant and necessary information, 2) use that information to construct 
useful, predictive claims regarding different interventions, and 3) successfully 
implement the intervention designated as most likely to bring about the 
desired outcome.  
 
4.3.2   Collecting and using evidence 
How do NGOs measure up to state institutions with respect to collecting 
useful information that can make their operations more causally effective? I 
address this question by first discussing the different paths by which NGOs 
and governments have come to place greater emphasis on the use of evidence 
and data collection, and some challenges faced by each. I then outline an 
alternative approach to the use of evidence for policy and project design and 
provide some reasons as to why NGOs might have an advantage over state 
institutions in implementing this approach.  
4.3.2.1   NGOs: Logical frameworks and their associated problems 
Effectiveness and its measurement have become significant issues for those 
working in and around the non-profit sector. As recently as 15 years ago, it was 
rare for an NGO to undertake rigorous internal evaluations of its projects; 
today it is commonplace for even mid-size NGOs to dedicate a team to 
monitoring and evaluation (these employees are often referred to as M&E 
personnel).522 This pressure on NGOs to verify the effects of their activities was 
originally born out of the push for greater NGO accountability that began in 
the early 1990s.523 As discussed in Chapter 2, the demonstration of 
effectiveness continues to be linked closely to theories of NGO accountability, 
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whether it is rooted in the principal-agent framework, or conceived of as an 
integral part of an organisation’s accountability to its own mission.  
With respect to what exactly constitutes effectiveness, “impact” has become 
the holy grail of NGO performance evaluation. The definition of the term 
comes out of a widespread approach to NGO project planning known as “logic 
chains” or logical framework analysis (LFA), originally developed by USAID in 
the 1960s.524 The purpose of a logical framework is to provide a systematic plan 
for a given project that identifies both the goals the project aims to achieve 
and the assumptions and organisational activities necessary to realise those 
goals. Under LFA, an organisation’s effects on its surrounding environment fall 
into one of three categories. “Outputs” are the immediate results of a project: 
for example, an output of a skills training project for indigent single mothers 
might be the acquisition of new job-related skills by project participants. 
Under the right conditions, these outputs can causally contribute to medium- 
and long-term effects. These are the second category of effects, referred to as 
“outcomes.” An outcome of the skills training project, for example, may be the 
participants being hired for a job, or an increase in their income.  
Demonstrated outcomes are considered more valuable than outputs, but 
outcomes are still isolated effects that may not reflect how the overall well-
being of a participant has changed due to the project. Therefore, donors and 
NGOs alike have become increasingly concerned with the achievement and 
proof of the third type of effect, “impact”: a sustained, long-term, positive 
social change caused directly by an NGO’s work. An NGO (or its donor) does 
not want to see its trainees simply increase their income—they want that 
increase to result in raising that individual out of poverty entirely, or 
empowering the participant to have more control over aspects of her life that 
are fundamentally important to her. Outputs and outcomes are ends-in-
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themselves, but more importantly they are also means to the achievement of 
the kind of social impact identified by an NGO’s core aims and mission 
statement. For this reason, demonstrating impact is now “the new mantra” in 
the assessment of third sector organisations.525  
The main feature of LFA is the construction of a ‘logic chain’ connecting 
organisational activities (inputs) to a chain composed of the above three types 
of effects: outputs, outcomes (sometimes referred to as ‘purpose’), and impact 
(sometimes referred to as ‘goal’). Assumptions for each move along the logic 
chain are identified, indicating what external factors must be in place in order 
for activities to successfully effect outputs, for outputs to translate into 
outcomes, etc. 
While the concern for measuring impact has intensified NGOs’ efforts at 
collecting and using evidence to plan and assess their projects, the logical 
framework approach has faced a number of criticisms. Des Gasper (2000) 
identifies three main problems, named after what he sees as being the form 
that logical frameworks can take in practice: “logic-less frames,” “lack-frames,” 
and “lock-frames.”526  
NGOs often use logical frameworks at the request of their donors, leading to a 
perfunctory application of the framework after the project has already been 
designed. Such use produces a logic-less frame that fails to actually guide 
project implementation, or draws questionable connections between inputs 
and outcomes.527 Logical frameworks are also lack-frames in the sense that 
they provide little room for capturing the important complexities of the 
environments in which NGO projects are implemented. The downside to 
simplicity is that “[n]ot everything important can be captured in a one- to 
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three-page, four- or five-level diagram.”528 Finally, a logical framework is 
typically left unrevised once the project has begun, becoming a lock-frame. 
The rigidity of such frameworks leads them to lose relevance and usefulness in 
the face of changing conditions that affect the assumptions of the project.529  
Similar frustrations with LFA were expressed by NGO staff in Mongolia. Staff 
at Mongolian NGOs cited the different approaches to LFA as an example of 
the onerous requirements placed upon them by foreign donors that sapped 
time and resources. Amongst INGOs, LFA procedures led to internal tensions. 
One INGO, which was attempting to use a community-based approach to 
identifying projects, required local officers to submit project proposals to the 
national office, which in turn required approval from monitoring and 
evaluation staff at the organisation’s international headquarters. The head of 
the monitoring and evaluation unit at the Mongolia office described LFA as 
being in direct tension with their organisation’s attempt to be community-
based. Project proposals from local officers were often rejected for failing to 
appropriately translate their project into an LFA format, for example, by 
confusing outcomes with outputs. While acknowledging the objectivity that 
LFA supposedly brought to the planning and monitoring process, the M&E 
staffer found it difficult and “disempowering” to instruct local staff on how to 
convey their project ideas through a set logical framework: 
I can see a lot of benefits in it, that it’s very logical. But—I know that 
basically development—we kind of try to have a universal framework 
for how we do projects and programs. And how we identify needs in the 
community and how we move those needs into a program or a project 
design. But I can also see that it doesn’t—there’s got to be a better way. 
Because it’s a very analytical process. And it’s a very Western education 
way of thinking about things that doesn’t necessarily translate easily 
into a different culture or a different context. It’s difficult to teach, and 
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even coming from a Western education system sometimes it’s difficult 
to understand.530   
Peter Smith argues that this attempt to apply a universal framework betrays a 
“naïve realism” implicit in LFA, in which the facts of the situation and the 
meaning of goals are assumed to be “clear to all reasonable people.”531 As a 
result, within the guidelines specified by LFA, “no effort is made to explore 
radically alternative views of the categories used or of the causal links between 
them.”532 This indicates that LFA can direct NGO staff away from identifying 
potentially important sources of evidence for the planning and assessment of 
their projects. 
4.3.2.2   The state: evidence-based policy and its challenges 
State agencies have had only a short chronological advantage over domestic 
and international NGOs with respect to focusing policy development around 
the collection and use of rigorous evidence. “Evidence-based policy,” which 
places a heavy emphasis on the use of randomised control trials (RCTs), has 
become a dominant approach to social policy across Western countries, in 
particular the U.K., Australia, and the United States.533 However, it only 
entered the mainstream of policy-making in the mid-1990s and did not 
achieve its current prominence until 2000.534 
The move towards evidence-based policy is motivated by the idea that 
effective policy is built on considerations of “what works,” and that rigorous 
research can provide evidence useful for determining what works.535 Evidence-
based policy thus reflects the above analysis of what constitutes a causal 
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capacity for justice: in order to be causally efficacious, policy-making 
inistitutions must have the capacity to formulate useful causal claims by 
appropriately collecting and using evidence.  
Since the increase in using evidence for policy, a number of challenges for 
integrating rigorous research into the processes of policy making have been 
highlighted. In the area of health, the underdetermination of certain causal 
claims has meant that research can be drawn on equally by policy-makers 
advocating for and against particular health policies.536 Policy-makers may 
look at the wealth of data and see what they wish to see, rather than use 
evidence to guide policy prescriptions. In the area of social work, the 
prioritisation of RCTs as a form of evidence has made that evidence difficult to 
use in identifying specific best practices.537 Meta-studies conducted on the 
effectiveness of evidence-based policy itself on improved policy pertaining to 
social services have been inconclusive.538 
More generally, policy-makers tend to rely heavily on reviews of multiple 
studies around a particular topic. The accuracy and usefulness of these reviews 
is questionable, however, as “[m]ost systematic reviews also tend to be one-off 
exercises, conducted only as funding, interest, or time permits. Rarely are they 
updated to take into account new studies that are relevant to the review, a 
challenge that is more significant given the cumulative growth of evaluation 
reports…”539 Overall, while state institutions have improved in terms of their 
collection of evidence, current practices indicate that there are significant 
challenges in successfully integrating evidence collection with the processes of 
policy-making. 
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4.3.2.3   INUS conditions and Theory of Change 
Recently, Nancy Cartwright (2008; 2009) has attempted to provide an essential 
tool to practitioners of evidence-based policy by articulating a theory of use 
for evidence. In presenting her theory, Cartwright has argued that information 
is useful for policy-makers insofar as it allows them to model the complex 
causal mechanisms relevant to the success of a given policy, and that, 
therefore, a theory of what counts as evidence must adopt the perspective of 
evidence users, not the producers.540 In order to get at these complex causal 
mechanisms, Cartwright proposes that policy-makers identify the INUS 
conditions—“Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but 
Sufficient conditions”541—for a policy outcome and seek to understand the 
ways in which these conditions interact and impinge on one another to bring 
about policy goals.  
The job skills training project mentioned above in the discussion of logical 
frameworks is an example of an INUS condition for the desired outcome of 
bringing the target population out of poverty. It is insufficient, since in order 
to be efficacious, it relies on the presence of other conditions, for example, 
effort from the participants to learn and utilise their training, the availability 
of jobs on the market for the participants to get hired, and an adequate wage 
rate. However, when it occurs in conjunction with these other conditions, the 
project operates as a non-redundant, or necessary, part of an overall sufficient 
cause. This overall cause, created by the conjunction of each of these parts, is 
sufficient to bring the target population out of poverty, but is also 
unnecessary, since the participants could rise out of poverty in other ways. 
Hence, it is an INUS condition. 
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Cartwright suggests that the search for INUS conditions directs the user of 
evidence to answering the important “how” question: how does a given policy 
or intervention operate on its environment. In other words, what is the “causal 
pathway”542 that the policy takes to produce particular outcomes?  
4.3.2.4   Comparing NGOs to states on evidence collection and use 
If we define high-quality collection and use of relevant information in terms of 
the modelling of causal pathways, then NGOs have a comparative advantage 
over states for two reasons: 1) the use of such models has a longer history in 
NGO activities than it does in governmental operations, 2) the construction of 
accurate causal pathways relies more on context-specific or local information 
than it does on cross-contextual studies or broader-level statistics and NGOs 
are more adept at the former, states better suited for the latter.  
The notion of a causal pathway has already been popularised in NGO 
monitoring and evaluation via the recent rise in “theory of change” 
methodology.543 Theories of change are similar to logical frameworks insofar 
as they direct project planning through the identification of a long-term goal 
and a reasoning process, through which NGO staff identify the causal chains 
necessary to achieve that goal. What differs, however, is that theory of change 
methods focus on pushing NGO staff to understand how they are changing the 
environment in which they act, and what factors contribute to or detract from 
this process. It directs them to identify the theory implicit in any social project 
that explains “how and why the program will work.”544 Grounding project 
planning in the construction of a theory not only adds value for the particular 
organisation using it, it also “facilitates aggregation of evaluation results into a 
broader base of theoretical and program knowledge”545 and has greater 
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potential to influence policy and popular opinion by addressing “the 
theoretical assumptions embedded in programs.”546   Theories of change thus 
attempt to avoid the central criticism faced by LFA, namely, that it rests on 
“assumptions of relatively well-understood and controllable change, 
engineered via a `project' within or largely controlled by a single 
organization.”547  
There is unfortunately little evidence as to whether either the NGO or state 
sectors utilise theory of change methodology to a greater extent. Yet there is 
reason to think that NGOs hold an operational advantage over states for using 
these methods, since they do not face the same kind of bureaucratic or 
political constraints.548 NGOs are generally more flexible than governmental 
authorities and more open to experimentation and adaptation.549 They can 
make decisions regarding changes to a project more quickly, indicating that 
they are better placed to revise their theories of change and shift project 
elements accordingly.  
The abilities of NGOs to accumulate evidence and contribute to the 
formulation of cogent causal pathways have been recognised by policy makers 
themselves, who have, in turn, created greater opportunities for NGOs to 
consult on and influence policy design. NGOs’ specialised aptitude for 
gathering rigorous evidence is of particular importance when they view a given 
policy as liable to cause harm instead of benefit. For example, in 1995 the 
World Bank agreed, at the behest of NGOs, to investigate the long-term 
impact of the controversial Structural Adjustment Programmes implemented 
by itself and the IMF in developing countries during the 1980s. Known as the 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), this assessment 
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process created a large role for civil society actors, most notably NGOs, who 
drew on their grassroots connections to gather data on the actual effects of 
SAPs on poverty and corruption.550 In some cases, SAPRIs led to a broader 
increase in NGO participation in formulating policy strategies, “breaking the 
monopoly of the government in development policy making.”551 Similarly, 
NGOs’ expertise and creation of a valued set of data has granted them a larger 
role in policy change and development at the WTO and other branches of the 
World Bank.552 
Another area in which NGOs have exerted a significant influence due to their 
research and data collection is that of international environmental policy. 
Because of the size of the data pool on changes and threats to ecosystems 
world-wide, IGOs rely on non-state actors such as NGOs for the collection, 
dissemination and analysis of relevant information.553 For example, the Global 
Environment Outlook, a project of the UNEP, and the UN Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment obtain data from a wide-ranging “network”554 of 
groups, each of which is responsible for gathering data on a particular region. 
NGOs play a significant role in these collaborations: “Global system 
assessment is integrated with local environmental reporting. NGOs and other 
non-state actors such as academic and research institutions are the main 
contributors, providing reports and data analysis.”555 Regional branches of 
large INGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund or Nature Conservancy can also 
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operate as primary sources for data on habitat destruction and decline or 
growth in species population.556 
In sum, while neither has a decisive advantage, there are reasons to believe 
that NGOs are at least as capable with respect to the collection and use of 
evidence for meaningful project planning as state institutions. Depending on 
the topic and context, NGOs have been adjudged as adequate providers of 
pertinent policy-relevant data. While it may be the case that state institutions 
still dominate policy environments, there is no indication that NGOs are 
incapable of constructing policy-relevant causal predictions on par with those 
reached by government policy-makers.  
 
4.3.3   Successful implementation 
Collecting and using relevant information is only of value for an agent of 
justice insofar as it supports the successful achievement of a just distribution. 
Meckled-Garcia claims that states possess the capacity to set the fair 
background conditions necessary to support a just distribution domestically, 
but that they lack this capacity internationally because: 
 “the long-term effects of actions...are beyond prediction. This is 
because their consequences will depend on the accumulated 
decisions of market agents. Encouraging a particular import, for 
example prawns, from a developing economy may, indeed, increase 
that economy’s growth in the short term, but it may also lead to a 
long-term loss of diversity in that economy as more resources are 
given over to prawn production, resulting in vulnerability should 
consumption trends change...”557 
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I quote Meckled-Garcia at length here because the prawn example indicates 
the degree of control he thinks an agent must have over the effects of its 
actions in order to qualify as an agent of justice, namely, control over “the 
overall outcomes of their agency.”  
But this will not do as a boundary marker for (causal) capacity, as states do not 
necessarily possess significantly more control over the domestic outcomes of 
their agency than they do internationally. One could point, for example, to the 
decision by the Bush administration to encourage home ownership amongst 
minorities by relaxing lending regulations, which some claim contributed to a 
housing bubble that consequently resulted in a large-scale financial crisis.558 In 
other areas of domestic policy, there is on-going uncertainty as to what kind of 
unemployment benefits scheme most effectively balances the need to provide 
assistance with the desire to incentivise individuals to continue to seek 
employment.559 There is similarly little consensus as to the underlying cause of 
increased income disparities or how they can best be reduced.560 The pursuit 
of evidence-based policy in the United States and Europe has revealed the 
challenges faced by local and national state agencies in predicting the overall 
consequences of their policies. For example, studies have identified welfare-
work schemes that had no effect on long-term employability for participants, 
or expensive policies that reduced classroom size, only to result in an influx of 
poorer-quality teachers that drove down test scores.561   
In contrast, there are well-known cases of non-state actors exerting at least as 
much control over the overall outcomes of their agency as state institutions. 
For example, in Bangladesh, BRAC (formerly the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee) operates as one of the largest NGOs in the world, 
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providing comprehensive social services to over 10,000 villages in Bangladesh, 
including education, micro-credit, health care, and legal services. In 2002 it 
initiated a project in Afghanistan, becoming the first NGO from a developing 
nation to conduct development work in another country. Now BRAC reaches 
over 110 million people throughout Asia and Africa, and operates in its country 
of origin as a “parastate”, arguably exercising a greater impact on Bangladeshis’ 
life prospects than the Bangladeshi government.562  
The influence of NGOs on medicine markets in developing countries provides 
another important example of non-state actors successfully providing a crucial 
service typically allocated to the state in contexts where the state cannot 
provide it on its own. In India and Sub-Saharan Africa, NGOs fund and 
provide key health services, including essential medicines.563 Mackintosh, et 
al. (2010) have described how this activity not only increases access to such 
medicines, but also has an indirect effect on the quality and price of such 
medicines by creating competition with other health providers in the market. 
Many NGOs also take on the role of regulator by conducting sample tests of 
medicines to ensure product safety. These tests are then used by others in the 
market to identify reliable suppliers. Thus, NGOs provide a form of informal 
regulation, or, “the shaping of market behaviour by ‘regulatory webs’ of actors 
and discourse,”564 and can be as effective in providing access to essential 
medicines to the worst-off and influencing the behaviour of individual market 
actors as the formal regulatory powers of the state.565  
These anecdotes indicate that Meckled-Garcia’s argument rests on presenting 
only one side of the story regarding state and non-state performance; the 
overall picture points to the conclusion that the capacity for effecting a just 
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distribution will, like any causal power, vary across types of actors in different 
social and institutional contexts. Meckled-Garcia mistakes a difference in 
degree (of causal control) for a difference in kind, over-emphasizing the causal 
powers of state institutions in the domestic domain and under-emphasizing 
their powers internationally, as well as the causal powers of non-state actors in 
both domains. In contrast to what Meckled-Garcia claims, the achievements of 
the American Farmland Trust (domestic NGO) in the United States may be 
the same achievements of Mercy Corps (INGO) in Mongolia, or the UNDP 
(IGO) in Kenya, or the Department of Agriculture (state) in Chile.  
 
4.3.4   Re-assessing the authority condition 
4.3.4.1   The authority condition as a causal power 
Meckled-Garcia might reply that the authority condition provides the basis for 
establishing a difference in kind between the causal powers of state agencies 
and those of NGOs. After discussing the various ways in which state 
institutions are incapable of controlling for outcomes internationally, he 
considers the following problem:  
“Have I shown too much here? For if it is beyond states to 
counteract economic effects relevant to a just distribution in the 
global sphere, it should be just as difficult for them to do so in the 
domestic case. Yet in the domestic case states have direct 
redistributive control on an ongoing basis through the distribution 
of rights and duties, whilst at the global level their only way of 
affecting distribution is through economic regulation on a 
coordinated basis.”  
Meckled-Garcia thinks that the ability to assign rights and duties is the 
determining factor in the state’s causal power to manage background 
conditions and rules so as to best approximate a just distribution. 
Internationally, state institutions are able only to issue regulations, the effects 
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of which may be counteracted or manipulated by the interventions of others 
whom they cannot control. Domestically, the state’s regulatory authority is 
buttressed by the additional ability to assign duties and articulate and fulfil 
rights, giving them sufficient causal capacity to support a just distribution. He 
could therefore claim that we have not adequately engaged with his premise: 
(2) Only agents who can assign rights and duties can causally effect a 
just distribution. 
There are two problems with this reply. The first is that answering this 
question requires operationalizing what it means for a state agency to 
“distribute rights and duties” in order to assess the causal effects of such an 
ability. It is unclear how this can be done in a way that would distinguish this 
ability from the regulatory activities that Meckled-Garcia deems insufficient 
for controlling a distribution. 
For example, the state may enshrine a right to education for all school-age 
children. What does this actually mean? Perhaps the state assigns duties to 
individuals: some options here might be a teacher’s duty to provide adequate 
teaching in a non-discriminatory manner, a parent’s duty to enrol their child 
in school, or citizens’ duties to provide funding for a public school system 
through taxation. But these duties are still vague and do not indicate a causal 
relationship between the authority condition and the achievement of a fair 
distribution of goods and opportunities. In order for the assignment of duties 
to be causally efficacious, they must be specified for the particular context in 
which the state acts—that is, state policy-makers would need to outline what 
specific actions or met goals would constitute a fulfilment of these duties. For 
example, specifying the duty to provide adequate teaching would involve 
setting standards for teachers both in terms of their training and their in-class 
performance. Taking this example alone, the state already has a variety of 
options from which it must select: should it make an education degree a 
requirement for new teachers, or specifically require that new teachers 
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graduate with something other than a qualification in education? Will random 
video monitoring of classrooms improve teaching performance? Should 
teachers be assessed based on standardized testing scores, in-classroom 
observations, qualitative assessments of student progress, or some 
combination of the three?  
Answers to these questions are all relevant, and some of them are necessary, 
for translating a state’s ability to enshrine rights and duties into a causal 
capacity for effecting a just distribution. And the answers to these questions 
depend on how state institutions collect and use evidence regarding the causal 
mechanisms relevant to the effectiveness of different interventions. Rights and 
duties are abstract concepts that can only acquire effective causal powers if 
they are operationalized into concrete actions, services and opportunities. This 
has two implications: 1) the meaningful assignment of a duty requires the state 
to become involved in the same predictive policy guesswork that they engage 
in for regulatory purposes, 2) even once duties are assigned and 
operationalised, there are other factors that may impinge on whether or not a 
right is fulfilled domestically. It is not clear that state institutions have a good 
handle on what those factors are. This undermines Meckled-Garcia’s use of the 
authority condition as a boundary marker between states and non-states in 
terms of their causal powers for justice, since the selection and 
implementation of these concrete interventions requires the same kind of 
regulations and policy-making that Meckled-Garcia argues is too unreliable for 
effecting justice domestically by NGOs and internationally by any agent.  
But there is a deeper reason why premise (2) is unsuccessful. In actual rights 
practice, NGOs play a significant role in the way in which people understand 
their rights and the degree to which governments actually fulfil rights and 
pursue socio-economic justice. 
For example, in a number of countries, domestic NGOs have played a critical 
part in the formulation and protection of immigrants’ rights. In the 
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establishment of South Korea’s Employment Permit System, “local pro-
immigrant NGOs played a more crucial role in the promotion of migrants' 
rights than the state or international human rights norms.”566 In other 
countries, NGOs “…have contested and expanded the local government’s 
definition of who is a legitimate community member worthy of local 
citizenship…In addition, NGOs often monitor compliance with laws and 
regulations that apply to foreign workers (especially in the workplace), helping 
to ensure that they are properly implemented.”567 
NGOs have also contributed to the enforcement of socio-economic rights by 
pursuing rights-based approaches to development. Rather than competing 
with or replacing the state, NGOs using the Human Rights Based Approach to 
Planning/Development (HRBAP/HRBAD) have emphasised the duties of the 
state and the empowering potential of civic participation as essential to the 
successful achievement of development goals. In some cases, organisations 
work against a noncompliant government, but in other cases state failure may 
be due to a lack of resources or, in many cases, a lack of sufficient local 
knowledge and connection to the realities of the poorest and most 
disadvantaged within their society. In all three contexts, NGOs provide the 
essential ligature between citizens whose needs are unmet and the 
government agencies responsible for meeting them. For example, in Brazil, 
where the right to food is enshrined in its constitution, domestic NGOs forced 
policy changes in the government by demonstrating how the latter had failed 
to provide adequate means for nutrition for all children under the age of 
five.568 In Uganda and Rwanda, international and local NGOs have successfully 
demanded greater accountability from public officials, leading to a downturn 
in corruption.569 Grassroots organisations successfully changed property law 
                                                 
566
 Kim (2011, p. 1). 
567
 Tsuda (2006, p. 25). 
568
 Hickey & Mitlin, (eds.) (2009). 
569
 Ibid. 
244 
 
and land re-distribution policies in order to protect the rights of marginalised 
ethnic minorities in Nicaragua.570 These examples and others indicate that, 
while states may have the unique prerogative to assign and recognise rights 
and duties through a body of law, the connection between this ability and the 
actual realisation of a principle of justice can run directly through the 
operations and advocacy work of NGOs. 
It is not my claim here that NGOs are better at bringing about just states of 
affairs or affecting the background rules that create the necessary space for fair 
private exchanges. In order to undermine Meckled-Garcia’s argument, I need 
only show that any differences that may exist do not establish that only states 
possess the right causal powers. Interestingly, the empirical evidence on the 
comparative performance of states and NGOs has often been cast as a 
criticism of NGOs, because it refutes the popular claim of the late 1980s and 
1990s that NGOs were inherently better at delivering services and 
development aid than states.571 This view, however, was as mistaken as 
Meckled-Garcia’s, and for the same reason: empirical evidence indicates that 
there are no essential distinguishing features of states or NGOs that makes 
either inherently better suited to achieve or provide the social goods 
constitutive of a full and well-functioning human life.  
4.3.4.2   The authority condition as a moral power 
Recall our formulation of Meckled-Garcia’s argument: 
1) Only agents that can justifiably (have the moral standing to) assign 
rights and duties can assign rights and duties. 
2) Only agents who can assign rights and duties can causally effect a just 
distribution. 
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3) Only agents who can causally effect a just distribution are agents of 
justice. 
4) Only state institutions operating domestically can justifiably (have the 
moral standing to) assign rights and duties. 
C:  Only state institutions are agents of justice. 
I have argued that premise (2) is false. However, while meeting the authority 
condition may not ground a set of unique causal powers for the state relevant 
to justice, it does identify a moral power possessed exclusively by the state that 
is important for delivering on distributive justice. 
The ability to coerce and assign rights and duties is a moral power for justice 
insofar as participants within a distributive scheme require some assurance 
that their transactions are taking place against a background of fair and free 
conditions. At minimum, an agent aiming to manage a just distribution must 
be able to demonstrate to members of the distribution that it is so. A 
centralised authority that can alter the normative situation of participants by 
assigning duties and rights, and can be appealed to in cases of suspected 
injustice, meets that criterion. Agents that can significantly alter distributions, 
but lack this authority, cannot. 
However, while the state’s moral power is necessary, in many cases it is not 
sufficient for the realisation of justice. While the demands of justice and 
human rights can be universal, the mechanisms, practices, and rules necessary 
to meet them in particular social contexts will vary widely. NGOs exercise a 
moral power of their own, influencing the normative situation of others by 
articulating how duty-bearers are failing to fulfil their obligations, highlighting 
socio-economic inequalities, and identifying specific policies needed to meet 
people’s rights. While they cannot affect the normative situation of others by 
assigning obligations and rights directly, NGOs can influence how obligations 
and rights are understood and practiced, thereby affecting how individuals 
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materially experience these moral requirements. Put differently, NGOs are 
able to assign or increase moral liability to an agent for failing to fulfil its 
duties.572  
This helps make sense of O’Neill’s mixed verdict on the contributions INGOs 
can make towards justice. NGOs and states possess the same causal capacity: 
the ability to accumulate and alter material resources for the purposes of 
positive social change. But their specific, effectively resourced abilities to 
exercise that capacity, in other words their capabilities, varies based on the 
institutional environment in which they operate.  
If we look at O’Neill’s and Meckeld-Garcia’s discussion through the lens of 
moral, instead of causal, capacities, then it may be true that NGOs are never 
able to act as primary agents of justice, because they lack the moral power to 
assign rights and duties. However, as indicated by empirical studies on the 
roles NGOs play with respect to human rights, these organisations possess a 
moral power to shape what it means to have a duty or right in a given social 
setting, and to provide essential assistance to state institutions as the latter 
seeks to fulfil its function. In contexts where states are dysfunctional or non-
existent, both this moral power and an NGO’s causal capabilities to direct 
material resources acquire comparative significance.573  
Finally, it bears mentioning how an NGO’s general causal capacity to 
accumulate and utilise material resources for the purposes of positive social 
change connects to the questions concerning NGO effectiveness raised in the 
previous and current chapters. As discussed above in 3.3, the important 
question for achieving effective social change, whether it is through state 
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policy or NGO projects, is not “what works?” but “how does it work?” Tools 
such as the (ABCD*) principle and logical framework analysis direct NGO staff 
to consider the comparative costs and benefits of different probabilistic 
outcomes. They do not seek to understand the factors that might explain why 
particular projects are more or less likely to be successful, or more or less 
costly. The (ABCD*) principle and LFA focus on the measurable results of 
causal pathways rather than on understanding how these pathways operate, 
thereby ignoring how they might shift in the middle of a project. This means 
they are unable to guide NGOs through the complex, dynamic situations that 
are most threatening to effective performance. 
Therefore, NGOs can better pursue effective performance through the use of a 
theory of change methodology, in which an organisation not only articulates 
the causal pathways of its projects, but also explains and justifies those 
projects through a broader theory of social change. In so doing, NGOs 
demonstrate that their utilisation of material resources conforms to an 
awareness of the conditions that will maximise the potential of those resources 
to accomplish positive change. This demonstration can be demanded of them 
as an obligation triggered by their stated intentions of achieving a more just 
world for others. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to make the following three points: 1) That 
voluntary associations can trigger obligations on the basis of the expectations 
that are generated by certain types of statement, which in turn are necessary 
for the existence of the association; 2) That Nagel’s argument for legitimate 
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political authority as the exclusive grounds for justice is inconclusive; 3) That 
there are two ways of understanding agential capacity: on the causal 
conception, states and NGOs cannot be distinguished based on organisational 
type alone and instead exercise different capabilities depending on the 
resources and conditions available to them; on the moral conception, these 
two do exhibit different types of power, but an NGO’s moral power with 
respect to distributive justice can still be significantly strong. 
As discussed in the introduction, NGOs are often overlooked as agents of 
justice, as they are not considered to be part of “the basic structure” of society. 
In general, two strategies have been pursued against this view. 
One strategy, opted for by Cohen (1997), is to deny that there is any division of 
labour with respect to moral principles, and hold that same set of moral 
requirements apply to social institutions and private individuals alike. On this 
monist view, NGOs would have the same obligations of justice as state 
institutions, not because they qualify as part of the basic structure, but 
because these obligations apply equally to all moral agents. 
A second strategy begins by accepting pluralism, and also accepting the 
Rawlsian basis for distinguishing the basic structure, either by appeal to its 
coercive, nonvoluntary structure, or by appeal to its wide ranging impact on 
people’s lives. The next step in this strategy is to show how NGOs are agents of 
justice, since they are sufficiently coercive or impactful as to qualify as part of 
the basic structure.574 
In this chapter, I have pursued a different strategy, by examining the 
underlying assumption that there are fundamental moral differences between 
1) nonvoluntary versus voluntary forms of association, and 2) between the 
capacities of state institutions and NGOs. This view accepts pluralism with 
                                                 
574
 Cf. Rubenstein (2009); James (2005b). 
249 
 
respect to moral requirements, but denies that coercion or wide impact ought 
to be the sole grounds for obligations of justice. NGOs play an important role, 
characterised by both causal and moral powers, in achieving justice in specific, 
actual social settings.  This role is distinct from, but equally important as, the 
role of the state.  
While they may be unable to act as centralised authorities for a given 
distribution, NGOs do possess the capacity to accumulate and harness 
material resources toward the purpose of effecting positive change, including 
the accomplishment of fairer and more just socio-economic conditions. In 
societies with stable state institutions, this capability can be vital for justice by 
identifying gaps in services or negotiating for contested rights; in failed states 
these powers turn NGOs into the closest approximations of a primary agent of 
justice to which people can appeal. 
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CHAPTER 5   BROADENING THE 
CLAIMABILITY OF RIGHTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we defined two conceptions of agential capacity: 
capacity as a causal power, and capacity as a moral power. I argued that on 
this understanding, Meckled-Garcia’s argument that only states possess the 
powers to operate as agents of justice cannot be defended. The causal powers 
of state and non-state actors with respect to effecting a just distribution across 
a given population depends more on their capabilities within a given 
institutional context than on any essential features of state or non-state 
agency.  
Capacity as a moral power was defined as the ability to affect the normative 
situation of others. Based on this definition, I described briefly how NGOs can 
affect the normative situation of others by shaping how duties and rights are 
understood and fulfilled in particular social settings.  
This chapter provides a second example of how NGOs can make rights more 
practicable by eliminating or weakening the mitigating factors often cited by 
those who believe these citizens do not owe significant obligations of 
compensation or assistance to the global poor. NGOs, I will argue, are able to 
convey information that broadens citizens’ awareness of the effects of the 
large, complex institutions in which they are implicated. They also function to 
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identify solutions and opportunities for achieving a more just global order. In 
order to motivate the importance of these abilities, I consider the role that 
causal and epistemic criteria can play in establishing the existence of a moral 
requirement. 
To provide focus to the discussion, I use Onora O’Neill’s critique of universal 
welfare rights as a paradigmatic example of a view that uses causal and 
epistemic criteria to argue that obligations of assistance are less stringent than 
obligations to refrain from direct harm. O’Neill’s conclusion is a result of her 
broader critique of rights-based approaches to moral requirement. She takes 
issue with welfare rights in particular, contending that such rights are not 
claimable without institutions that recognise them. The positive nature of a 
welfare right, she claims, makes it fundamentally unclear which duty-bearers 
are morally responsible for providing which specific recipients with access to 
basic goods and services. She concludes that universal welfare rights do not 
exist because they cannot be claimed by specific individuals against specific 
others without institutions. 
After discussing O’Neill’s argument in section 1, I examine Elizabeth Ashford’s 
objection to O’Neill in section 2. Ashford raises the challenge of matching 
duty-bearers to rights-holders in cases involving complex causal chains with 
large groups of people. In such cases, where the moral responsibility for a 
rights violation is shared by many, Ashford argues that victims cannot make 
the claims against specified others that O’Neill says are necessary for the 
establishment of a universal right. Ashford’s cases pose a dilemma for O’Neill: 
either she can accept that they qualify as rights violations, in which case her 
basis for distinguishing between liberty and welfare rights disappears, or she 
can claim, implausibly, that such cases do not qualify as human rights 
violations, despite the foreseeable and avoidable cause of serious injury to 
others. 
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Ashford successfully shows that complex causal chains defeat O’Neill’s claim 
that one can identify the violators of a liberty rights violation but not the 
violators of a welfare rights violation. However, as I argue at the end of 5.2, 
Ashford’s cases are not strong enough to fully defeat O’Neill’s argument, since 
O’Neill provides multiple characterisations of her claimability condition. 
O’Neill discusses claimability in terms of both an antecedent and a post hoc 
perspective; Ashford’s cases address only the latter. I therefore present 
modified versions of Ashford’s cases in 5.3 which, I argue, defeat the 
antecedent version of O’Neill’s claimability condition. 
Finally, in 5.4, I connect this discussion to the agency and obligations of NGOs 
by highlighting how these organisations can assist in conveying information to 
duty-bearers in contexts of complex causal chains. Using the abolitionist 
movement as an example, I argue that contemporary NGOs ought to similarly 
use an honest and accurate transfer of information to instigate wider support 
for institutional reform.  
 
 
5.1   Claiming welfare rights: Against whom? For what? 
 
5.1.1   O’Neill on welfare rights 
In a deontic system, rights and duties can operate as different perspectives on 
the same moral requirement. With respect to the act, “setting another’s house 
on fire,” from the duty-bearer’s perspective there is an obligation to refrain, 
and from the rights-holder’s perspective there is a justified claim against 
having one’s house set alight. The appeal of a deontic system is that it 
structures relationships and sets clear expectations for moral agents through 
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the classification of actions as required, forbidden, or permissible.575 If A is 
required to perform an act with respect to B, then B is entitled to expect that 
act; if A is permitted to perform an act, then B is not entitled to demand the 
omission of that act, etc. O’Neill, like other moral constructivists,576  contends 
that this deontic structure plays an important role in establishing the 
existence of a right, since one cannot have an entitlement without there being 
a corresponding requirement on others to honour that entitlement. In order 
for B’s claim against having her house set on fire to have any normative 
authority, there must be some specifiable agent(s) who has or have an 
obligation to refrain from setting her house on fire. This is because a moral 
requirement can only operate as a requirement if it demands certain actions of 
specified agents. If no such agent or action can be identified, then B’s ‘right’ is 
not so much a claim as it is a mere wish, or aspiration. This is O’Neill’s 
“claimability” condition, a necessary condition for the existence of a right, 
which can be broadly defined as follows: 
Claimability condition: A right to Φ exists only if the rights-bearer can claim 
a specific action or inaction (the content of a right to Φ) against a specific, 
identifiable agent.577  
A so-called “right” that fails to meet this condition is “radically incomplete,”578 
as it identifies a normative requirement without specifying how that 
requirement can be fulfilled or which agent(s) is or are responsible for its 
fulfilment. O’Neill treats the claimability condition as fundamental to deontic 
reasoning, using it to reveal what she sees as two asymmetries in a deontic 
system of moral requirement: one between rights and duties and another 
between welfare rights (rights to basic goods and services necessary for 
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sustaining human life) and liberty rights (rights against bodily harm or 
interference with political participation or free speech).579  
Rights and duties are asymmetrical with respect to their co-dependence. 
Because a claim has no normative force without a claimant, a right cannot 
exist without there being an agent who has an obligation to fulfil it. Duties, 
however, do not depend upon rights for their existence, as A may have a 
normative requirement to Φ even if no one has a claim on A to Φ. This 
asymmetry supports the familiar Kantian distinction between perfect duties, 
which are stringent and have corresponding rights, and imperfect duties, 
which operate as less stringent requirements that are not claimable by 
others.580 In addition, O’Neill distinguishes between duties and rights that are 
“universal,” that is, identifiable outside of an institutional system, and those 
that are “special,” arising only in the context of certain relationships or 
institutions.581 Duties can, therefore, take on four distinct structures: perfect 
and special, perfect and universal, imperfect and special, and imperfect and 
universal.582  
Using this taxonomy, O’Neill argues that there is a fundamental asymmetry 
between the structure of a welfare right and a liberty right at the pre-
institutional, or universal, level. Her argument is based on two claims: 1) the 
primary duty corresponding to a liberty right is negative and the primary duty 
corresponding to a welfare right is positive; 2) because of (1), welfare rights fail 
to meet the claimability condition outside of an institutional system. 
With respect to a liberty right, O’Neill claims, we can identify clear answers to 
the questions, ‘What is the content of the duty corresponding to this right?’, 
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and ‘Who holds these corresponding duties?’ The primary obligation 
corresponding to a liberty right is the negative obligation to refrain from harm 
or interference, which gives specific guidance to duty bearers by identifying 
actions they are prohibited from engaging in. Such is the ease of a negative 
duty: the agent may fulfil her obligation by doing anything she wishes, so long 
as she refrains from engaging in the action prohibited by the duty. Because an 
individual’s right to bodily security and free expression are only met if all 
others fulfil this corresponding obligation, this allows us to identify all others 
as the relevant duty-bearers. O’Neill often highlights the important 
implications this has for identifying rights violations. In the case of a liberty 
rights violation, “whether or not specific institutions have been established, 
there are determinate others to whom the violation might be imputed.”583 
While in practice there may be challenges to identifying those who are the 
cause of a given harm, in principle we know the specific relation which 
constitutes the violation of a liberty right (A causes harm to B) that would 
allow us to match perpetrators to victims. Thus, the duties corresponding to 
liberty rights are perfect, universal duties: they are duties to which others have 
a claim, and which each individual holds with respect to all others, 
independent of any institutional system. 
The situation is quite different with respect to welfare rights, O’Neill claims, 
because positive obligations to provide goods and services do not specify what 
constitutes adequate assistance, nor can they be obligations an individual 
holds towards all others. Duties of assistance place demands on an agent’s 
time and resources and, since these are finite, it is not feasible to require an 
obligation bearer to provide assistance to all relevant rights-holders.584 
Furthermore, the bearer of a welfare right does not require that all others act 
in order for her claim to be met. She only requires certain others to act.  
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Herein lies the central problem for O’Neill: it is unclear, in principle, how 
these specific others may be identified and linked to each individual rights 
holder. Thus, in order for a welfare right to be claimable, institutions must 
allocate obligations to specific duty-bearers and identify the content of these 
obligations. Without these linkages between rights-holders and duty-bearers, 
it is impossible to identify those responsible when welfare rights go unmet: 
“…when supposed universal rights to goods, services or welfare are not met, 
and no institutions for distributing or allocating special obligations have (yet) 
been established, there is systematic unclarity about whether one can speak of 
violators and not just contingent uncertainty about who they might be.”585 
Without the presence of institutions, it is impossible to identify who has 
violated an agent’s welfare right, because it is not clear, in abstract, who was 
obligated to assist her specifically in the first place.  
One might point out that the full protection of a liberty right also requires an 
allocation of positive obligations by institutions, such as a police force or legal 
system of penalties for those who violate the liberty rights of others. Similarly, 
it is not clear that welfare rights correspond strictly to positive obligations, as 
an agent may also have the obligation to refrain from interfering with an 
individual’s attempts to secure basic goods for her survival.  
Indeed, O’Neill recognizes that liberty and welfare rights both require a 
mixture of positive and negative obligations in order to be fulfilled in societies 
larger than a few dozen people. But, she says, enforceability is not the same as 
claimability.586 Although liberty rights may depend upon institutions to 
allocate and specify relevant “second-order”587 obligations for their practical 
achievement, it is still possible, in principle, to identify the corresponding 
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“first-order”588 negative obligation and responsible agent(s). Yet, welfare rights 
do not identify first-order obligations or obligation bearers at the abstract 
level; they depend upon institutions not only for their enforcement, but for 
their very existence. Without such institutions, welfare “rights” are not really 
rights at all. 
For these reasons, O’Neill concludes that welfare rights are special, not 
universal. This means that, while duties of assistance can still be perfect, they 
achieve this stringency only within the context of an institutional system. The 
institution’s recognition is the basis for the normative authority of a duty of 
assistance. Outside of this recognition, the duty is merely imperfect, an 
obligation that an agent can choose to fulfil in a variety of different ways.589 
This is disappointing for rights advocates who maintain that socio-economic 
rights share the same universal moral standing as civil and political rights. But 
in reply, O’Neill urges that taking obligations seriously is essential in order to 
take rights seriously, as obligations are the essential ingredient for a right’s 
normative force.590 On her view, we are not justified in speaking of such rights 
as if they exist outside of institutional recognition. To do so is to engage in 
“bitter mockery to the poor,”591 offering aspirational rhetoric without paying 
heed to the obligations needed for rights to operate as real normative 
requirements.592 
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5.1.2   The multiple meanings of claimability 
In sum, O’Neill argues that welfare rights are not universal because:  
1) In order to be universal, a right must be claimable by all, against all, 
outside/prior to the existence of institutions.  
2) The primary obligation corresponding to a welfare right is the positive 
duty to provide assistance. 
3) Positive duties (in particular, the duty to provide assistance) are not 
universally claimable. 
Though I believe premise (2) is not well supported, we can grant O’Neill this 
claim and assume that the primary obligation corresponding to a welfare right 
is the positive obligation to provide assistance.593 There remains the following 
problem: O’Neill is not clear on what precisely she thinks claimability consists 
in, or why it is important enough to draw a distinction between perfect and 
imperfect types of obligation.594 In general terms, this condition refers to the 
ability of the rights-bearer to make a claim against others, as stated above: 
ClaimabilityIdentifiable Duty & Duty-bearer (ID) condition: A right to Φ exists only if 
the rights-bearer can claim a specific action or inaction (the content of a right 
to Φ) against a specific, identifiable agent.595  
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This characterisation of claimability takes the perspective of the recipient, or 
rights-holder, an approach that O’Neill contends is too limited for identifying 
ethical requirements.596 An emphasis on recipience ignores an entire class of 
obligations that are not claimable by anyone (due to the asymmetry between 
rights and duties), such as the obligation to cultivate virtues like courage or 
fairness.597 Treating rights as fundamental also does not take seriously the 
activities and institutions necessary for fulfilling the claims of rights-
holders.598 Therefore, O’Neill moves from the perspective of the rights-holder 
to the perspective of the duty-bearer in order to develop further her claim that 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between liberty and welfare rights.599 
Adopting an obligation-based perspective, O’Neill thinks that in order to 
operate as a moral requirement, a directive must meet certain conditions that 
are conducive to real agents in the world acting on, and being guided by, such 
requirements.600 One of these is a physical or material condition, which 
O’Neill draws on in her discussion of liberty and welfare rights.601 Our moral 
requirements, O’Neill thinks, must take into account our nature as embodied 
agents with physical limitations602: 
Physical condition: An agent has a universal obligation only if she is 
physically capable of fulfilling this obligation with respect to all other 
individuals. 
As mentioned above, O’Neill thinks this poses a problem for the claimability 
of a welfare right. As potential duty-bearers, we are embodied agents, “hence 
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spatially and temporally dispersed,”603 with limited resources. While we are 
physically capable of refraining from harming all others, or from interfering 
with the free speech of all others, we are unable to provide adequate access to 
basic goods and services for all potential rights bearers.  If O’Neill is correct, 
and it is the case that no individual duty bearer can hold the corresponding 
obligation to assist with respect to all other individuals, this means that I, as a 
potential rights bearer, cannot make my claim against everyone in the same 
way that I can with my liberty rights. I cannot claim access to goods and 
services from all, because no one has an obligation to assist all others, and it is 
unclear to me which potential duty bearer would be tasked with the obligation 
to assist me specifically. 
The welfare rights advocate, O’Neill says, will probably respond with the 
following: the Physical condition does not matter because duty-bearers may 
still fulfil their obligation by providing assistance to a subset of rights-holders. 
This means that as a rights-holder, while I cannot lodge a claim to basic goods 
and services against all, I can lodge it against some, which is sufficient to claim 
my right.604  
O’Neill replies that this will not be sufficient for grounding a universal right to 
welfare because of a new epistemic problem that arises when a moral 
requirement fails to meet the physical condition. From the right-holder’s 
perspective, the epistemic problem is that I do not know against whom, 
specifically, I can make my claim; from the duty-bearer’s perspective, I do not 
know which subset of individuals to assist, or the extent of my required 
assistance (the content of my duty).605  
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O’Neill refers to this generally under the heading of whether or not a right is 
“claimable and waivable.”606 So we get two further specifications of the 
claimability condition from the perspective of the duty bearer: 
ClaimabilityIdentifiable Recipient (IR) condition: A right to Φ exists only if the 
prospective duty-bearer can identify the specific persons towards whom she 
has the corresponding duty.607 
ClaimabilityIdentifiable Content (IC) condition: A right to Φ exists only if the 
prospective duty-bearer knows the content of her duty corresponding to the 
right.608 
Finally, O’Neill also explains the asymmetry between welfare and liberty rights 
through what she sees as a consequence of ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC not being 
met: the inability, in the absence of clear relationships between identifiable 
recipients and duty bearers, to identify who is at fault when a right is not 
fulfilled. O’Neill thinks that the inability to identify the perpetrator of a 
supposed violation of a welfare right is a direct consequence, or implication, of 
a welfare right’s inability to satisfy ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC: 
Suppose we think that there are both rights not to be tortured and 
rights to food. If, in the absence of enforcement, A tortures B, we are 
quite clear who has violated B’s right; but if A does not provide B with 
food, not even with a morsel of food, we cannot tell whether A has 
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violated B’s rights. For nothing shows that it is against A that B’s claim 
to food holds and should be enforced.609 
In cases where A’s action or inaction is a contributing cause of B suffering 
harm or not having access to any food, we cannot know if this causal relation 
is sufficient for attributing moral responsibility without a prior assignment of 
obligations. Negative obligations to refrain from harm can be assigned, or 
identified, without the existence of institutions, indicating for O’Neill that 
perpetrators of violations can also be identified without such institutions. But 
if positive obligations to assist depend upon institutions for their allocation, 
then B’s lack of access to food cannot be pinned to a particular perpetrator 
without the existence of an institution. O’Neill therefore characterises the 
asymmetry of the claimability of liberty and welfare rights in terms of whether 
perpetrators can be identified:  
ClaimabilityIdentifiable Perpetrator (IP) condition: A right to Φ exists only if it is 
possible to identify a responsible perpetrator when a rights claim goes unmet 
(a right is violated). 
The problem with O’Neill’s reliance on these four characterisations of 
claimability is that ClaimabilityIP asserts something quite distinct from the 
stipulations of Claimability.ID, IR, and IC ClaimabilityIP refers to our ability to 
attribute moral responsibility for a past action or inaction. It is backward-
looking, stating that an agent only has a right to Φ if denial of her enjoyment 
of Φ can, in principle, be causally attributed to an identifiable perpetrator. The 
other three types of claimability offer an epistemic, not causal, condition: an 
agent only has a right to Φ if it is possible, in principle, to antecedently link her 
to specific obligation-bearers and to identify the content of the obligations 
required to fulfil her right.  
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 O’Neill (2000, p. 136), italics added for emphasis. See also O’Neill (1996, p. 132). In these 
cases, there is an assumption that there are many others like B whom A could help instead, 
and many others who could help B to get food, hence the indeterminacy. 
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O’Neill seems to move from ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC to ClaimabilityIP through 
the following assumption: If we can antecedently identify who has an 
obligation to whom and for what, then, when the recipient is denied that to 
which she is entitled, we will know who is causally, and thus morally, 
responsible. Conversely, in the case where ClaimabilityID, IR, or IC are not met, 
then perpetrators will not be identifiable, since there was no clear allocation of 
obligations—or substantive moral responsibility—to begin with. 
With these different characterisations of claimability identified, we can now 
turn to Elizabeth Ashford’s examples of complex causal chains between duty-
bearers and right-holders. I will argue that Ashford’s cases successfully 
undermine the assumption O’Neill uses to move from ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC to 
ClaimabilityIP, and thus, show that ClaimabilityIP is too narrow to operate as a 
necessary condition for the existence of a right. However, O’Neill can still 
maintain the necessity of ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC for establishing a right. 
Therefore, I modify Ashford’s cases in section 3 to argue that ClaimabilityID, IR, 
and IC are, like ClaimabilityIP, too restrictive as a necessary condition for a right 
since they cannot account for cases in which duty-bearers may knowingly 
commit rights violations, despite lacking antecedent knowledge of the specific 
content of their duties and to whom those duties are owed.   
 
 
5.2   Ashford’s complex causal chains 
O’Neill’s critique of welfare rights reflects the implications of accepting what 
Elizabeth Ashford calls our “traditional conception of the duties imposed by 
human rights.”610 Ashford contends that this traditional conception rests on an 
unduly restrictive understanding of claimability. Revising our understanding 
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of claimability, as Ashford contends we ought to do, will eliminate the basis on 
which global poverty is currently denied to be a prime and urgent example of a 
violation of human rights. This denial of poverty as a violation of a human 
right by our traditional conception of rights occurs at two levels. First, a 
positive duty to provide others with a minimally decent standard of living is 
rejected because, as discussed in the previous section, its content and 
assignment rely on institutions for its specification. Second, the claim that 
severe poverty is a violation of a negative right is rejected because the causal 
links between the actions of citizens of affluent nations and the active 
deprivation of the poor are so complex that it is unclear whether this 
relationship is sufficient for attributing moral responsibility.611 
Ashford offers a strategy against both points by showing how the 
O’Neill/traditional view would force us to reject obvious liberty rights 
violations that arise through interactions involving large numbers of 
individuals. In these interactions, comprised of complex causal chains, “few or 
none of the agents who contribute to the causal chain can be singled out as 
responsible for the harm suffered by any particular victim and so be identified 
as the perpetrator of any particular human right violation.”612 Ashford then 
poses a dilemma for the O’Neill/traditional view. If O’Neill wants to include 
such cases as violations of rights, then the claimability-based distinction 
between welfare and liberty rights collapses. If, by contrast, she rejects such 
cases as violations of rights, then her view offers an implausible assessment of 
what does and does not constitute a liberty rights violation.  
Ashford contends that the narrow interpretation of claimability on which the 
distinction between welfare and liberty rights rests ought to be discarded for a 
broader conception that is better suited for identifying rights violations caused 
by a multitude of agents. She develops her argument through consideration of 
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two types of complex causal chains: those that produce what she calls 
“additive” harms and those that produce what she refers to as “multiplicative” 
harms.613 
 
5.2.1   Direct harm: additive and multiplicative harms 
5.2.1.1   Additive harm 
Additive harms are created through a causal chain in which each individual 
makes a small causal contribution to a harm that is spread over a large 
number of victims. In such a chain, each contributing agent produces an effect 
which “is very thinly spread over millions of victims and therefore does not in 
itself cause a serious harm to any particular victim, even when the cumulative 
effect of the behaviour of all these agents is an extremely serious harm to a 
huge number of victims.”614 Ashford modifies Derek Parfit’s ‘Harmless 
Torturers’ scenario615 as an example, calling it the Torturers’ Union case616: 
Imagine that a large number of agents are employed by a company that 
manufactures equipment used by robots to torture victims whom these 
workers never see. The workers are spread across a number of factories, each 
of which is responsible for an individual component of the torture equipment. 
While they are uninformed as to the exact nature and use of the equipment, 
the workers “have strong reason to suspect”617 that this equipment is used to 
cause serious harm, yet they choose to remain wilfully ignorant because the 
factory jobs offer good pay.  
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Ashford argues that we can plausibly consider the torture in this case to be a 
violation of the victims’ liberty rights, given that the harm is serious, 
foreseeable and could be avoided. And yet, she claims, contrary to O’Neill’s 
account of a liberty rights violation, it is not possible to link the harm suffered 
by any individual victim to the action of any individual agent working in the 
factories.  
Ashford stresses that this is not merely an epistemic problem, wherein each 
factory worker is singularly causally responsible for the torture of a single 
victim, yet does not know in what way or which victim.618 The causal chains 
that produce additive harms are not simply opaque networks of causal 
relationships linking perpetrators to victims. “Rather, none of the agents is 
responsible for a serious harm to any one of the victims. Moreover, if any one 
agent withdrew from participating in the causal chain, none of the victims 
would suffer significantly less.”619 Because each worker contributes only a 
small portion to the overall cause of the victims’ torture, no individual factory 
worker is directly causally responsible for the torture of any single victim. 
Insofar as the causal contribution is dispersed across the factory workers, so 
too is the actual attributive moral responsibility for the rights violation truly 
dispersed. No victim can make a claim against any individual worker, Ashfords 
says, as the victim’s claim is against the entire group of workers. And yet, given 
that the caused harm is serious, foreseeable, and avoidable, it seems 
reasonable that each victim has a claim against the group of factory workers as 
a whole.  
5.2.1.2   Multiplicative harms 
Complex causal chains can also create multiplicative harms, which Ashford 
defines as cases in which “the main effect of a contributing causal factor is to 
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magnify the harm caused by another agent or agents.”620 Taken in isolation, 
the individual’s contribution would not be enough to cause harm (it may even 
be beneficial), but, in conjunction with the contributions of others, it creates a 
harm that is significant. Given that the effect of each contributor does not 
necessarily “multiply” (in the case where the pollution would be positive in 
isolation, the effect in fact changes entirely from a benefit to a harm), a more 
accurate term for this kind of harm might be “conjunctive”: each isolated 
cause conjoins with one another to create a new cause. In reference to our 
earlier discussion in 4.3, each agent’s contribution in this case is an INUS 
condition-type cause for harm: a necessary part of a sufficient, but 
unnecessary cause of harm.  
Ashford uses an example from Thomas Pogge (2005)621 to illustrate this point. 
Suppose that there are several factories discharging into a river. On its own, 
each factory’s waste has no significant environmental impact, yet when the 
group of pollutants mix, they create a toxic chemical that destroys the local 
ecosystem and causes serious bodily harm to the people who use the river as 
drinking water. We can call this the Polluting Factories case. If there were only 
one factory polluting and causing this destruction, then it would be a clear 
case of a human rights violation, as there is a direct causation of foreseeable 
and avoidable harm. It would be absurd, Ashford says, to hold that adding a 
second, third, fourth, or nth factory to the causal chain makes the rights 
violation disappear.622 
Ashford argues that multiplicative, or conjunctive, harms such as these require 
institutions for their rectification, as “it is indeterminate against which 
particular agent or agents a particular victim has a claim. All we can say is that 
this victim, along with all the other victims, has a claim against the whole 
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group of factory owners.”623 But this is problematic for the O’Neill/traditional 
view, since violations of liberty rights should not, in principle, require 
institutions for the identification of morally responsible perpetrators. Yet 
again, O’Neill must choose between abandoning her claimability condition as 
a necessary condition for a right, or implausibly claim that the mere presence 
of additional factories disqualifies Polluting Factories as an example of a 
human rights violation.  
 
5.2.2   A broader account of claimability 
Because they are collectively exercised, O’Neill cannot account for rights 
violations caused by additive or multiplicative/conjunctive causal chains. A 
condition that demands a one-to-one matching of rights violation victims to 
perpetrators appears to be too narrow to account for cases of highly plausible, 
yet group-based, rights violations. As Ashford points out, the 
O’Neill/traditional view may apply well to interactions within close-knit 
groups, but “it is inappropriate to the much more complex relations between 
agents and victims that now form the backdrop of much of our behaviour, 
where the interaction of the behaviour of a huge number of agents ultimately 
causes severe harms to a huge number of victims round the world.”624  
Therefore, Ashford suggests a broader claimability condition according to 
which individuals may hold rights against institutions and groups, and can 
place claims on the individuals who support and participate in these exercises 
of collective agency: 
This is genuine claimability, because it articulates a demand each 
victim can make against all those who fail to take enough action 
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towards reforming the social institutions of which they are members. 
Where agents are directly responsible for their contribution to complex 
causal chains that lead to serious harms, victims of the harms have a 
claim against them that they take personal responsibility for this 
contribution and either withdraw from the chains or seek to coordinate 
with others to stop them.625 
Under this revised notion of claimability, those who suffer harm from the 
operation of unjust institutions have a legitimate claim on their participants to 
seek institutional reform and to provide compensation.   
 
5.2.3   An escape route for O’Neill? 
Recall that the traditional conception of human rights rejects poverty as a 
violation of a right at two levels: as a positive right and as a negative right. 
Ashford’s cases successfully undermine this rejection at the level of a negative 
right. The traditional claim is that poverty is not a violation of a negative 
human right, on the basis that the causal relations between citizens of affluent 
nations and the global poor are too complex to establish moral responsibility. 
But this cannot be correct, as it would also rule out Torturers’ Union and 
Polluting Factories as examples of a violation of a human right against serious 
harm. Ashford concludes:  
This indicates the status of torture as a human right violation does not 
depend upon our being able to identify the perpetrators. It follows that 
deprivations of secure access to basic necessities may constitute human 
rights violations even where we cannot identify the agent(s) specifically 
responsible for a particular victim's coming to be deprived of a 
subsistence income.626 
It follows from Ashford’s cases that a collectively caused deprivation of secure 
access to basic goods and services can constitute a negative human rights 
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violation, akin to the violations that occur in the Torturers’ Union and 
Polluting Factories cases. It remains to be seen, however, whether these cases 
pose a problem for O’Neill’s claimability condition and the distinction 
between a positive right to welfare and a negative right to liberty that this 
condition supports. 
As we saw in 5.1.2, O’Neill conceives of claimability in a variety of ways. Only 
one these versions, Claimability,IP refers to the possibility of identifying the 
perpetrator of a rights violation through a causal link between individual 
action and harm. As mentioned, O’Neill often introduces ClaimabilityIP as an 
example or illustration of her main explication of claimability, which draws 
more heavily on Claimability.ID, IR, and IC This may provide O’Neill with an 
escape route from the dilemma posed by Ashford, if it turns out that 
ClaimabilityID, IR, or IC is indeed satisfied in both cases.   
5.2.3.1   The Torturers’ Union revisited  
As Ashford describes this scenario, the factory workers have good reason to 
suspect that what they are doing causally contributes to torture, and they can 
avoid this by quitting their jobs. On this basis, ClaimabilityIR and 
ClaimabilityIC have been satisfied: antecedent to their actions, the duty-
bearers know the content of their duty (do not harm) and the recipients 
(everyone). They also know that they can fulfil this duty by not working in the 
factory. Thus, O’Neill can say that her claimability condition fully accounts for 
the rights violation constituted by the factory workers’ activity. The workers 
violate their victims’ rights by engaging in activities they specifically know will 
causally contribute to the torture of others. 
It is a further question as to whether ClaimabilityID has been met, that is, 
whether the victims of the robotic torture scheme can identify those who bear 
duties towards them and the content of those duties.  Ashford writes that the 
rights-holders cannot identify specifiable others against whom they have a 
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claim, since the cause of their torture was collectively created, and therefore, 
their suffering is not linked to any single factory worker.627 But this is 
claimability for a rights violation, which refers to a causal attribution of each 
victim’s suffering to the past actions of individual workers. Thus, this 
consideration applies strictly to ClaimabilityIP.  Antecedently, the rights-
holders knew they had a universal claim against all others not to be tortured.  
One might ask why ClaimabilityIP is not satisfied in Torturers’ Union: why can 
we not say that each victim has a claim against each factory worker? If they 
were able to identify their obligations before the fact, then we could attribute 
moral responsibility to each as perpetrators of human rights violations once 
they choose to work in the factory. In this case, O’Neill would avoid Ashford’s 
dilemma altogether, as she could argue that the rights violation meets the 
condition of Claimability.IP  
But what Ashford’s case shows is that O’Neill’s move from the epistemic 
conditions of ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC to the causal condition of ClaimabilityIP is 
unsupported. O’Neill thinks that if we can identify duty-bearers, duties and 
rights-holders prior to action taking place, then we can identify rights 
violations through one-to-one causal connections between victims and 
individual duty-bearers who fail to perform the required action. The ability to 
make clear causal connections for wrongdoing is entailed within the ability to 
antecedently identify who owes what to whom; if ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC is 
satisfied, then ClaimabilityIP will follow. 
Ashford’s cases show that these two aspects of claimability pull apart, as the 
one-to-one causal condition expressed in ClaimabilityIP does not hold in 
Torturers Union. No individual victim of torture can be paired with the action 
of a single worker as the cause of their suffering. Thus, we cannot always link 
victims of human rights violations to individuals who act as their singular 
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cause, even in cases where we can identify antecedently who owes what to 
whom. As Ashford’s case demonstrates, this is true even for negative rights 
against harm.  
Yet, because ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC are arguably still satisfied in this case, 
O’Neill could abandon the idea that ClaimabilityIP is entailed by antecedent 
knowledge of one’s duties and corresponding rights-holders, and also abandon 
her contention that ClaimabilityIP is a necessary condition for the existence of 
a right. Instead, she may insist, it is the possibility of the antecedent 
identification of duty-bearers, duties, and recipients that truly matters in the 
distinction between welfare and liberty rights. And this identification is still 
possible in Torturers’ Union. 
5.2.3.2   The Polluting Factories revisited  
In the case of the Polluting Factories, while “it is entirely predictable” to the 
factory owners that if they all pollute the river, “the overall result will be 
devastating,”628 Ashford does not indicate with what degree of certainty each 
factory owner believes that the others will also pollute.  
Let us say that it is either the case that (1) the factory owners knew enough to 
foresee with relative certainty that all of them will pollute into the river and 
could thereby predict that their actions would cause serious harm, or (2) they 
did not foresee the joint action, with each instead acting with the belief that 
the others will not discharge, and that his own individual discharge will be 
harmless or even, perhaps, beneficial. 
If (1) is the case, then O’Neill could agree that this is a human rights violation, 
since each factory owner has an obligation not to discharge in circumstances 
when he believes others will pollute as well. In this case, each was aware that 
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they had an obligation to refrain from harming all those using the river as a 
water source, and yet chose to causally contribute to serious harm in view of 
this awareness. As with Torturers’ Union, this poses no problem for her 
claimability condition since ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC have been satisfied. Each of 
the individuals affected by the pollution knows, prior to the joint pollution, 
that he or she has a claim against each factory owner to not discharge if it is 
the case that the others have discharged. 
If (2) is the case, O’Neill might say this is not a rights violation, but that this 
answer is more in line with our intuitions about plausible rights violations. If 
the owners acted under non-culpable ignorance, with justifiable belief that 
their pollution would either do no harm, or produce a benefit, then this 
weakens the conviction that the factory owners violated the rights of their 
victims. 
However, in Polluting Factories, ClaimabilityIP is not satisfied, since the 
individual harms suffered cannot be matched one-to-one with the discharging 
action of each factory owner. Once again, the ability to causally attribute a 
rights violation does not follow directly from the ability to identify the content 
of one’s duties and to whom they are owed prior to acting. The complex chains 
in which our actions become entwined disperse the causal links between 
individual actions and their collective effects. Yet we still think there is moral 
culpability for violations in these cases. O’Neill would add that the reason why 
we think this is because the antecedent conditions ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC are 
still satisfied. I will now argue in 5.3 that this is wrong: rights violations can be 
avoidable and foreseeable without ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC  being met. 
5.2.3.3   Rights and necessary conditions 
In sum, O’Neill’s claimability condition in fact offers two necessary conditions 
for the existence of a right: 1) an epistemic condition regarding what duties 
and relationships can be identified antecedently to establish substantive moral 
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responsibility, and 2) a causal condition regarding whether attributive moral 
responsibility can be assigned in such a way as to match individual 
perpetrators to individual rights violations. Ashford’s cases show that (2) is not 
a necessary condition for a right, as causal responsibility for a serious, 
foreseeable and avoidable harm can be spread across groups of agents.  
However, as I argued, the epistemic condition is satisfied by both cases, 
indicating that at most, Ashford’s complex causal chains undermine (2) and 
O’Neill’s assumption that (2) is a direct implication of (1). When faced with 
Ashford’s objection, O’Neill could therefore drop this assumption as well as 
Claimability.IP She could then maintain that the asymmetry between positive 
and negative rights consists primarily in Claimability.I.D, IR, IC  The conditions of 
ClaimabilityID, IR, IC are for the most part satisfied in the above cases and, where 
they are not, there is plausibly no rights violation.   
 
 
5.3   Human rights in contexts of uncertainty 
 
5.3.1   Revising Ashford’s cases 
Here I aim to strengthen Ashford’s objection to O’Neill by arguing that, with 
slight modification, the complex causal chains she identifies can undermine 
our epistemic abilities to antecedently identify the content and recipients of 
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our negative obligations against harm. Doing so will rebut O’Neill’s claim that 
only liberty rights satisfy ClaimabilityID, IR, and IC pre-institutionally.629 
5.3.1.1   The Human-Powered Torture Machine 
Imagine that the masterminds in the Torturers’ Union case could not find any 
workers to employ, so they have instead completely mechanised the 
construction of the equipment. However, they still need to power the 
machinery and the robots that use the equipment to torture, so they have 
rigged both systems to myriad devices that individuals use on a daily basis. 
Turning on a light switch, for example, may help move the conveyor belt. 
Running on a treadmill or using a stationary bicycle in a gym is enough to put 
in several screws. Fruit picking machinery may contribute to flipping the 
switch to turn on the torture equipment once it has been completed. 
Importantly, however, not all types of device are linked to human-powered 
machinery, nor are all token instances of any device: all coffee pots and some 
light switches and treadmills are not connected to the system. 
In this case, individuals contribute causally to the torture of others through 
typically innocuous activities such as exercise or the purchase of fruit. As in 
Ashford’s original case, the harm they cause is additive: the effect of each 
individual’s action is spread out over many victims, each of whom suffers a 
significant degree of harm.  
What is different in this case is the separation between the duty-bearers’ 
knowledge of the general effects of their activities and their knowledge of 
which activities in particular contribute to this effect. Such a separation must 
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occur in order to produce a successful counter-example to O’Neill’s 
claimability condition. This is because knowledge of the general effects is 
necessary for attributing moral responsibility to a duty-bearer, but knowledge 
of which specific activities the agent must refrain from cannot be present, as it 
would allow O’Neill to contend that, at the very least, ClaimabilityIC has been 
met. She would then be able to explain why such a case qualifies as a human 
rights violation. To undermine Claimability,IC we need a case in which an 
agent can foresee the harm caused by her action (so as to establish moral 
responsibility), but has an epistemic deficiency with respect to identifying the 
content of her duty, that is, what exactly she must refrain from doing in order 
to refrain from harming others.  
In Torturers’ Union, the workers can identify the content of their obligations 
towards others: they ought not to work for the factory. But in the Human-
Powered Torture case, individuals do not know which of the otherwise 
innocuous activities they engage in will contribute to the making and 
powering of the torture equipment. They know of the effects of their day to 
day activities, and that they have, in general terms, a duty to refrain from 
harming others. Presuming that it is too burdensome to expect individuals to 
stop all such activities630, this leaves individuals unable to antecedently 
identify the practical content of their obligation to refrain from harm. They are 
unsure (and have no means of discovering) of how their use of various devices 
or their activities with others contributes causally to the serious harm and 
deprivation of the victims. ClaimabilityIC has not been met, and yet, as Ashford 
argues, it would be implausible to deny that this counts as a rights violation, 
given the general foreseeability and avoidability of the harm. It seems then 
                                                 
630
 Aside from the burden of withdrawing from one’s day to day activities, it is also quite a 
blunt solution to the problem. The individuals in this case need only to avoid using the 
particular devices that are connected to the machinery. The problem is that they do not know 
which devices are in that subset. 
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that ClaimabilityIC places too significant an epistemic burden on potential 
duty-bearers to establish a human right.  
5.3.1.2   The Polluted Tributaries 
Whereas the previous modification argued that the content of our negative 
duties is unspecified (ClaimabilityIC), modifying the Polluting Factories case 
can illustrate how the recipients of our negative duties are pre-institutionally 
unspecified (ClaimabilityIR). Suppose that each of the many factories in this 
case sits on the shore of an individual tributary, all of which converge into the 
same river several miles south, before branching out again into new tributaries 
and creeks that provide water to 100 different towns scattered across the 
region. Because the factories are not on the same shoreline, they cannot see 
whether or not one of the other factories is polluting as well. Let us also 
imagine there is no way for them to communicate with one another. 
The owner of Factory A knows that if his factory’s discharge, let’s say 
Discharge-A, goes into the water on its own, for 75% of the population not 
only will it do no harm, it will actually be beneficial for the health of the 
people who drink it, like a vitamin supplement. For the other 25%, however, it 
will cause serious, potentially debilitating, health problems. If Factory B 
happens to be polluting at the same time, and Discharge-A mixes with 
Discharge-B at the point where their tributaries connect, then it becomes toxic 
to anyone who swims in the river that day, but will have no effect if it is 
processed as drinking water. Finally, if the A-B mixture mixes with Discharge 
C, then only people with a certain genetic condition, the prevalence of which 
in the population is unknown, will be seriously sickened and everyone else will 
be unaffected.  
In this case, the owner of Factory A knows that, whatever else happens, if he 
discharges into the river some subset of the population living along the 
tributaries will suffer serious harm. But the variability of possible outcomes 
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means that he cannot antecedently identify those individuals who have a 
claim against him polluting into his tributary. It is not the case that everyone 
has a claim against the owner of Factory A: if no other factory emits discharge, 
then 75% of the population will in fact be benefitted from the owner’s 
pollution. In the second scenario, only those unfortunate enough to swim in 
the river will have a claim against the owners of factories A and B. 
Polluted Tributaries meets the following necessary conditions for a human 
rights violation: the harm is foreseeable, as the owner knows his discharge will 
cause harm, it is avoidable, and it causes (conjunctively, or multiplicatively) 
serious harm to others. However, the owner is unaware of the circumstances 
in which his discharge will occur: he does not know if his discharge will harm 
25% of the population on its own, harm swimmers by mixing with Discharge-
B, or harm those with the genetic condition by mixing with both B and 
Discharge-C.  
Unlike Polluting Factories, in which the entire population of those who use the 
river will be harmed by the pollution, in this case the relevant rights-holders 
are not fixed and identifiable. Rather, those who will be harmed constitute a 
subset of the total population, and the content of this subset (which particular 
individuals are members of it) varies based on the actions of the other factory 
owners. Because he is unaware of which scenario will unfold, the owner of 
Factory A does not know, prior to his action, the specific rights-holders who 
have a claim against his discharging into the river. The people who will be 
better off with the pollutant in the water if it is discharged on its own, or the 
people who do not have the genetic condition in the case where A is mixed 
with Discharges B and C, do not have a claim against the owner of Factory A. 
Only those who would be harmed have a claim. But it is unclear to the owner 
who, specifically, those rights-holders might be.  
ClaimabilityIR is not satisfied in this case, yet, again, it would be implausible to 
deny that the owner of Factory A violates an existing right when he decides to 
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discharge into the river. He commits this violation despite the impossibility of 
identifying, antecedently, which individuals have a claim against his action. 
The owner knows he will harm someone by discharging into the river, but has 
no way of specifically identifying his victims. O’Neill insists that universal 
human rights are only those for which we are able to identify specific rights-
holders prior to the establishment of institutions. But this cannot be the case, 
as we can be aware that there is a claim against us to perform or refrain from 
an action, while being unable to identify specifically who is the holder of this 
claim. 
 
5.3.2   The supposed relevance of antecedent claimability 
In response to these modifications, O’Neill might still insist that there is some 
sense in which we “know” we have an obligation to all others in abstract to do 
no harm to them, and all others “know” they have a claim against all to refrain 
from harm, whereas we do not “know” to whom, in abstract, we have an 
obligation to provide goods and services. That is, the owner of Factory A still 
knows, in a vague sense, that he has an obligation to do no harm to all others, 
but does not know for which individuals this obligation will be violated by his 
action. Similarly, an individual in Human-Powered Torture Machine knows 
very generally she should not harm anyone, but simply has no idea how to 
actually go about refraining from harm or minimising her contribution to 
harm. 
But at this point the onus is on O’Neill to explain what this epistemic 
requirement really amounts to and why it is important. Because it seems 
perfectly reasonable that I know “in abstract” that I have a general obligation 
to do my part to provide goods and services to all others. Working out the 
details of this obligation requires coordination, or even institutions. But this is 
no different from the details I need to engage with to know what my 
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obligation to do no harm to others consists in, particularly in a world of 
complex causal chains such as ours. My ability to antecedently identify a 
universal obligation to refrain from harming all others means as much (or as 
little) for my decisions about what to do and with respect to whom as the 
identification of a universal obligation to provide assistance. To take both 
obligations seriously, we must take seriously the role of relevant institutions 
and social actors that can help us to instantiate our obligations in specific 
contexts and decisions. 
 
 
5.4   NGOs and claimability: rectifying epistemic deficiencies 
 
5.4.1   Indirect harms and social institutions 
As argued above, O’Neill and the traditional view of human rights rely on an 
understanding of claimability that is too narrow, both antecedently and post 
hoc, to account for cases of direct human rights violations when those 
violations come about through a collective cause. This understanding of 
claimability is also too restrictive, Ashford argues, to account for cases of 
indirect harm, in which the duty-bearer’s contribution to harm is mediated 
through a social institution, and is, therefore, neither foreseeable nor 
avoidable.  
Why should a conception of claimability be able to fit such cases, thereby 
qualifying indirectly caused harms as rights violations? Precisely because many 
of the most egregious rights violations in human history have been 
perpetrated by social institutions, for example the institution of slavery or the 
denial of women’s rights to vote and own property in most 19th century legal 
systems. In cases such as these, the violation of the victims’ rights does not 
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consist solely in token acts of slave ownership or the refusal to provide a 
woman with a ballot. Rather, because token acts of harm and oppression are 
made possible by their systematic legitimation, responsibility for such harm 
and oppression falls upon all participants within the social and legal system 
that supports it.  
Ashford reasons that, if individuals bear a negative duty to refrain from harm, 
then they also bear a negative duty to refrain from participating in social 
institutions that foreseeably and avoidably lead to the serious harm of others. 
If the social institution is so pervasive that agents are unable to withdraw their 
participation, or it is unreasonable to demand that they do so, then they have 
a duty to seek to reform the institution (or create the necessary new 
institutions) along with a duty to attempt to rectify the harms suffered by 
others.631  
The consideration of indirect harms illustrates, yet again, a problem with 
Claimability.IC Agents involved in a rights-violating social institution from 
which they cannot easily extract themselves do not have a clear idea of the 
content of their negative duty in such cases.632 Consider, for example, a non-
slave owning person living in the United States in the 1840s. What might this 
individual do to fulfil his negative duty to refrain from supporting social 
institutions that cause serious harm to others? Agents support and sustain 
social institutions by way of a variety of means. Therefore, if total withdrawal 
is not feasible, then it is down to the agent to determine which activities he 
can refrain from and which he cannot. A non-slave owning person may 
attempt to boycott certain products that are particularly dependent upon slave 
labour, participate in political demonstrations and processes to voice his 
ideological opposition to slavery, or assist in illegal activities such as the 
Underground Railroad. 
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Insofar as the content of a negative duty in cases of indirect harm is 
undetermined and multiply satisfiable, it is no more specified, and thus, no 
more claimable, than a positive duty to provide aid.  Moreover, because 
participants can exercise discretion in how they fulfil their obligation to 
refrain from supporting harmful institutions, and because they do not owe this 
obligation to any particular claimant, this negative duty is imperfect. Given 
that the duty to refrain from harm is a paradigm example of a duty of justice, 
Ashford concludes that duties of justice can be imperfect.633  
If the perfect/imperfect distinction does not map precisely onto the 
distinction between negative and positive duties, as O’Neill claims it does, 
then there is no basis for her denial that duties to provide assistance are also 
duties of justice. Moreover, a duty of justice may consist in an imperfect duty 
to create the means necessary for transforming it into a perfect duty, i.e. to 
establish and support the necessary institutions.634 Regardless of whether one 
views our imperfect duty to the poor as a negative duty to off-set the harm 
caused by our socio-economic institutions, or as a positive duty to provide life-
saving material assistance, an essential part of that obligation is to work 
towards the establishment of institutions and laws that better meet 
individuals’ liberty and welfare rights by allocating responsibility for their 
fulfilment. 
 
5.4.2   Moral capital and NGOs 
Those who believe we have a stringent obligation to provide compensation or 
assistance to the poor frequently compare our contemporary global economic 
system to past institutions of slavery, on the basis that the relationship of 
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many citizens of affluent nations to the former is structurally and morally 
similar to the relationship of non-slave owning citizens to the latter.635 I 
believe this analogy is appropriate for an additional reason: just as their 
predecessors played a primary role in successfully demolishing institutions of 
slavery, contemporary non-governmental organisations have the ability to 
help bring about, through various means, the institutional and interactional 
changes necessary for correcting global economic and political injustices. 
One of the ways in which NGOs can do this is by eliminating the frequently 
cited barriers to holding such citizens morally responsible for global injustice, 
and by increasing citizens’ abilities to fulfil the imperfect duties of justice 
outlined by Ashford above.  
Here, the comparison to the anti-slavery movement is particularly instructive. 
Recent scholarship on the abolition of slavery has argued that historians have 
explained the event of the abolition of slavery in large part through a change 
in the moral sentiments and beliefs of English and American citizens, yet have 
not explained how this change occurred or how it led people to take action 
against slavery.636  
Christopher Brown (2008) offers such an explanation by detailing the 
development and activities of several key anti-slavery organisations. Because 
they had built a reputation for themselves through other popular works of 
charity, Brown argues, these groups had accrued “moral capital”: a form of 
prestige that could be “mobilized ‘for the sake of tangible, exterior returns.’”637 
They then “spent” this capital on mobilizing the English and (at least part of) 
the American public against the evil of slavery. I quote the beginning of 
Brown’s account of this transformation here, as it illustrates the similarities 
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between the role of these charitable organisations and the one that NGOs can 
fill today: 
It is one thing to notice an injustice and something else to act. For too 
long, the antislavery movement in Britain has been described as the 
consequence of shifts in moral perception, as if the mere recognition of 
a moral duty must have led men and women to act. It can be easy to 
forget what most of us know from our own lives: that professed values 
do not always determine the choices we make, that sometimes we 
decide against what we believe to be right, that we often accept 
questionable practices because they seem necessary to the world we 
know or because they enjoy the sanction of age, however troubling they 
may seem on careful reflection. Antislavery values were not enough in 
the eighteenth century, or after...Somehow this particular moral wrong 
had to become important and urgent enough to drive individuals and 
groups to confront entrenched institutions.638 
NGOs can engage others to confront entrenched institutions through the 
capacity discussed in Chapter 3, the ability to articulate norms and shape 
public opinion on moral issues. However, an equally important capacity used 
by NGOs to alter and undermine unjust institutions is the ability to convey 
information across epistemic boundaries, that is, to inform an audience on 
matters that can significantly affect the way they see their world.  
The conviction that contributing directly and indirectly to the serious harm of 
others is wrong is arguably shared by many. However, due to the epistemic 
uncertainties elicited by complex causal chains, the degree to which our 
currently accepted practices and institutions constitute such a wrong remains 
largely unrecognised. As argued above, rights-holders do not need to be 
epistemically or causally matched one-to-one with duty-bearers in order to 
establish the existence of a right. But the lack of a specific assignment of duty 
poses a practical challenge for the enforceability and fulfilment of rights. 
NGOs can help overcome these practical difficulties by gathering and 
conveying information on the collective harms caused by the institutions with 
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which individuals cooperate, and on the ways in which they can currently act 
to fulfil obligations of assistance and compensation for specific others.  
In the 18th and 19th centuries, recognition of the values of freedom and equality 
was not enough for individuals to reject outright the institutions that 
flagrantly violated these values (this juxtaposition is perhaps no better 
demonstrated than in the Constitution of the United States of America, which 
begins with a universal declaration of freedom yet affirms the practice of 
owning human beings as property). The similar acceptance of a universal 
negative right against harm today has not yet led to a widespread call for the 
reform of the institutions and collective practices that violate this right. In 
order for this to occur, these institutions and practices must be identified as 
token instances of the violation of a human right; their moral standing and 
acceptability must be re-cast through an increased awareness of the facts 
regarding their repercussions.   
The anti-slavery movement exercised the ability to convey information across 
epistemic boundaries to great effect. In the middle of its campaign, the 
London antislavery committee reproduced a diagram of the Brookes slave ship 
for publication in newspapers, magazines, and as posters (see figure 4). The 
abolitionists took care to ensure that the diagram was free of any 
embellishment—in fact, the number of slaves depicted on the diagram was 
considerably less than the estimated maximum capacity used by some ship 
captains at the time.639 The Brookes diagram ended up being one of the 
primary tools of the abolitionist movement. In his memoirs, Thomas Clarkson, 
a leading abolitionist, wrote of the diagram: “the print seemed to make an 
instantaneous impression of horror upon all who saw it, and was therefore 
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instrumental, in consequence of the wide circulation given it, in serving the 
cause of the injured Africans.”640 
 
Figure 4. Diagram of the Brookes Slave Ship641 
 
 
Contemporary NGOs also possess the ability to orchestrate institutional 
change by simply conveying the facts of injustice. Some have successfully 
exercised this ability, for example, in changing supply chain practices by 
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http://www.bl.uk/learning/citizenship/campaign/myh/photographs/gallery2/image2/brookes
ship.html 
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raising awareness of poor labour conditions.642 Like their predecessors, these 
organisations also have an obligation to convey this information accurately. 
Just as the “moral capital” of the abolitionists gave credence to their campaign, 
collaborations with contemporary NGOs based on their identity as norm-
enacting agents entail the expectation that they will convey information 
honestly and accurately. NGOs working on issues of poverty and justice today 
can thus follow in the footsteps of the abolitionist movement in two ways: 1) 
by conveying information honestly and accurately, and 2) by doing 
considerably more to highlight the causal links between practices that 
structure the daily lives of those in affluent nations and the deprivation that 
dominates the daily lives of the global poor.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued against two main tenets of the traditional view of 
human rights, as espoused by Onora O’Neill: 1) rights against interference are 
more stringent than rights to access to basic goods and services; 2) poverty is 
not a violation of a human right. The previous three chapters each identified a 
causal capacity of NGOs: the ability to affect the abilities of others, the ability 
to shape and alter moral perspectives and social values, and the ability to 
collect and use material resources for effecting positive change. This chapter 
identified a fourth and final643 causal power of NGOs: the ability to convey 
information across epistemic boundaries. In exercising this capacity, NGOs 
can assist in overcoming the epistemic uncertainties and causal complexities 
that prevent individuals from recognising and fulfilling their obligations 
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toward distant others. Contemporary aid NGOs could utilise this ability better, 
I suggested, to achieve institutional reform on par with the abolitionist 
achievements of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
  
289 
 
INTERLUDE  
FOUR NGO CAUSAL CAPABILITIES AND 
THEIR CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
As defined in Chapter 1, NGOs are agents that are characterised by their 
reliance on collaborative activities with others. The extent to which an NGO 
can exercise a capability—a “specific, effectively resourced”644 causal ability—
in a given environment depends largely on the cooperative relationships it can 
forge with the other relevant actors within that environment. An NGO elicits 
this cooperation by presenting itself to others through a set of norms that 
structure its organisational identity. Other parties are then motivated to 
interact with the NGO insofar as they recognise it as a norm-enacting agent. 
They draw on this recognition in identifying reasons for their collaboration 
with the NGO.  
The quantity and depth of these beliefs can vary widely: a donor or 
government official can have a complex account of what a particular NGO 
does and the value of its work, or they can think very little about the 
organisation. What matters is that they must think of it as norm-enacting in 
some degree. If an NGO’s collaborators did not recognise the organisation as 
norm-enacting, this would amount to a decision to collaborate with an agent 
that identifies itself by norms but does not, in fact, act in accordance with—or 
in pursuit of—realising those norms. Given the time, resources and other 
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forms of commitment demanded of an NGO’s collaborators, it is implausible 
that they would engage in this collaboration if they knew the NGO did not 
conduct itself in a manner befitting of a norm-enacting agent. If an NGO does 
not take its self-identified norms seriously, this undermines the reasons others 
have to take it seriously as a social actor. 
In short, an NGO presents itself as a norm-enacting agent, convinces others to 
collaborate with it on the basis of this self-identification, and relies on these 
collaborations for the exercise of its own agency. This process forms the basis 
for identifying a set of NGO obligations.  The argument can be presented as 
follows: 
1) An NGO can exercise its agency (its causal capabilities) only 
if others collaborate with it. 
2) Others collaborate with an NGO on the basis that NGOs 
identify themselves as agents defined by norm-enacting 
activity. 
Therefore:   3)  An NGO can exercise its agency only if others recognise an 
NGO as a norm-enacting agent. 
4) If the recognition of an NGO as a norm-enacting agent is 
unmerited, then its exercise of agency rests on false 
pretences. 
5) One ought not to exercise one’s agency on false pretences.   
6) Necessary characteristics of a norm-enacting agent include:  
a. respectfulness toward others, 
b. consistency in its actions and values,  
c. accomplished norm-enactment,  
d. honesty and use of accurate information. 
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7) If an NGO fails to fulfil the necessary characteristics of a 
norm-enacting agent (a. through d.) others’ recognition of it 
as a norm-enacting agent is unmerited. 
Therefore, from (3)-(7): 
C:     If an NGO fails to embody the necessary characteristics of a 
norm-enacting agent, it does that which it ought not to do: 
exercise its agency on false pretences.  
To say that an agent exercises its agency on false pretence means that the 
reasons supporting its activities and capability to act are falsified by the 
agent’s own attitudes or conduct. This is the kind of wrongdoing that occurs 
when an individual or institution, tasked with a set of powers and privileges, 
engages in activity that violates the reasons justifying their exercise of that set 
of powers and privileges. Its wrongness rests on it being a subset of the 
broader category of deceitful action. This argument, therefore, assumes the 
existence of a general obligation to refrain from intentionally deceiving 
others.645 My contention is that NGOs that do not embody the characteristics 
of a norm-enacting agent violate this obligation and, therefore, commit 
wrongdoing. Their failure to embody these characteristics constitutes deceit 
insofar as their collaborations with others are based on their self-identification 
as norm-enacting agents, and on others’ acceptance and recognition of that 
identification as a condition for their collaboration with the NGO. 
In the literature on NGOs, the perceptions and assumed expectations of other 
parties are sometimes discussed as important for an NGO’s “legitimacy” or its 
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“credibility” as an actor.646 Often, this discussion expresses the view that 
NGOs ought to be concerned about others’ perceptions of their authenticity as 
actors because failure to do so may have an adverse effect on their operations. 
By failing to support their moral claims, some authors argue, NGOs are at risk 
of losing future support or funding.647  
The difference between this approach and the argument I offer here is that, 
according to the latter, NGOs ought to meet the characteristics of a norm-
enacting agent because in doing so their agency is not exercised through 
indirect falsehoods: others’ recognition of them, which grounds their 
collaborations and gives strength to their capabilities, is not ill-founded. 
Insofar as an organisation fails to fulfil the characteristics of a norm-enacting 
agent, it exercises an agency based on “sham” collaborations, in which it acts 
in a manner that subverts the very reasons and justifications that support its 
ability to act. In short, an NGO that undermines the exercise of its own agency 
in this way fails to take itself seriously.  Organisations that, in contrast, take 
themselves seriously as unique social agents, are obligated to “get it right” by 
directing themselves in thoughtful conformity to the basic characteristics of a 
norm-enacting agent. 
Each obligation identified in this thesis corresponds to one of the four causal 
capacities discussed in chapters 2-4 (see Table 1). These capacities each 
illustrate one aspect of an NGO’s agency, by providing an example of what an 
NGO utilises its collaborations with others to do. I now briefly summarise the 
capacities and their corresponding obligations, as they were introduced in the 
previous chapters. 
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Table 1. 
 Causal capacity Necessary characteristic 
of a norm-enacting 
agent  
Obligation 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Altering the abilities 
of others 
 
Respectful, responsible 
engagement with others  
 
 
Accountability 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Altering values, 
social norms, and 
evaluative 
judgments 
 
 
Values and actions are 
consistent 
 
Fidelity to mission 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Use of material 
resources for 
positive social 
change 
 
Accomplished norm-
enactment 
 
 
Construction of a 
theory of change 
that is sensitive to 
variables that can 
affect the success 
of the activity  
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Epistemic 
connectedness 
 
 
Honesty and use of 
accurate information 
 
Use of appropriate 
internal procedures 
for learning and 
evidence collection  
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In Chapter 2’s discussion of accountability, I argued that NGOs have the 
ability to alter the abilities of other agents, and that this triggers a 
responsibility to create the opportunity for those agents to engage in moral 
appraisal of the NGO. However, I argued that a democratic version of the all-
affected principle was not the reason that affecting others’ abilities triggers an 
NGO’s obligation of accountability. Rather, the basis for the obligation of 
accountability, I argued, was that an NGO relies on other agents to collaborate 
with it in order to successfully enhance or diminish the abilities of a given 
actor. The basis for this collaboration is the recognition of an NGO as a norm-
enacting agent, a characterisation that entails the expectation that the agent 
conduct itself in a respectful and responsible manner toward others. After 
arguing for a conception of accountability as respectful moral appraisal, I 
concluded by highlighting how accountability is an obligation an NGO has to 
structure its relationships in a manner that allows for moral appraisal. 
Fulfilling this obligation is intrinsically valuable for an NGO, as it is 
constitutive of the relationships through which its agency is exercised. 
Chapter 3 engaged with Thomas Pogge’s argument that the moral priorities of 
INGOs should be considered from the viewpoint of an economic framework of 
agency that casts NGOs as intermediary agents for their donors. At the end of 
this chapter, I argued that one of the ways in which NGOs of all types engage 
more actively with potential and actual donors, as well as other parties, is 
through the shaping of social norms and moral perspectives. Again, an NGO’s 
ability to alter the way we view our moral landscape rests on our collaboration 
with it that recognises and affirms it as a norm-enacting agent. In this 
recognition, other parties attribute to the NGO, or assume that it will 
maintain, a level of consistency with respect to its values and other 
collaborations and activities. On this basis, NGOs have good reason to refuse 
collaborations with donors holding questionable moral viewpoints, as this 
undermines the basis for their collaborations with others.  
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This does not mean, however, that NGOs have no obligations with respect to 
their effectiveness at poverty relief (or other projects). In Chapter 4, I 
compared the respective causal and moral powers of NGOs and state 
institutions with respect to distributive justice. I distinguished between causal 
and moral agential capacities, as well as between these and the notion of a 
capability, that is, what an agent is actually able to do in a given institutional 
context. These distinctions allowed us to get a better handle on chapter 1’s 
definition of NGO agency; I argued that an NGO’s agency consists in its 
capabilities, which in turn are shaped through its particular collaborations. It 
is in this sense that an NGO’s agency depends upon its cooperative 
engagements with others: without them, an NGO has general capacities, or 
potential, to act in a given way, but is unable to actually realise that potential.  
The third capacity, identified in Chapter 4, was an NGO’s ability to harness 
material resources for positive change, where that change can be social, 
ecological, political, etc. Those who collaborate with a norm-enacting agent 
must assume that it can meaningfully enact its norms through concrete 
accomplishments and be able to explain those accomplishments. Importantly, 
this approach to NGO performance emphasises the use of a theory of change 
and an attention to the causal stories underpinning an NGO’s activity, rather 
than the linear logic and rote production of quantifiable results that dominate 
NGO evaluation today. The activation of this capacity into a specific capability 
for utilising material resources to achieve social change requires a fuller 
understanding of the causal pathways that contribute to this change in a given 
context. As a result, fulfilling this obligation will require NGOs to engage more 
in narratives, causal analysis, and a reflection on process.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I identified the causal capacity of an NGO to transfer 
information across epistemic boundaries. This capacity is significant for the 
fulfilment of universal human rights, as it allows individuals to better identify 
the complex causal chains through which they impact one another’s well-
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being. It can also provide such individuals with the necessary information to 
compensate or assist those harmed indirectly by their support of unjust 
institutions. A particular NGO’s capability to successfully convey information 
rests, in part, on the willingness of their audience to listen and to view this 
information as coming from a credible source. The perception of NGOs as 
norm-enacting significantly increases this willingness, since a basic 
characteristic of a norm-enacting agent is honesty and truthfulness. NGOs 
therefore have an obligation to ensure that the information they use is 
accurate by implementing the appropriate internal procedures that can 
increase organisational learning and can verify the facts it uses for 
campaigning and fundraising. 
Thus, in sum, NGO agency is characterised by four general capacities. These 
capacities tell us what NGOs have the potential to do, but NGOs require 
specific collaborations with other actors to actualise that potential. 
Institutional settings are particularly important if NGOs are to become 
effectively resourced. To support this process of transforming capacities into 
actual capabilities, NGOs present themselves to others as norm-enacting 
agents. The actual exercise of their agency, i.e. their capabilities, thus depends 
upon other agents recognising them as norm-enacting. If an NGO takes its 
agency seriously, it will seek to get things right by fulfilling the characteristics 
of a norm-enacting agent, so that its collaborations with others are authentic, 
not deceptive. 
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CHAPTER 6   A GROUNDED THEORY OF THE 
ETHICAL STANDPOINT OF NGOS 
 
 
Introduction 
Any project in applied ethics faces the challenge of engaging in moral 
theorising in a way that is rigorous and at the same time directly relevant to a 
real moral problem. The previous four chapters have explored normative 
questions regarding the moral status of NGOs: their accountability, whether or 
not they are intermediary agents, and their general causal and moral 
capacities. This chapter discusses the findings of a 10-month qualitative 
research project on the key ethical obligations and challenges faced by NGOs, 
as seen through the eyes of NGO staff in Mongolia. 
The aim of understanding key ethical issues from the perspective of those 
working in such organisations was to identify the key problems characterising 
the standpoint of an NGO as a moral agent. The obligations identified in this 
thesis could then be assessed by the extent to which they provided guidance 
on these problems. All too often, proposals offered within applied ethics 
abstract from real world constraints and provide directives that will only guide 
action if certain conditions are met.648 This approach is particularly tempting 
when the aim is to provide guidelines for reforming or improving NGO 
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activity, since in many cases the only roadblock to an otherwise workable 
solution is the presence of some regrettable or non-ideal circumstance that is 
subject to change. If only donors would support it, one might say, then an 
international association of evaluators and funders could be established to 
make NGO funding and monitoring more stable and coherent.649 If only NGOs 
had more time or resources, they could utilise practices that would make them 
more accountable to their beneficiaries.650 This thesis has aimed to avoid these 
problems by situating an NGO’s obligations in the conditions upon which it 
relies for its very activity.  
The first goal of this chapter is to illustrate the significant role that an NGO’s 
relationships play in shaping how its staff views, and struggles with, their 
organisation’s obligations. The second goal is to connect the findings of this 
study to the rest of the thesis by discussing how greater attention to the four 
obligations and account of moral agency defended previously can assist NGO 
staff in managing these relationships. 
This chapter is organised as follows. 6.1 describes the grounded theory 
methodology employed in the study and explains why this approach is 
particularly useful for the integration of descriptive theory with philosophical 
analysis. 6.2 describes an initial problem that hampered the generation of a 
theory from the data, before explaining the core categories of validation and 
relationship frames. Finally, 6.3 outlines two frameworks based on the 
obligations identified in the previous four chapters and discusses briefly the 
relevance of these frameworks for the NGO staff that participated in this 
study. 
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6.1   Methodology and research design 
 
6.1.1   Introducing grounded theory 
The overarching purpose of this study was to understand the ethical nature of 
NGO work from the perspectives of those engaged in it. Grounded theory 
methodology was selected in view of its goal of “discovering”651 an explanatory 
or predictive theory through deep, systematic analysis of qualitative data. 
Strauss and Corbin652 summarise the methodology as follows: “Theory 
building is a process of going from raw data, thinking about that raw data, 
delineating concepts to stand for raw data, then making statements of 
relationship about those concepts linking them all together into a theoretical 
whole, and at every step along the way recording that analysis in memos.”653 A 
grounded theory approach pushes the researcher to go beyond mere 
description and arrive at a more abstract understanding of key concepts and 
meanings that are conducive to generalisation. Therefore, using this approach 
maximises the informative potential of qualitative research for a philosophical 
account of NGO moral agency. 
While it is not a feature of every study, grounded theory methodology 
supports the possibility of identifying deeper processes and meanings that find 
expression in, but are not wholly defined by, the particular context of study.654 
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 Glaser & Strauss (1967, p. 1). 
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 The method of grounded theory was originally developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss (1967). Later, each developed his own approach (Strauss did so in collaboration with 
Juliet Corbin), thus there is “Glaserian” grounded theory and “Corbin & Strauss’” grounded 
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(2006).  
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Generalizability can be reached in two ways. The “constructivist” approach to 
grounded theory embraces the methodology’s processes of inductive 
reasoning, and suggests situating a theory firmly within its cultural and social 
context so as to provide a better basis for comparison. This comparison 
between specific contexts allows the researcher to test the categories of her 
theory against new variations, allowing her to gradually build up its generality. 
A second way of achieving generalizability is suggested by Corbin and Strauss, 
who argue that grounded theory also makes use of deductive reasoning, as the 
researcher draws on previous theoretical categories and theories to derive 
conclusions that pertain to the context under study.655  If successful, the 
resultant theory may be sufficiently general to extend to other situations. 
Reaching a generalizable theory was a primary goal of this study.656 The 
research design reflected this goal in the selection of participants, design of 
interview protocol, and coding processes. While the NGOs interviewed all 
operated in a single country, Mongolia, data coding was sensitive to the aims 
of distinguishing between issues specific to the Mongolian context and those 
that were reflective of a general NGO outlook and experience. This perspective 
was aided by asking INGO staff to reflect on their previous NGO work 
experience in other countries and to contrast this with their experience in 
Mongolia. 
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 Corbin & Strauss 2008 (pp. 210, 294-5). 
656
 The problem faced by the study as a result of making generality a goal rather than 
something that emerged naturally from the analytic process is discussed below in 6.3.2.  
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6.1.2   Research questions and data sources 
Within the overall aim of the study, four specific research questions were 
identified: 
(1) What does it mean for an NGO to be accountable, and how important 
is accountability to NGO staff? 
(2) What norms does an NGO organize itself around, i.e. what moral 
concepts does it refer to in its self-definition? 
(3) What ethical decisions does an NGO employee consider difficult to 
make and how do they make them? 
(4) What do NGO staff see as their own obligations and rights as an 
organisation, and what do they identify as the obligations and rights of 
their stakeholders? 
Raw data was comprised of interview transcripts, observations recorded in 
field notes, and organisational documents, such as monitoring and evaluation 
guidelines or fundraising brochures. This data was collected over a 10-month 
period from December 2007 to September 2008. In order to arrive at a theory 
that was both rich and generalizable, the study was designed to involve two 
different types of participation. Under the first type, a breadth of NGO types 
was represented in the data through one-time interviews with staff from 4 
international and 9 domestic (Mongolian) NGOs.  
In addition, several organisations were solicited for more in-depth 
participation as case studies. These case studies involved a series of repeated 
interviews with multiple members of staff and observations of their project 
implementation and monitoring activities. For this component of the project, I 
sought an even distribution of domestic and international NGOs. Agreement 
from three domestic and three foreign/international organisations was initially 
secured for repeated interviews and site visits, however two of the Mongolian 
NGOs could not make staff available for interview after the initial round of 
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interviews, and repeated attempts to coordinate a site visit were unsuccessful. 
They were therefore dropped as case studies, leaving one Mongolian NGO, 
two large international development NGOs, and a fourth organisation founded 
and staffed primarily by foreigners that was heavily volunteer-based, 
structured similarly to a grassroots organisation, and concentrated on 
servicing a particular ethnic minority in Mongolia. Each of the case study 
participants is profiled below in Boxes 2-5. Names of the organisations and 
certain operational details have been altered for the purposes of protecting 
confidentiality. 
 
 
Box 1. List of Mongolian terms 
aimag  province 
soum  second-level administrative unit 
bagh  administrative unit within a soum 
khurul  legislature 
Box 2: Association for the Advancement of Rural Women (AARW)  
Mongolian NGO 
 
Formed in the mid 1990s, AARW engages in a mixture of development and 
advocacy activities aimed at improving the lives of impoverished women 
living in rural areas. Because much of Mongolia fits the description of a 
‘rural area’, AARW maintains 26 soum-level branches across 8 aimags, as 
well as informal ties to micro-credit and business initiatives in other soums. 
Its main headquarters are located in Ulaanbaatar. AARW is entirely 
dependent upon funding from international donor organisations and 
INGOs. Its programme areas include: issuing micro-credit loans, providing 
training and support to women in business entrepreneurship and political 
activism, and HIV/AIDS prevention. 
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Box 3: Collective Compassion (CC) 
INGO 
CC is an international development and relief NGO that began operating 
in Mongolia in the late 1990s and now has regional offices in 13 aimags as 
well as a main office in Ulaanbaatar. Its main programmes focus on 
capacity building in Mongolian civil society and the business sector, and 
improving natural resource management and entrepreneurship amongst 
herders. Project goals include: 1) increased local availability of commercial 
services and increased economic production, 2) maximum 
“institutionalization” of program concepts and services within the local 
economy, 3) an enhanced ability of rural communities to make informed 
economic and social decisions 4) an enhanced ability of rural communities 
to participate in public sector decision-making. CC receives most of its 
funding from a single government donor agency and in 2007 was facing 
the end of a 10-year funding cycle. Staff were therefore in the process of 
concluding two large, long-term civil society capacity building and rural 
economic development projects and were holding strategic meetings to 
plan future programmes and identify new sources of funding.  
Box 4: Local Horizons (LH) 
Foreign, single-issue NGO 
LH focuses on development projects geared primarily towards an ethnic 
minority group in the Bayan-Olgii aimag of Mongolia. It was founded by a 
group of Americans in the early 2000s, one of whom continues to act as its 
Executive Director. The organisation is small, relying heavily on volunteer 
staff, with two or three Mongolians employed as logistics coordinators and 
translators. Its original focus was on improving human health and 
strengthening herd population levels. In 2005, it worked with herders to 
establish a tourist business, run and managed by the herders, in order to 
take advantage of the tourist interest in the ethnic minority and its unique 
cultural practices. 
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Box 5: United For Children (UFC) 
INGO 
UFC is a faith-based international development and relief organisation 
that focuses on child well-being and protection. Its Mongolia office has 
one of the largest operating budgets of any organisation in Mongolia, 
including the United Nations. It operates over 30 regional offices, not 
including its main office in Ulaanbaatar, and it is estimated that 50% of 
the Mongolian population is reached through UFC’s projects. From mid-
2007 to the summer of 2008 two significant events occurred at UFC that 
triggered broad changes at the organisation.  
 
The first was UFC Mongolia’s decision to abandon the “grassroots” model 
of beneficiary engagement used by UFC International, as senior staff found 
that it was not truly meeting the definition of grassroots development and 
had failed in their eyes to engage adequately with rural Mongolians. Senior 
staff then had to devise a new plan for re-structuring the regional offices, 
which began with five pilots in late 2007. This re-structuring required, 
among other changes, that Mongolian staff in the regional offices move 
closer to the target areas of their projects (because of the large size of 
Mongolia, some regional offices were as far away as 200km from the target 
area of their project, even though they were within the same aimag), a 
change that was met with significant resistance by the regional staff.  
 
The second event was a significant internal conflict at the Ulaanbaatar 
office. Several Mongolian staff holding senior positions (Programme 
Directors, 4
th
 down from President) wrote a letter of complaint about the 
President and Vice President of UFC Mongolia to UFC International 
headquarters. An investigation was launched and resulted in the firing of 
the Mongolian staff who had signed the letter. A new HR policy was 
created stating that senior staff positions could no longer be filled by 
Mongolians. The other Mongolian Programme Directors who had not 
been involved in the complaint were moved out of their Programme 
Director positions and into different roles at the organisation with fewer 
oversight responsibilities. 
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In total, 36 open-ended interviews, averaging 1 hour in length each, were 
conducted across 16 NGOs and 4 IGOs/donor organisations (See Appendix A). 
11 memos were also written on informal conversations or untaped interviews 
with NGO and IGO staff. A further 5 memos were written based on 
observation of five NGO-IGO meetings and workshops attended in 
Ulaanbaatar. Amongst the four case study organisations, memos were written 
for each of the five site visits. These visits were conducted to observe the 
NGOs’ activities and interview local and regional staff where applicable. 
 
6.2.3   Coding 
The coding software nVivo7 was used to conduct open coding on the first four 
transcripts half-way through the field work, in May 2008. Emphasis was placed 
on using “in vivo”657 codes: codes that draw directly on the language used by 
study participants. For example, one of the codes for the line of transcript 
“Mongolia is a culture of closedness—but democracy is a culture of openness, 
so they have to adjust.” was “closedness contra openness.” In vivo terms are 
useful in so far as they assist the researcher in retaining “participants’ 
meanings of their views and actions in the coding itself.”658 However, since the 
ultimate aim is the development of a theory that can explain and predict 
rather than merely describe, in vivo codes must be problematized and 
abstracted from to identify broader explanatory categories.659  
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 Glaser (1978), also discussed in Charmaz (2006). 
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 Charmaz (2006, p. 55). 
659
 Ibid. (pp. 55-7). 
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Initial coding yielded a long list of codes—over 100—which were then grouped 
based on the broader analytic categories suggested by participants’ usage of 
these terms. From these codes, as well as a handful of theoretical memos, 
three main categories emerged which were worked into the set of questions 
used for later interviews: NGOs’ relationships to others, the process of 
justification, and the meaning and use of thick concepts660 such as 
“empowerment” or “community.” After field work was completed, focused 
coding was used on a selection of later interviews and memos. Whereas open 
coding involves line-by-line coding of a transcript in order to ensure that the 
initial concepts generated accurately reflect the data, focused coding is more 
selective, and guided by the emerging trends and categories identified by 
grouping the initial list of codes.  
During this time I also attempted a combination of what Strauss and Corbin 
call “axial coding”661 and what Glaser calls “theoretical coding.”662 Both forms 
of coding aim at enriching the core concepts by formulating hierarchical and 
lateral relationships between codes. Axial coding “increases the density of 
relationships around the ‘axis’ of a concept”663 by identifying properties, or key 
attributes, that allow the researcher to categorise events or empirical 
phenomena under that concept. These properties are further developed by 
identifying their dimensions, that is, ranges along which properties can vary. 
An example of this might be: the concept, “academic career” has the property 
of “contributing to research,” one dimension of which is “publications in peer-
reviewed journals” that has a range from “high” to “low.”  
                                                 
660
 Williams (1985, pp. 140-1). Thick concepts are those which both describe and express an 
evaluative judgment. These are discussed in greater detail below in 6.4. 
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 Strauss & Corbin (1998, p. 125). 
662
 Glaser (1978, p. 74; 1998). 
663
 Strauss (1987, p. 64). 
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In contrast, theoretical coding aims at integrating the emerging concepts to 
tell “an analytic story that has coherence.”664  This type of coding was helpful 
for concepts that were not conducive to the property-dimension structure, as 
it provided a number of category “families”665 which were used to test out 
different possible relationships between the emerging substantive codes.666  
The initial attempt at building a theory through this higher-level coding was 
impeded by what appeared to be either a contradiction in the coding scheme 
or the absence of a core category that fit all the data while remaining 
theoretically interesting. Upon reflection, it seems this hurdle was caused by 
implicit assumptions in the research questions that were not fully recognised 
during the study. These are discussed below in 6.3.2. After setting the data 
aside for a period of reflection, axial and theoretical coding were resumed, at 
which point the preconceptions became clearer and an emergent theory was 
identified. 
 
 
6.2   Validity and the importance of relationship frames 
 
6.2.1   Overview of findings 
Following the format of other grounded theory studies,667 I now present the 
theory of NGO ethical perspective that emerged from the data, addressing 
broader theoretical connections as they arise in relation to the empirical 
                                                 
664
 Charmaz (2006, p. 61). 
665
 Glaser (1978, p. 74). 
666
 Ibid.; Charmaz (2006, p. 63). 
667
 Cf. Goddard & Assad (2006). 
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findings, rather than prior to discussion of the core emergent categories. 
However, in order to provide a useful guide to the reader, I will first give a 
brief overview of the core categories that form the basis for the theory. 
Those who follow Strauss and Corbin’s approach to grounded theory 
methodology often draw on their “paradigm model”668 for theory construction. 
The paradigm model directs the researcher to answer a fixed set of questions 
in order to identify concepts and build a theory. The constituents of the theory 
are a core phenomenon, a set of action/interaction strategies employed by 
actors with respect to the core phenomenon, the consequences of these 
strategies, and the conditions or circumstances in which these strategies take 
place. Researchers are guided to build their theory by identifying the specific 
concepts that fill out each of these categories.  
While useful for other contexts, for this study, the paradigm model was found 
to be too rigid and restrictive for explaining how the core emergent categories 
related to one another. In particular, the paradigm model does not capture 
how the core phenomenon can itself be altered through actors’ response 
strategies, how consequences can loop back to affect strategy, or how 
conditions or circumstances are affected by interactions between actors. This 
made such a model insufficient for explaining the myriad and complex 
relationships and processes cited by NGO staff in their discussions of 
accountability, ethical obligation and decision-making. 
Instead, two core phenomena were identified as constituting the ways in 
which NGO staff experienced the issues of ethical obligation, accountability, 
and organisational value: the process of validation, and the framing of 
relationships with others. These, and the main categories connecting them to 
one another, are depicted below in figure 5. 
                                                 
668
 Corbin & Strauss (2008, pp. 89-95).  For examples of published grounded theory research 
that draws on this paradigm model, see: Goddard & Assad (2006), Hildenbrand (2007). 
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Throughout conversations on what they considered to constitute right action, 
NGO staff characterised the moral justification of their activities by reference 
to an objective notion of validation. Ethical problems were constituted by 
scenarios or conflicts that threatened organisational validity. The three main 
sources of validity are identified above by the boxes in red: process (method, 
or, “how” the NGO worked), consequences (the effects or outcomes of the 
NGO’s activities), and, most importantly, their relationships with other actors, 
which impacted validity through the concept of obligation.  
NGO staff considered their organisation validated if they 1) achieved the 
“right” process, 2) achieved the “right” consequences, and/or 3) fulfilled their 
obligations to others. These obligations in turn were defined in terms of how 
the NGO staff viewed their organisation’s relationships with other actors. 
NGO staff identified these obligations to others by characterising, or framing, 
their relationships based on two factors: the focus of the relationship (process 
Validity 
Consequences 
Process 
Relationships 
with others 
Obligation 
Relationship 
base 
via fulfillment 
Figure 5: The sources of validity 
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or consequences), and the relationship base, namely, whether the relationship 
was personal or professional.  
 
6.2.2   Validation as a core phenomenon in NGO self-perception 
A concept that emerged early on was the process of “justifying,” and its impact 
on how NGO staff understood their relationships with others and the value of 
their work. This process came up differently for the four case study 
organisations. For the foreign single-issue organisation, Local Horizons (LH), 
one of their most significant ongoing challenges was justifying their operations 
to competing NGOs as well as local government officials, who they perceived 
as threatening to the success of their projects. Staff of the two international 
NGOs discussed struggling with the internal process of having to “explain 
ourselves” to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) teams at their international 
headquarters, who were described as operating like “a double donor, a double 
wall” they had to go through in order to receive funding. Staff from the 
Mongolian NGO, the Association for the Advancement of Rural Women 
(AARW), explained that justifying their activities and motivations to the 
husbands of the rural women they were trying to serve had become a 
significant operational challenge:  
Respondent:  In one example, there was a training and there was 
one woman who was very active and really wanted to learn and 
increase her education levels. But the second week she didn’t 
come, and so we went to the home and her husband had beat 
her up, so he didn’t let her go to the meeting and workshop. And 
we had to talk to the husband and said, ‘Why are you doing this, 
because if your wife knows everything—or not everything, but 
increases her information it would be good for you and maybe 
your life would be better.’ But he said, ‘No, she doesn’t need to 
learn any of these things, she just needs to stay home and take 
care of the family.’… Now this is one of the challenges. Some of 
the husbands don’t like it, they don’t like the training programs, 
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so now we are trying the family together—having workshops for 
families. We are thinking about that. 
While the audiences they had to prioritise were different, the four case study 
NGOs, as well as many Mongolian NGOs, repeatedly described experiencing 
the need to justify and explain themselves, or in some cases being compelled 
by others to do so.  
This seemed initially to support the idea, found both in the literature and also 
in previous grounded theory studies of NGO accountability, that NGO 
legitimacy, or the managing of legitimacy, is a core feature of the NGO ethical 
experience.669 NGO legitimacy is often understood as a descriptive concept: as 
the actual perception or belief that an NGO is “appropriate”670 or “justified”671 
in doing what it does. According to this conception of legitimacy, insofar as 
other actors do not perceive the NGO to be justified, it lacks legitimacy. This 
supposedly leads to conflicts for NGOs as they attempt to satisfy the varying 
and conflicting legitimacy demands of multiple stakeholders.672  
In contrast to this, it became clear through multiple interviews that 
participants thought of justification as part of, or one of multiple paths to, a 
broader process of achieving a more objective standard of self-assessment, that 
is, validity, or validation. The Executive Director of NH makes the distinction 
when talking about his organisation’s approach to budgeting and resource 
allocation:  
I also knew that the more we address in terms of project 
activities the longer there would be a need for our organization, 
the longer we could—I mean that justifies, justifies sounds like 
you need to excuse yourself but, you know, uh, validate our 
presence, and, I knew that to pursue those additional initiatives 
we’d need to invest resources in it.  
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 Vedder, et al. (2007), Goddard & Assad (2006). 
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 Edwards (1999, p. 258). 
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 Ibid. 
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 Logister (2007); Ossevaalde, et al. (2006). 
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Legitimacy was often referred to as a process of justifying one’s organisation 
with respect to a particular audience: what justifies the NGO to its donors, 
what legitimates an organisation in a broader community of NGOs and other 
institutional actors, etc. Similarly, the Executive Director of NH associated 
justification with having to defend oneself to a critical audience. What made 
this audience “critical” was their questioning of the authority by which NH 
was acting.  
This perspective was shared by the INGO staff interviewed toward the end of 
the study. One of the INGOs, United For Children (UFC), had experienced a 
tumultuous year, with a complete re-organisation of its structure and a serious 
staff conflict that resulted in a number of firings and a revised HR policy. The 
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation for the Mongolia national office discussed 
the way in which she was having to communicate these changes to UFC 
International Headquarters. 
Interviewer: How much is justification a process that’s involved 
in that? The process of justifying…to yourselves, to your donors 
or beneficiaries? Is that something that resonates with you? 
Respondent: Yeah, I think so, because myself I’ve had to have a 
lot of conversations with our funding officers, not necessarily by 
design, but by default. Talking to them about M&E and having a 
discussion around all the changes that have happened. It’s kind 
of hard to say—you know, having to justify it and explain it and 
explain what happened, and explain that we’re moving and we’re 
trying to do our best. You know at the end of the day, I really 
think we’re trying to do our best, you know, (laughs) that’s kind 
of what it’s come down to is, is, all these things have happened 
but come on guys, we’re trying to do our best. 
This example complements the NH director’s comparison of justification to 
excuse-making. Justification was a process directed at winning approval or, in 
this case, a reprieve from critical scrutiny, by providing a rationalisation for 
what had happened to a particular audience and defending one’s motivations 
or level of effort. Like an excuse, justification was largely spoken of as a 
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process triggered by a negative occurrence or event—a ‘mistake.’ Processes of 
justification were primarily responses to challenges by other actors.  
This raises the question: Challenges to what? What was it that NGO staff were 
defending or justifying in these situations? An initial answer is legitimacy: 
NGOs were faced with challenges to their perceived appropriateness, which 
they then attempted to manage or rectify via justification and other strategies.  
However, participants in this study drew a firm distinction between their 
standing in the eyes of others and their overall “ultimate” or “real” value or 
standing as an organisation. Winning over certain stakeholders was 
instrumentally important for the success of an NGO’s activities. But beyond 
and alongside legitimacy, NGO staff appealed to a deeper evaluative standard: 
validity. While justification to others was one means of increasing validity, 
NGO staff appealed to other sources as well, such as effectiveness, or by appeal 
to aspects of the way in which they worked (their method, or process).  
Validity and validation are appropriate concepts for describing this form of 
self-evaluation because they connote a more objective evaluative standpoint. 
Sources of validity were referenced as intersubjective or objective standards 
according to which the organisation or its activities was deemed right or 
wrong, valid or invalid. Validity also fits well with the implied meaning of the 
“logical framework,” a moniker that indicates ‘good’ projects are those that can 
be structured as tightly as a logical argument. In logic, validity indicates a 
successful deductive argument in which it is impossible for the conclusion to 
be false if the premises are true. If the inputs are correct, then the predicted 
outcome, or impact, will follow. Similarly, making this distinction between the 
perceptions of others and their overall validity allowed NGO staff to appeal to 
factors other than the particular perceptions of a single stakeholder to make 
their self-evaluation incontrovertible. It also allowed them to dismiss demands 
for justification they felt were groundless, on the basis that such demands 
were objectively wrong or would move them further from “real” achievements: 
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I’m a major believer in the public sector but they’re just so 
problematic and irresponsible and still unaware of this 
community, and if we were accountable to them then it would 
be pathetic. If we listened to what the government says, we 
would have done some of the dumbest things possible for this 
community and we would have overlooked some of the most 
obvious things that this community wants and needs. (NH) 
Everyone acknowledges the importance of having a monitoring 
system, but what’s really important as well is, you know… when 
is it really real, solid work? (Collective Compassion (CC)) 
The perceptions of the government and of donors (via the monitoring system) 
operated as initial evidence of an NGO’s validity that could be offset, or 
contextualised, by an objective assessment of how well the government 
understood the actual needs of the target community or an objective 
assessment based on a notion of “really real, solid work.”  
The organisations involved in the study appealed to three main sources of 
validation. These sources are: their relationships with others, consequences of 
their activities (often referred to as impact/outcomes/results), and features of 
the processes in which they engaged. Understanding of these three sources of 
validation and how NGO staff employed them in practice was only arrived at 
after a significant interpretive problem in the research design was identified. I 
now discuss this problem and how its resolution led to a deeper consideration 
of how NGO staff’s perceptions of their organisations’ relationships impacted 
how they viewed their obligations and primary ethical challenges. 
 
6.2.3   Looking for the ‘ethical’ in NGO practice 
One of the defining features of grounded theory methodology is its directive 
that literature relevant to the topic of study only be consulted after the initial 
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stages of coding are completed and the researcher has begun to identify basic 
categories.673 This is because a familiarity with the literature at the outset can 
colour the researcher’s perspective, making it difficult to see the topic through 
the eyes of study participants and remain open to a theory that is actually 
supported by the data.674 As Glaser and Strauss originally described this 
problem, predilection for a given theory at the outset of the research threatens 
the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity to the data at hand, to the point where 
he “can no longer ‘see around’ either his pet theory or any other.”675 
While at the outset of this study I was less familiar with the empirical 
literature on NGOs and the actual processes and procedures that constituted 
the “daily life” of an NGO,676 to fulfil a requirement for my PhD I had 
conducted an extensive literature review on theories of NGO accountability. 
This, combined with a general outlook informed by a background in moral 
theory, led to an interpretive problem that was not clearly identified and 
addressed until after the primary field work was completed. 
The study was initiated with a preconceived idea of the role that moral values 
and principles play in defining and guiding NGOs, and of the kinds of 
situations and relationships that would be labelled as ethically controversial or 
important. Specifically, my approach to answering the four main questions of 
the study, reflected in the interview protocols and the spontaneous follow-up 
questions pursued in interviews, rested on the following implicit assumptions: 
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 Glaser & Strauss (1967); Charmaz (2006, p. 6). 
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1) While individuals might use different criteria to identify an issue or 
problem as “ethical,” their use of the term as a label would be the same, 
in the sense that there may be differences in conceptions of ethical 
principles or problems but agreement on the basic concept of an ethical 
principle or problem as that which is based solely on a sound moral 
argument.  
2) From the viewpoint of NGO staff, there is something inherently 
ethical about NGOs and what they do, given the kind of work in which 
they are involved and the concepts and values by which they identify 
themselves.  
Both assumptions posed problems for adopting the perspective of study 
participants when they said they could not think of any ethical problem they 
had faced, or identified ethical problems that were specific to certain 
professional relationships. Commonly cited ethical problems were: a staff 
member having a minor conflict of interest with respect to a given project, 
intra-staff relationships, and a perceived lack of programme effectiveness. 
When participants were asked to elaborate on what made ineffectiveness an 
ethical problem, they did not refer to the ethical value of the desired outcome, 
as expected. Instead, they spoke of it in terms of a broken promise: it was 
morally problematic only insofar as they said they were going to do something 
and did not do it. In asking NGO staff about their programme objectives or 
obligations towards others, the expectation was that they would at some point 
reveal an affinity for a particular ethical principle, justifying these objectives or 
obligations based on their own account of the “right thing to do.” But instead, 
in most cases these objectives and obligations were explained instead by 
reference to organisational policy, pragmatism, or personal relationships.  
What made these responses particularly difficult to process was the continued 
use of concepts which I was coding as ethical or moral, such as 
“empowerment,” “sustainability,” “justice,” and “accountability.” For instance, 
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INGO staff would use the term empowerment frequently to describe the way 
in which they wanted to structure their interactions with beneficiaries, yet 
when asked directly, said they did not think that poverty alleviation or 
development aid was something beneficiaries were owed, as a matter of ethical 
obligation. While development was important, the INGO was there by choice, 
not by obligation. Their works were “charitable,” and, insofar as they did not 
coerce beneficiaries, the latter always had an exit option: 
The thing to remember, particularly with the participants, is 
that all of these projects are voluntary. No one is being gang-
pressed into this… (INGO) 
And I’m certainly not saying, not diminishing the importance of 
accountability of NGOs, but the fact is, the work of NGOs in a 
lot of circumstances, especially with this community is almost a 
gift, literally and metaphorically: it’s backed by gifts from 
individual donors and it’s done with voluntary efforts. There’s 
never a guarantee. (LH) 
It was difficult to process this kind of answer, given the assumption that NGOs 
justified their projects directly through an appeal to moral principles and 
obligations. This led to the expectation that the values an NGO cites in its 
project implementation would connect to the motivations behind their work. 
It therefore seemed discordant when a participant stated that empowering 
individuals to be active, capable agents was an important value for the 
organisation but that the delivery of an empowering development project to 
those individuals was a matter of “gift-giving” and choice, not obligation.     
It was only after stepping away from the data and returning to it that it 
became evident that most NGO staff did not see their ethical obligations or 
challenges as resting on abstract moral arguments or concepts. Despite 
engaging in processes of validation that implied an overall objective evaluative 
standpoint, the thinking that identified their ethical obligations was filtered 
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through particular types of relationship (See figure 5).677 Interestingly, these 
similarities did not fall into categories based on type of stakeholder: there was 
no unified “beneficiary” or “donor” type of relationship. Instead, relationships 
were framed according to an implied base for the interaction (relationship 
base), and the source of validation around which the interaction was oriented 
(process or consequences). The combination of these two factors elicited four 
basic categories, within each of which there were two variations based on 
whether the relationship was positive or negative. This yielded in total eight 
relationship frames: frames that NGO staff applied to their interactions with 
others that shaped the way they viewed their obligations, and which placed a 
certain value on that interaction with respect to its role within the 
participant’s assessment of his or her organisation’s validity. 
 
6.2.4   Relationship frames 
As individual agents, we can bear a variety of obligations in virtue of our 
special relationships with others. Our obligations to our friends are different 
from our obligations to our students, which in turn are distinct from our 
obligations to fellow church-goers. Basic features of the different roles we 
assume serve as the grounds for the obligations we acquire through those 
roles.  
A view that is common to both moral philosophy and everyday moral practice 
holds that there is another, more stringent class of obligations that we bear in 
virtue of a broader condition or standing: our humanity, our capacity to 
reason, or our capacity to feel pain. These obligations place demands on us as 
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 Cf. de Graff (1987). 
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agents regardless of any particular relationship or institution we may belong 
to; they are universal ethical obligations.678 
Most NGO staff placed their ethical obligations in the former category. Their 
obligations arose within the context of a type of interaction and were shaped 
by two factors: the base of the relationship and the source of validation 
towards which that relationship was oriented. 
6.2.4.1. The relationship base: personal or professional 
In participants’ descriptions of obligation and ethical conflict, a contrast 
emerged between relationships in which there was a deeply felt commitment 
or long-term personal connection, and those which were discussed in terms of 
contractual obligation and what it was like to “work” in development or act as 
an employee of an NGO. The category of relationship base emerged from this 
contrast between personal and professional bases for understanding 
relationships.   
This contrast between personal and professional emerged more explicitly in an 
interview with a staff member of CC. This person was describing previous 
work she had done in Nicaragua with what she described as a “volunteer” 
organisation, work that she felt was considerably different from the work she 
was doing for CC in Mongolia. Describing the difference, she said: 
You know, since working on development projects, I think that 
the motivations for doing it [volunteer work]—people have 
other jobs and they’re doing the volunteer stuff because they feel 
very—for a variety of reasons. Some people felt very connected 
to Nicaragua, some people felt very connected to, um, to the 
project itself, or really wanting to give back, the level of 
motivation versus this kind of development, at this level, I don’t 
know what you’d even call it. You kind of get into more like—at 
times I’ve even wondered, here, people treat it like a business, 
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 See the discussion of monism and pluralism in Chapter 4. 
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kind of, in some ways. So it’s a different type—it’s your job, it’s a 
job, and that just changes the way you feel about it. And also I 
think the dynamics become very different within the 
organisation…  
Notions of “business” or “job” in relation to how staff approached their work 
were contrasted with those of “connection” and a deeper level of motivation. 
Through this discussion and the descriptions participants used to explain their 
relationships to others, the concept of “relationship base,” which ranged from 
personal to professional, was filled out through axial coding in three main 
properties (see Figure 6).  
The first property is the origin of the relationship, which was understood 
through the dimension of sharedness of goals and values. High sharedness of 
goals and values was found in relationships that were described as originating 
in personal relationships or shared experiences and beliefs. Relationships on 
the low end of range originated out of the recognition of mutual self-interest 
with another actor, or as a means for furthering the organisation’s ends. These 
were relationships in which an individual was likely to identify her experiences 
as her “job,” as opposed to her “personal connection” to a given issue or group.  
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Figure 6. Properties and dimensions of the category: Relationship Base 
 
  
Property     Dimension and dimensional range_______ 
  
             Personal  Professional 
 
 Relationship    high                 low  
      origin            Sharedness of goals and values 
 
 
 Proximity  deep           instrumental  
       Commitment 
 
   local      distant 
 
              Geography 
 
   
   shared              not shared 
      Culture 
 
  
Self-image  relational     skill 
           Basis of expertise 
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Proximity has three dimensions: commitment, geography, and culture. This 
means that NGO staff could feel close, or have high proximity, to another 
actor with respect to their commitment to one another, geographical location, 
and cultural membership. Closeness in terms of culture and geography were 
straight-forward dimensions through which participants explained their 
proximity to another actor. Individuals were from “UB (Ulaanbaatar, the 
capital)” versus “the countryside,” or “Mongolian” versus “foreigner/ex-pat.”  
Depth of commitment was another way in which participants conveyed their 
closeness to others. The difference between this dimension and the dimension 
of sharedness of goals and values is that the latter applies specifically to how 
the relationship originated, whereas proximity in terms of commitment was 
used to describe the current state of the relationship. NGOs could thus express 
disappointment in the trajectory of a given relationship that originated in a 
high degree of sharedness of goals and values but at present had devolved into 
a more distant relationship, with members viewing their commitments as 
supported only by instrumental reasoning. 
Finally, NGO staff understood these relationships through the construction of 
an image of themselves in the relationship. This self-image varied along the 
dimension of expertise, which ranged from relational (expertise dependent 
upon their relations with the other party) to skill (expertise dependent on the 
actor’s isolated abilities and background).  
Through these dimensions, we can identify two main types of relationship 
base: personal and professional. When an NGO casts its relationship with 
another agent as having a personal base, it views the relationship as 
originating in shared commitments or personal experiences and sustained 
through some form of proximity. Its self-image, as an expert, is centred on the 
degree of intimacy that the organisation enjoys with the other actor. 
Obligations grounded in personal relationship bases arise out of 
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considerations of loyalty, communitarian solidarity, and personal 
responsibility.  
An NGO views its relationship base with an agent as professional when it 
treats that relationship as a means to an end originating in mutual self interest 
or imposition from the other agent (such as a hostile government). Agreement 
on substantive values and ends is not assumed, and instead the relationship is 
one in which the NGO feels greater loyalty to the task at hand than to the 
other agents involved in its execution. Expertise in these relationships is 
conceived of as individually formed: the particular strengths and contributions 
of the organisation are defined in terms of its skill set or background, factors 
that are independent of its relationship with the other actor. When an NGO 
staffer considers her organisation’s relationship base to be professional, her 
organisational obligations to the other agent are grounded on a notion of 
contractual obligation or basic professional etiquette.  
As represented in Figure 6, the personal and professional types sit on opposite 
ends of a single scale. Actual relationship bases can therefore be personal or 
professional in matters of degree: the relationship frame is an ideal type, 
which NGO staff apply in varying extents to their interactions. Relationships 
are also malleable: events impacting a relationship can push it more towards 
the professional or personal end of the spectrum, as discussed below. 
6.2.4.2   The source of validation: consequences or process 
Consequences and process play a complex role in NGO staff’s perspectives on 
their own organisations. Participants identified the demonstration of “results” 
or “impact” and using “locally-driven,” “community-based” or “transparent” 
processes as sources of overall validation that were independent of the 
obligations they had towards others. At the same time, a focus on 
consequences or process also informed how NGO staff conceived of their 
obligations to other actors (see Figure 5).  
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If an NGO focuses on process in its relationship with an agent, this means that 
how the relationship develops or proceeds is the primary locus of value around 
which the relationship is oriented. In its relationship with the other actor, the 
NGO values the processes that allow the relationship to meet certain 
conditions deemed desirable by the NGO. Examples of sources of validation in 
process-focused relationships are: openness, power-sharing, and non-
interference.  
Consequence-focused relationships are those in which the NGO values the 
outcomes produced by a relationship with the other agent. In consequence-
focused relationships, the NGO aims to produce certain outcomes through the 
relationship, not achieve certain features or conditions within it. Examples of 
consequences are: project ownership by beneficiaries and the outputs and 
outcomes specified by a given project plan.  
6.2.4.3   Eight relationship frames 
Moving from these abstract distinctions, I now discuss the eight relationship 
frames that NGOs used to assess their validity and contextualise their 
obligations towards others. There are eight, rather than four, relationship 
frames because a different frame was applied based on whether the 
relationship was perceived to be positive or negative (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Relationship frames 
 
 
 
 
  
Personal Professional 
Process 
Consequences 
Engager / Rival 
Parental: nurturing/ 
frustrated 
Supporter / Imposer 
Promisor / Opportunist 
Relationships with 
other agents that 
reflect efficiency, 
results, 
sustainability 
Relationships with 
other agents that 
reflect proximity, 
shared values, 
representativeness  
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Personal base, process-focused 
Engager:  
In an engager relationship frame, the NGO has a positive relationship with 
another actor that is oriented around a method or way of working and is 
structured through shared commitment and close proximity. This frame is 
called “engager” because relationships that were personal and process-focused 
were described as relationships in which the NGO was “engaged” with a 
particular actor.  Management staff of the faith-based INGO, UFC, used this 
language to specifically distinguish their approach to beneficiaries from a top-
down approach focused only on ends:  
The emphasis is on building relationships with the community 
and assessing what are some of the needs, the issues, the 
problems within the community. So you’re using the 
relationships to make the assessment. So it is not a baseline 
measurement, or assessment—it is an assessment that comes 
out of my discussions with people in the community, or in the 
government, or informal leaders, such as a teacher, or leader of a 
church, or a temple. So, the whole emphasis is on building 
relationships and using relationships to understand what’s 
happening inside the community. Based on that we then create 
a design, a design for engagement.  
In these relationships of engagement, UFC staff aimed at creating “processes 
of transformation” that would “empower” both local staff and intended 
beneficiaries.  
Although engagement was highly valued by NGO staff, it did not always 
indicate a relationship that produced positive day-to-day experiences. Close 
proximity, a feature of an engager relationship (because it is on the personal 
end of the relationship base scale), indicated intimacy, which for some non-
Mongolian NGO staff was measured in terms of a beneficiary’s willingness to 
criticise them. For example, the Executive Director of LH identified the lack of 
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pleasantries between himself and herders as an indication that the 
relationship had been strengthened: 
And they’ve gotten, in a lot of ways—it’s, it’s funny, in some 
ways they’ve gotten harder with me and in some ways they’ve 
gotten easier. Harder—and I’ve even brought this topic up with 
lots of them. I said, ‘Why do you guys give me so much shit?’ 
And they go, ‘Because we know you’re going to come back. 
We’re beyond, like, formalities, and, you know, we’re beyond 
our best behaviour and pleasantries with you. You should take it 
as a compliment.’ And I’m like, ‘Well it sucks. [laughs] Can you 
stop?’ And, and people—outsiders have definitely noticed that 
too. They’re real with me. If they don’t’ like something they tell 
me. And the day they started telling me the things they didn’t 
like or ideas that I had they thought were dumb, was like, we 
had made a break-through, it was awesome. 
The break-down of civility in this relationship indicated to LH staff that there 
was increased honesty, and thus strengthened communication, through which 
they could gain a clearer understanding of the areas of agreement between 
themselves and the herders. In other words, there was engagement instead of 
formality or polite deference. This also increased their sense of relational 
expertise, as their relations with the herders became more “real” and thus 
authenticating. 
Rival:  
If the relationship turns negative, NGO staff may still read the relationship as a 
personal one, defined by certain shared commitments, thereby treating the 
other actor as more of a common rival than a partner. In the case of LH, this 
was the relationship frame that existed between different NGOs working with 
the same beneficiary group. A staff member of LH described this as similar to a 
dysfunctional family: 
And when we all sit around tables together, we’re all nice to 
each other. It’s really strange, it’s like a dysfunctional family. You 
know, when you’re with your family—you have a certain 
connection with your family that you don’t with anyone else, 
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and even if you hate them and you can’t get along with them, 
they’re your family. And there’s something that unifies everyone, 
a common experience, so when you’re with these people, it’s 
like, ‘oh man, he’s a pain in the butt’, but if there’s anyone else in 
the world that gets this, and can share sustained frustrations, it’s 
these people, and I feel sort of connected to them, and they’re 
involved, and they know the people I know, and, you 
know…when I tell my friends and family in the U.K. about it, 
they can’t put visualisations to the stories and can’t really make 
sense of things. And these people can, better than certainly a 
total outsider. 
Despite the competitive dynamic that prevailed over their interactions, the 
NGOs working in this region of Mongolia engaged with one another on a 
personal basis, due to the shared experiences that increased their proximity 
and united them as “insiders”, not “outsiders.” This rivalry was process-focused 
insofar as the organisations valued their position within comparative processes 
of validation and were engaged in an ongoing competition with respect to that 
validity. While the organisations could agree on a number of things regarding 
their aims for the beneficiary group they were working with, they competed 
for their comparative role in how these aims were achieved. 
 
Personal base, consequences-focused 
Nurturing parent:  
In some cases, attention within a personal base relationship shifted to 
consequences or outcomes over process: while there remained a high level of 
perceived proximity, the emphasis of the relationship was oriented around 
achieving certain results.  Attention to consequences over process correlated 
with an increase in the disparity of power between the NGO and the other 
actor. Since actors were focused on just “getting it done” or getting “results,” it 
was common for one actor to assume a more powerful role. Thus, while the 
same level of intimacy and closeness was present, one actor in the relationship 
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took on more of a patronising role, relating personally to the other agent but 
attempting to coax or lead them to a particular end result.  
This relationship frame was evocative of a nurturing parent, who relates 
personally and intimately to his child while attempting to instruct it so as to 
accomplish certain outcomes. The self-image of a nurturing parent was 
evident in a number of examples where INGO staff spoke of Mongolian 
counterparts or beneficiaries as being like “children” that they had to “parent” 
in order to reach a desired project goal. This was oftentimes raised in 
conjunction to the INGO staff’s discussion of the challenges they faced in 
making their development projects truly community-based and empowering.  
UFC, for example, underwent a major re-structuring of its programming in 
2007 as a response to their conclusion that their current approach to 
community-based development was not creating the kind of relationships that 
they had hoped for. UFC had attempted to initiate grassroots organisations in 
different aimags across Mongolia as a way of creating bottom-up channels for 
project initiation and implementation. But the relationships had been 
consequence-focused, centred around getting the UFC-created GROs to 
initiate a target number of activities. Because the relationship had not been 
process-focused, that is, because it did not attend enough to aspects of how 
the GROs were operating and interacting with UFC, this led to the perception 
that, while the GROs achieved outcomes, they were remaining dependent 
upon UFC: the GROs were therefore likened to children. 
So for us we basically created these GROs because it was what 
we were supposed to do. But they ended up being, I don’t know 
what’s the analogy…(laughs)..they’re like a baby, and UFC is the 
mother, and they’re dependent upon UFC. So we’ve just done an 
assessment—we have 14 currently—that was done by an external 
agency, using an appreciative inquiry approach: how do we get 
them from being a baby to not being dependent upon us. So, 
how do we support them to get them being grown up—how do 
we grow them up, so they can be completely independent, so 
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they’re not dependent on us, so they have the skills to get other 
funding to be, to be independent… 
Interestingly, UFC national staff reacted to resolve this problem by shifting to 
a focus on process, but did so via consultation with an external agency, rather 
than engaging more directly with members of the GROs.  
Frustrated parent:  
Within negative, personal base, consequence-focused relationship frames, one 
actor takes the form of a frustrated parental figure when it is perceived that 
desired outcomes are not materialising. Out of all the NGOs studied, the 
organisation that used professional base relationship frames most frequently 
was the INGO CC. The main exception to this amongst CC staff occurred in 
CC’s Civil Society Capacity Building (CSCB) programme. The Head of the 
CSCB programme at one point had to engage with Mongolian NGOs 
participating in the programme at a more personal level in order to mediate a 
conflict. Describing the experience, the Director said: 
The biggest headache right now is probably involving one of our 
networks in which there’s two factions in the network that don’t 
get along with each other, so we have to do a lot of babysitting 
and trying with great difficulty to explain that a network is not 
an organisation, these are not your co-workers, you don’t have 
to like each other. 
In this example, two different relationship frames push against one another. 
The Mongolian NGOs participating in the civil society network established by 
CC approached the network through an engager frame, which, upon the 
instigation of interpersonal conflicts, grew into a rival frame. The CC Director 
responsible for the project, who, as discussed below, otherwise operated with a 
Professional-base set of relationship frames, expressed frustration with the 
personalisation of the network’s operations and the more personal role of 
frustrated parent (“babysitter”) into which she was placed. She therefore 
sought to achieve certain consequences in her relationship with the 
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Mongolian NGOs: move them to a more professional relationship frame in 
order to alleviate the conflict. Mongolian NGOs were told they did not “have 
to like each other”, and were encouraged to view the network as a system 
created through mutual self-interest of Mongolian civil society actors rather 
than as an engagement based on shared values. 
Professional base, process-focused 
Supporter:  
Professional base, process-focused relationships that were positive operated as 
an interaction in which either the NGO or the other actor supported the other 
in order to improve a given process. NGOs using this supporter frame cast 
themselves more in terms of businesses hired by their donors to offer their 
expertise and counsel to the government and individual entrepreneurs of a 
developing country. For example, the Head of CC’s Mongolia office described 
their approach to programme design as one of selective engagement that 
attempted to support market-based growth without interfering with market 
forces in a way that would impede sustainability: 
I think that, ah, we our primary business is to sustain 
development. And we try the best we can to help people move 
along the path towards ah, being able to mobilize resources to 
meet their socio-economic needs and so forth through what we 
see as an approach that doesn’t interfere too much, if you like. 
The support is there if it needs support but it doesn’t disrupt the 
general flow of things. We don’t undercut the market by 
handing out shovels. If people want shovels, they can buy 
shovels, or we can help you find shovels or we can advise them 
on what kind of shovels they need to get, or how many shovels 
they should buy. But we won’t go buy them and hand them out. 
The obligation associated with this supporter relationship frame was one of 
non-interference. This is because the NGO’s view was that individuals were 
generally able to “meet their socio-economic needs,” and thus only required 
minimal interventions in order to do so. They therefore interpreted support as 
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providing only what was minimally necessary, without getting in the way of 
individuals’ attempts to meet their own needs.  
Imposer:  
Negative versions of this kind of relationship constituted an imposer frame, in 
which one agent’s procedures or consequence-related aims were pressed upon 
another, making the process an imposing one. This relationship was invoked 
when Mongolian NGO staff described the cumbersome and time-consuming 
donor-required reporting procedures that took up as much as 50% of their 
time and a significant portion of their resources. INGO staff also described the 
rising dominance of monitoring and evaluation practices within their 
organisation as “imposing” and top-down. Monitoring and evaluation tools 
such as the logical framework were perceived as professionalising project 
implementation in a way that stifled more personal relationship frames. This 
emerged, for example, when the Head of M&E at UFC described her attempts 
at trying to mitigate the imposer relationship between UFC International and 
local aimag-based staff: 
So, for me, ensuring that the daily processes are…that it’s 
something that is done in they come in an empowering way. 
Because a lot of it, because it comes from UFC International, we 
have all these standards and frameworks we have to apply, so it 
can be a very imposing format. You have to use this format. You 
have to use these methods. You have to do this, this, this, and 
this, and produce this report in a certain way. So it can be very 
imposing. So I think we have an ethical responsibility as our 
department, as, you know, management, from the national 
office, to make that process as empowering as it can be for the 
staff. 
Acting as an intermediary between UFC International and regional staff, the 
Head of M&E attempted to translate her professional base, process-focused 
relationship with UFC International into a personal base, process-focused 
relationship for her subordinates; she referred to this as her attempt to “make 
that process as empowering as it can be.” During a site visit to a regional office 
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that was observed for this study, she asked staff to first explain their draft 
logframes to her and directed discussions about indicators by asking how the 
staff wanted to monitor and evaluate the progress of their projects. While at 
times she took on a professional role, throughout the 2 day visit she 
continually engaged on a personal level with the regional staff, asking about 
their families and how the new logframes made them feel, commiserating with 
them on the artificiality of the logframe format, making jokes, etc. All of these 
strategies seemed aimed at converting the process she experienced through an 
imposer relationship frame with her superiors into one that was more personal 
and positive. 
Professional base, consequence-focused 
Promisor:  
Within professional base, consequence-focused relationship frames, 
obligations were perceived as based on a contract, or promise. NGO staff 
viewed their obligation with respect to the relationship upon which it was 
based to be fully satisfied so long as they had honoured the terms of the 
agreement. This is the primary relationship frame senior staff at CC used in 
describing their accountability obligations to donors and beneficiaries: 
So if we say we’ll give them a training workshop and a business, 
we’ll give them a training workshop and a business. We’re 
accountable in that sense. When we make promises, we come 
through on it.  
Because the relationship was professional, proximity in terms of culture, 
geography and shared commitment were low. Instead, NGO staff were 
connected to the project via the promise to produce certain outcomes. 
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Opportunist:  
Professional, consequence-focused relationships were construed as negative if 
one of the actors in the relationship became opportunistic, seeking to draw as 
many concessions or promises from the other as possible. 
A primary example of the opportunist relationship frame was found in the way 
NGO staff spoke of the accountability mechanisms in place between 
themselves and their donors. They saw their accountability to their donors as 
rooted in donors’ perceptions or mistrust of the NGO as opportunistic: the 
NGO would misdirect their funds unless the donor imposed tight oversight 
and controls over how these funds were used. 
A less expected relationship to which this frame was applied was between 
Mongolian NGOs and two other types of stakeholder: the Mongolian 
government, and their targeted beneficiaries. It would be reasonable to expect 
that the relationship between Mongolian NGOs and Mongolian beneficiaries 
to be closer, and thus more personal, than the relationships that INGOs had 
with their beneficiaries.  However, as mentioned in Section 2, Mongolia’s large 
land mass and nomadic history contribute to perceived divisions between 
those who live in Ulaanbaatar and those who live in the countryside, as well as 
divisions based on aimag. The Ulaanbaatar staff of AARW recognised this as a 
challenge, responded by engaging with local government officials—bagh-soum 
governors and Khururl officers—and attempting to form cooperative 
relationships. However, they found this to be relatively unsuccessful, as local 
government officials would engage with them only when they could receive 
direct benefits for themselves: 
R: If we go to the bagh-soums, we come from UB [Ulaanbaatar], 
so even though we make an effort and say to them ‘we know it’s 
a hard life for you’ the bagh-soum governors are people who live 
there, and they know their lives better and know better than us 
how to lift their lives. So we try to cooperate with the bagh-soum 
governors all the time, and they say they will cooperate but for 
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some reason, I don’t know why, but they do not cooperate; there 
is not enough cooperation happening.  
For example, take Bagan-Nuur. We started a project, and had a 
request from the local people to do some trainings, they heard 
about the business trainings and said, ‘we want to do some of 
these kinds of trainings.’ So we did some research and we went 
to Bagan-Nuur, but the Bagan-Nuur Khurul officers didn’t want 
to include the poor people in the training. They wanted to 
include only their families, so there’s a moral conflict there. In 
order to improve my job I’m interested in the research of my 
work. We need to learn how to cooperate, how to cooperate 
with local government. 
AARW attributed this consequence-focused attitude by government and rural 
Mongolians as a product of INGO activity that had conditioned people to 
think of their relationships to NGOs in terms of getting things for free: 
R: We are implementing projects where only the poorest women 
come. We can’t reach all the women in the soum, so we invited 
the poorest women, but it was ineffective, they didn’t come. The 
reason is that the women are not that interested in social life. 
They are not empowered. So if we can, we give them more 
information—too many NGOs are working for women, for 
children, for families, so maybe they just take the papers but 
don’t read them, maybe they can’t read. In some of the rural 
areas, too many NGOs have implemented too many projects, 
and the rural people mostly just want to take the things, free of 
charge, and not for anything, to increase their knowledge, or 
anything. 
I: How do you try to overcome that challenge? 
R: When we come to the site, all the people ask me, ‘what will 
you give us?’ So I answer, ‘I will give you ideas. I will give you 
information, and I will be training you, or your wife.’ 
While at times the Executive Director of AARW discussed these relationship 
problems in a more personal manner, reflecting more of a frustrated parent 
frame, overall these relationships fell under an opportunist relationship frame 
because of the more equitable power dynamic and because of the professional 
manner in which beneficiaries and government officials related to AARW. 
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Despite AARW’s attempt to relate more personally and to focus their 
relationships on processes instead of consequences, rural Mongolians and 
local government officials consistently responded with a professional-base, 
consequences-focused frame. When AARW did not deliver the desired goods, 
these stakeholders opportunistically refused AARW’s services. 
 
 
6.3   Two frameworks for the guidance of NGO obligation 
 
In the Interlude, four main obligations were identified in connection to the 
four causal capacities of NGOs. Given the fluid and varied nature of the 
contexts in which NGOs operate, an account of NGO obligation that attempts 
to articulate a single principle or formula for action will likely be too rigid and 
therefore unable to guide actual organisations. As a preliminary guide to the 
practical judgment of an NGO as a moral agent, I offer instead two 
frameworks: a power framework, to guide organisations in identifying which 
causal powers they exercise in their relationships with different parties, and a 
justificatory framework, which lists questions that an NGO can use to assess 
the degree to which it has justified its exercise of its moral powers. These are 
presented below in Tables 2 and 3. 
While there are significant problems with the logical framework approach to 
project planning and monitoring, I chose this as a model to build my power 
framework, so as to present it in a format familiar to most NGO practitioners. 
It does not, however, employ the problematic linear logic of traditional LFA 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The power framework provides a set of questions for NGOs to apply with 
respect to each of their relationships or interactions with others, in order to 
identify the moral powers and thus obligations relevant to that relationship. 
Once these are identified, guiding questions for each can be used to assist the 
NGO in its self-assessment.  
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Table 2: Power Assessment Framework 
 
Power 
assessment 
Donor Beneficiary 
group 1 
Beneficiary 
group 2 
Local gov. 
officials 
Other 
NGO 1 
Etc…. -->  
 
 
How do we 
interact 
with this 
actor? 
 
     
 
Aims of 
interaction: 
 
 
     
 
How do we 
affect the 
abilities of 
this actor? 
 
     
 
What norms 
or values 
underlie 
our 
interaction? 
 
     
 
What is this 
actor’s 
relationship 
to our use of 
material 
resources? 
     
 
What 
information 
do we 
convey to or 
about this 
actor? 
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Table 3: Self-assessment Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligation Guiding Questions/Indicators 
 
Accountability 
 
 Are there opportunities for parties 
to offer their appraisal of the 
organisation’s activities to project 
and executive staff? 
 
 Does the organisation provide 
justifications or responses to these 
appraisals? 
 
 Are there opportunities for the 
organisation to explain why it 
might view certain appraisals to be 
unmerited, and why (i.e. provide 
justification for why it might 
disregard certain appraisals)? 
 
 Does the organisation engage in its 
own regular assessments of how its 
activities affect the abilities of other 
parties to act and pursue their 
interests? 
 
 Are these assessments made 
publicly available, and if not, is 
there good reason to support why 
this is not the case? 
 
 Does the organisation have internal 
procedures of accountability that it 
makes public (e.g. Action Aid’s 
ALPS framework)? 
 
 Are there mechanisms for 
processing and responding to 
complaints, both internally and 
externally? 
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Obligation Guiding Questions/Indicators 
 
Demonstrating Positive Change 
 
 Has a causal model been identified 
during the initial stage of project 
planning? 
 
 Have the causal powers of the 
organisation’s activities been 
identified? That is, has the 
following question been answered: 
‘What will we do that will produce 
effect E?’ 
 
 Have indicators been identified for 
determining if/when the 
underlying assumptions of the 
causal model are no longer being 
met in the surrounding 
environment? 
 
 Have thick concepts been clearly 
defined, i.e. both in terms of what 
they describe (have they been 
operationalized) and their 
evaluative function (are they clearly 
linked to organisation’s justification 
of project) 
 
 Are there rules or procedures that 
tie resource allocation to the 
comparative strength of theories of 
change for different potential 
projects?  
 
 Are project/programme 
frameworks and their underlying 
causal models publicly available? 
 
 If they are not publicly available, 
are they at least available to all 
those who donate time or money to 
the organisation? 
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  Obligation Guiding Questions/Indicators 
 
Demonstrating Positive Change 
(ctd.) 
 
 
 
 Are there procedures in place for 
adjusting project frameworks in 
response to changes or new 
challenges? 
 
 Is the positive change aimed for 
coherent with norms shareable by 
those affected by the change? 
 
 
Maintaining normative consistency 
 
 
 
 Are organisational norms clearly 
defined and connected through an 
explanation, framework, theory or 
argument? 
 
 Is the normative function of each 
concept and principle clearly 
identified and translatable to 
different interactional contexts? 
 
 Have certain values or principles 
been identified as ‘non-negotiable’ 
or deontic, i.e. the organisation is 
unwilling to compromise on these 
or include them in trade-offs with 
other ends? If so, have justifications 
for this position been tied to the 
basis for the organisation’s 
existence or agency? 
 
 Does the organisation provide 
public information regarding the 
different actors with whom it 
interacts on an annual basis? 
 
 
 
 Is there a clear, public policy 
regarding what stakeholders the 
organisation will or will not 
collaborate with, and why? 
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Obligation Guiding Questions/Indicators 
  
Epistemic virtue  
 Does the organisation have clear 
standards of credibility that it can 
use to assess its claims? 
 
 Is information articulated clearly to 
others? 
 
 Is there evidence that can be 
presented to support each claim? 
 
 Is that evidence publicly available 
or, if not, is there an explanation 
for why it is not? 
 
 Is there a ‘devil’s advocate’: a 
person whose role is to challenge 
and test organisational knowledge 
and factual claims? 
 
 Are there organisational learning 
procedures that facilitate ‘double 
loop’ learning? 
 
 Are there clear means by which 
outside parties can introduce new 
information or evidence for 
consideration by the organisation? 
 
 Does the organisation have a clear 
procedure for verifying information 
it conveys about another actor to 
different audiences? 
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Concluding Remarks:  
Framing relationships for validity and NGOs as norm-enacting 
agents 
Relationship frames emerged as a core category in this study because an 
NGO’s relationships—and the obligations that they grounded within them—
were a primary source of both validation and conflict. This observation 
contributed largely to the view offered in this thesis, beginning in Chapter 1, 
that NGO moral agency is characterised primarily by such organisations’ 
reliance on multiple types of collaborative activities with others. 
With this in mind, the above frameworks attempt to provide an initial guide to 
organisations for navigating these relationships in a way that helps to clarify 
which demands ought to function as sources of obligation and which can be 
dismissed as unreasonable requests by other parties. In what remains, I shall 
conclude with some comments on the connection between validation, 
relationship frames, and the account of NGO moral agency argued for in this 
thesis. 
NGO staff in this study understood their obligations as based on the kind of 
relationship they had with others. However, they also sought to meet a more 
objective standard of validation. In this way, NGO staff in Mongolia sought to 
get things right: that is, they engaged in a holistic self-assessment that took 
stock of the variety of relationships in which they were involved, the quality of 
the demands and expectations that others placed on them in those 
relationships, and the degree to which they were able to meet their 
responsibilities overall as an organisational agent. 
As mentioned above, NGO staff used a number of “thick concepts”—concepts 
that were both descriptive and evaluative—in describing their work and their 
relationships. In cases where relationships turned negative, this could be 
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partly explained by the fact that the norms the NGO was enacting—as 
indicated by the evaluative concepts it employed—were in tension with the 
orientation of the relationship. For instance, in the scenario described under 
the imposer relationship frame, the top-down planning and monitoring 
relationship between herself and her superiors was framed negatively by the 
UFC M&E staffer, as she experienced tension between this approach to 
planning and monitoring and the grassroots-prioritising norm that UFC was 
attempting to enact. In other circumstances, NGO staff discussed difficulties 
with defining key normative concepts such as sustainability, community-
based, and empowerment in a way that was conducive to guiding their 
relationships and activities.   
This study’s identification of relationship frames as a way of achieving 
organisational validity complements two main themes within qualitative 
research on NGOs working in developing countries. The first is that NGO 
activity is frequently dominated by a particular discourse, or “NGO-speak”679: 
INGOs utilise certain vocabularies to entice funding from donors, in turn 
pressuring local NGOs to use the same terms and concepts to frame their own 
work. This was evident amongst Mongolian NGOs that had participated in 
“civil society capacity building” projects operated by INGOs. When discussing 
how they thought of the function of an NGO in Mongolian society, Mongolian 
NGO staff referred to the concepts and ideas of INGOs as though they were 
official policies or hard facts. 
A second theme, reiterated throughout this thesis and in this study, was the 
impact of the broader system of actors on what an NGO is able to be and to 
do. NGO activity within Mongolia was shaped by constructions of NGO 
agency created by international donors and Mongolians, as well as by many 
NGOs of one another. NGOs were affected by the definitions and roles placed 
                                                 
679
 See ff. 17. 
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upon them by others, and sought to affect the abilities of other actors by the 
same means, using thick concepts to express and justify these roles.  
Insofar as an NGO’s relationships with others were impacted by evaluative 
concepts, directing greater attention to the nature of their organisation’s work 
as a norm-enacting agent could assist NGO staff in clarifying what they are 
doing, on what basis it is justified, and in what way this activity obligates them 
to act towards others. The four obligations identified in this thesis can thus be 
read as an initial step in this direction. Engaging in moral appraisal 
accountability allows NGO staff to discuss with other actors the justifiability of 
their activities, and identify possible disagreements or disparities regarding 
the way in which key evaluative concepts are defined by different actors. 
Assessing activities and relationships with an eye to maintaining consistency 
with organisational norms can help identify the source of tension in negative 
relationship frames. This tension can then possibly be resolved by reference to 
a rigorous and detailed theory of change that connects the NGO’s norms to a 
set of empirical goals, and explains the causal pathways needed to meet those 
goals. For example, in the imposer frame experienced by the UFC staffer, the 
top-down approach to planning and monitoring could be assessed with 
respect to whether it causally contributes to UFC’s broader goals of 
community-based, child-focused positive change. Finally, attention to honesty 
and accuracy of information requires NGO staff to reflect on the veracity of 
the claims they make, including those they make to donors and local 
associations about the cultural and institutional context in which they operate.  
Regardless of how they framed their relationships or assessed their own 
validity, NGO staff in Mongolia took their work seriously and wanted to get 
things right. The obligations outlined here bring these two concerns together: 
by identifying what obligations are entailed by an NGO taking itself seriously 
as a moral agent, the above frameworks aim to provide some initial guidance 
for getting things right.  
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Case studies 
 
Mongolian NGO: Association for the Advancement of Rural Women 
Interviews Dates 
Executive Director 
Regional Project Leader 
26 Feb, 3 March, 22 Aug 
3 March 
Site visits Dates 
 
Accompanied Executive Director on 
visit to observe projects at a regional 
office. 
 
22-27 March 
 
 
 
INGO 1: Collective Compassion 
Interviews Dates 
Executive Director 27 March, 4 April, 26 Aug 
Head of Nomadic Livelihood 
Improvement Program 
18 March 
Head of Civil Society Capacity 
Building (CSCB) Project 
14 April 
Project Leader, Nomadic Livelihood 
Improvement Program 
18 March 
Site visits Dates 
 
Accompanied Head of CSCB on visit 
to regional office in Dundgobi 
province 
 
22-25 May 
 
 
INGO 2: United for Children 
Interviews Dates 
Vice Director (position 2 in 
organisation) 
3 April 
Head of Child Sponsorship 3 April 
Head of M&E 31 July 
Head of one of 32 regional offices 
 
22 July 
Site visits Dates 
 
Accompanied Head of M&E to 
 
15-16 July 
347 
 
regional office visit, Hovd province 
 
Foreign NGO: Local Horizons 
Interviews Dates 
Executive Director 
 
8 Feb, 27 Feb, 8 March, 10 June, 16 
Aug 
Site visits Dates 
 
Accompanied Head of CSCB on visit 
to regional office 
 
7-15 March 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Interviews 
NGOs: 
Type//main area of work 
 
Position of person(s) 
interviewed 
 
Date(s) 
 
Mongolian//democracy-
promoting, civil liberties 
 
President 
 
1 Feb; 11 Aug  
 
Mongolian//freedom of the 
press, civil liberties (GI) 
 
 
Executive Director 
 
7 Feb  
Mongolian//gender equality, 
human trafficking prevention 
 
Executive Director 15 Aug  
 
Mongolian// legal aid President 9 March 
 
Mongolian// youth 
organisation 
 
Coordinator 9 March 
Mongolian// environmental PRA leader 2 July 
 
Mongolian// anti-mining, 
environmental 
 
President 10 July 
Mongolian//rural women’s 
aid association 
 
Secretary 9 March 
International, faith-based// 
development and relief 
Country Director; 
Project Manager for 
Cooperative 
14 Jan; 21 Feb 
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Development Project 
   
Donor organisations/IGOs Position of person(s) 
interviewed 
Date(s) 
 
The Asia Foundation 
 
 
Executive Director 
 
29 Feb; 27 
March 
 
Asian Development Bank 
 
Procurement Officer 20 June 
USAID/MCC Director of Civil 
Society Relations 
 
5 September 
World Bank Country Head; Head 
of Civil Society 
Relations 
26 June; 26 June 
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